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# **The Evolution of Citizenship Education in Nation-Building in Singapore and Hong Kong**

**Submitted By  
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**Supervisor: Professor Michael Byram**

**2006**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **The Evolution of Citizenship Education in Nation-Building in Singapore and Hong Kong**

Citizenship Education is a highly political agenda for politicians and governments, especially those of the emerging nations studied in transitology. Political circumstances that surround the birth of a nation are inextricably tied up with the unique economic, social and even globalisation contexts that shape the formation of that particular nation. Citizenship education mirrors the political climate of such circumstances.

A ruling government's policies and ideologies are often transmitted to the masses through education in the form of citizenship education in its evolving forms that take after the political orientations of the nation. A historical-comparative study of Singapore and Hong Kong is the focus of the thesis and a combined case in point.

This historical-comparative approach presents a chronological and qualitative analysis of Singapore and Hong Kong that links the past to the present, and points to future direction on how citizenship education has transformed in its focus, dimensions, content, message and values.

Theories of nationalism, nation-state and national identity provide a basis for the understanding of the political, economic and social factors that impact nation-building and the subsequent evolvement of Civic and Moral Education in Singapore and Hong Kong after independence.

In an analysis of the content-domain of citizenship education, Singapore's curriculum is shown to reflect the ruling party's ideologies infused through National Education, where the *Singapore Story* is sacrosanct and has to be mastered by all students so that the continual survival instinct is preserved at all times.

Hong Kong covers more breadth with a curriculum that includes the history of China that can be taught critically and a Chinese cultural heritage element that is infused into all the Key Learning subjects. The Life Event Approach is also more practical and relevant to the students' appreciation of the more individual-growth values learnt.

Singapore is identified as an Objective/Globalised nation-state with a parallel Objective/Globalised National Identity that has a predominantly strong political leadership and economic priority in its nation-building foundation. It recognizes the need to rise up to the global challenges ahead.

Hong Kong has a combination of Objective/Subjective/Globalised region-state with a parallel Objective/Subjective/Globalised National Identity with China due to its cultural heritage component inherited from China and also the need to meet global challenges.

The thesis demonstrates how education can be used as a channel to serve the ideologies of the politicians who have a direct stake in shaping the focus of the political content in citizenship education in building national identity. It also illustrates how the respective political circumstances, economic reasons, social contexts and globalisation challenges drive the evolvement of the citizenship education in both Singapore and Hong Kong.

**TITLE: THE EVOLUTION OF CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN NATION-BUILDING IN SINGAPORE AND HONG KONG**

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## **Chapter 1 THE RESEARCH STUDY**

### **1.1 Introduction**

The central argument of this thesis will be that citizenship education is a part of a political agenda decided upon by the various political leaders governing countries. Economic stakes and social factors are also important aspects that contribute to the decisions made in determining the content of citizenship education. This argument will be illustrated in a case study of Singapore and Hong Kong by examining the political circumstances that surround the birth/political transition of a nation with the ensuing respective economic, social and globalisation contexts that shape the political ideologies of both Singapore and Hong Kong. These ideologies are then translated into the various forms of citizenship education that have evolved historically. This study is done by a comparative-historical analysis of the political transitional periods of 1960-2005 for Singapore and 1997-2005 for Hong Kong, drawing on official primary and secondary political, academic and media documents from both Singapore and Hong Kong.

### **1.2 Factors in the Evolution of Citizenship Education**

In explaining why citizenship education is the newest addition to the national curriculum in the United Kingdom, Gearon (2003) noted that the number of formal democracies has increased significantly in the world. World events like the fall of the Berlin Wall, democratization of former communist states in East Europe, ending of apartheid in South Africa contribute to political circumstances



that give birth to new nation-states. Notions of citizenship and citizenship education, whether defined solely in terms of national identity or fundamental freedoms, have been augmented to address concerns of political apathy and lack of engagement in civil society. As debates about citizenship education in schools are a microcosm of broader debates about citizenship in society, national policy statements and curriculum documents are useful starting points for considering what citizenship education is about.

Ichilov (1998) observed that in recent years, paramount political, economic, technological and cultural changes have taken place all over the world, resulting in the transformation of meanings of citizenship and citizenship education. Citizenship education mirrors the political, economic, social and cultural changes within any given society. This trend is evident in many countries both in the West and East. For example, understanding American democracy in citizenship education in the United States entails an appreciation of the economic, political and social concerns identified. Even in Latin America, redemocratisation in the early eighties was affected by the prevailing economic, political and cultural factors and its educational system reflected the political culture. (Braungart et al, 1998).

In the case of Britain too it can be argued that there is a response to economic factors faced with challenges of globalization of the economy and British political leaders have shown more interest in producing workers for the economy than



citizens for the polity. More interest has been shown in moral education than citizenship education that has been given low status and is marginalized (Lister, 1998).

A different kind of example is afforded by the European Union because it is not a single state, but here too we can see that citizenship education is a response to changing economic, political and social factors. The political global complexity of European citizenship was established after the European Union was formed in 1993. With the dissolution of national borders and creation of a supra-national citizenship, a citizen from one country in European Union is at the same time a European citizen. It makes the education for European citizenship more complicated as political developments in European history will have to be considered and a range of political, economic and social issues explored (Osler, 1995).

Turning to developments in East Asia, in Asia-Pacific, educational decisions are also a reflection of deeply embedded political, economic and cultural factors that are unique to a particular society. Print and Smith (2001) contend that Asian countries are experiencing a revival in civic education to address problems of national identity, citizenship, democracy and civil society. Cogan et al (2002) define civic education in the broadest sense as the formation through the process of schooling of the knowledge, skills, values and dispositions of citizens. It encompasses associated terms like civics, values education, political education

and citizenship education. They then argue that the phenomenon of newly created democratic societies have created a plethora of policies and statements of curriculum goals for civic education across Asia-Pacific. This explanation echoes Gearon's (2003) sentiments about the political cause of the surge of citizenship education in the West and thus both scholars use the term citizenship education and civic education interchangeably. The researcher will use the umbrella term citizenship education to include civic education and social studies.

Further examples are to be found in East Asia too. The content of civic education in Japan reflects the political stance of the politicians. Students learn in Japan about the politics, economics and the workings of society in the local and international affairs. Schooling in civic education in Hong Kong, Thailand and Taiwan has been affected by major education reforms, initiated in response to important political and social changes in societies. Especially for Hong Kong, since the return of sovereignty to mainland China in 1997, the once highly depoliticised subject of civic education has been reintroduced as an optimal subject to foster closer identity with the People's Republic of China (Cogan et al, 2002).

### **1.3 Citizenship Education in New Nations and Decolonisation**

When a new nation is born into independence after a colonized past, the ruling political party would want to translate its national politics and ideologies into visions and values for the country through the public medium of the schools.

Government policies are translated mainly through education in the form of citizenship education in its various evolving forms as dictated by the political and economic circumstances. Singapore is a case in point.

Though Singapore suffered the dubious distinction of the birth of a new nation-state by being ejected from Malaysia in 1965, the challenge of nation-building has been largely credited to the rather unique monopoly of a strong People's Action Party (PAP) government in attending to the economic needs and political stability of the country. Given its rather short history of independence, the autocratic rule of the PAP seemed to be serving Singapore well economically and politically.

Civic education was seen as an essential element in nation building in schools to build a sense of nationhood and nurture students in values of responsible citizenship. The programme has evolved to the present form of National Education to meet the perceived needs of the nation as envisioned by the political leaders.

In the process of decolonisation, education performs the significant role of nation-building and national integration for newly born nation-states. For these new nation-states, building up national unity and a new political order becomes a pressing need. Political education through citizenship education is often used to cultivate a sense of national identity and loyalty (Tse, 1999).

#### **1.4 Transitology**

Studies of political transition have become a domain of study in its own right under the term “transitology”. Although this term emerged with reference to the political, economic and cultural problems of Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s, it extended to analyses of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Cowen, 1996).

Bray et al (1997) extend the application of “transitology” to include studies in Asia and other parts of the world. However Hong Kong is noted to be different from other colonial transitions in that Hong Kong’s change is not to sovereign independence but a reunification with its motherland China.

The researcher would also like to position her work under the classification of “transitology” insofar as Hong Kong and Singapore are concerned. Both countries were once British colonies but took different interesting routes in their nation-building paths. Hong Kong was given assurances by the People’s Republic of China that it will pledge 50 years of a high degree of autonomy until 2047 and exists under a “one country, two systems” rule while still maintaining its own identity. Singapore as a new reluctant nation had to face immediate socio-economic and political challenges in 1965.

The political and economic circumstances of Singapore during independence necessitated the emphasis of citizenship education to protect the young state and strengthen it to withstand challenges (Gopinathan, 1999).

Hong Kong's unique form of "transitology" to its political reunification with China in 1997 brought about a promotion of civic education to develop the social, political and civic awareness among young people, with Guidelines on Civic Education introduced in 1985 and revised in 1996 by the Education and Manpower Branch.

The two locations thus have some history in common but also significant differences in the transition, one to statehood and the other to a unique position which is neither statehood nor integration. In the following text, for the sake of simplicity, the researcher will however refer to both as independent "states" unless it is important to draw attention to the specific character of Hong Kong, then she will refer to Hong Kong as a society.

### **1.5 Purposes and Methods of This Study**

Given the importance of the argument that citizenship education is used to foster new national identities of new nation-states, especially for decolonised states, the researcher has deemed it worthwhile to examine through a historical comparative analysis, the political and economic factors that shape the changes in the nation and citizenship education field in Hong Kong and Singapore. The analysis will

show if and how both states/societies have tried to use politicized citizenship education to build national identity.

Economically and politically as new states, Singapore and Hong Kong have parallel similarities and also marked differences in their chronological developments. Citizenship education in both countries is organic, evolving and has been influenced by the political, economic and social status of the decolonised nations as they seek to build their own identities within the confines of their respective unique political parameters.

The purpose of this thesis will be to analyse if and to what extent the assertion that citizenship education is part of a political agenda and part of the transition of decolonised societies can be supported from historical and comparative analysis.

There are however limitations to the analysis as the primary sources of curriculum documents and national policy statements are sifted from what is released and made available to the public. Furthermore the effects and impact of citizenship education in both countries are not considered as only the scope of coverage as outlined in the syllabi is examined.

Nonetheless the researcher posits that fresh and authentic insights can be gleaned from this thesis as existing literature has not adequately covered such a holistic chronological view of political and economic factors; and the use of

citizenship education to build national identity, especially in Singapore. For Hong Kong, the chronological evolvement of Civics education as a result of political transition in 1997 has drawn scholars to examine how citizenship education has been approached to promote a sense of national identity and political participation (Morris et al, 2002; Tse 1999; Sum, 2000; Bray et al, 1997; Leung et al, 2000).

Bray et al (1997) observed that a huge literature exists on education and political transition for Hong Kong. Thomas (2002) refers to it as “symbiotic linking” in which political changes cause educational changes and also the ways in which educational changes cause political changes.

Literature on comparative education produced in Hong Kong has been described as fertile; and it is concentrated upon ties between education and economic development and/or education and political transition incorporating a historical perspective (Sweeting, 1999).

However the comparative studies done on Hong Kong and Singapore focus on education and colonial transition (Tan, 1997); hegemonies compared (Wong, 2002); and the globalization impact of higher education (Lee, 2003).

No attempt has been made to further examine the chronological political and economic factors that impact the role of citizenship education in building

national identity in the post-colonial years for Singapore and Hong Kong. The researcher is convinced that such an attempt, even with its limitations, can shed light and bring fresh perspectives to the academic field of comparative studies

## **1.6 Organization of the Study**

In order to address the research questions, the study consisted of a number of phases. The first phase defines the research study and research methodology that justifies the historical-comparative approach. The second phase analyzes literature on nationalism that provides a basis for examining factors affecting nation-building in Singapore and Hong Kong. The third phase looks at citizenship education and examines how citizenship education contributes to nation-building at both the macro and micro levels in Singapore and Hong Kong. Writing up the thesis occurred across all stages.

The thesis consists of nine chapters that spans the three phases. Chapters One and Two comprise the first phase. Chapter One is this introductory chapter that gives background information relating to the focus and purposes of this study. Chapter Two comprises the research methodology. It discusses the historical-comparative approach and analyzes the data gathering and methodology of analysis from chapters 3 to 8.

Chapters Three to Five comprise of the second phase. Chapter Three consists of a literature analysis of theories of nationalism, nation-state and national identity;



which provides a basis for analyzing national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong. Chapters Four and Five provide a macro explanation at the political, economic and social levels of how Singapore and Hong Kong had different national identity categories.

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight comprise of the third phase which examine how citizenship education can contribute to nation-building. Chapter Six discusses the relationship of citizenship education to the creation of national identity and the support for the nation-state. The theory of and application of citizenship education is applied to Singapore and Hong Kong. Chapter Seven examines how citizenship education contributes to building national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong. Chapter Eight analyses the scope of citizenship education curriculum in Singapore and Hong Kong in nation-building.

Finally, Chapter Nine outlines the study's conclusions and makes recommendations for further research. A list of references of primary and secondary sources; relevant appendices and a list of tables complete the thesis.

## **Chapter 2 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **2.1 Methodology and Data**

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for the thesis that provides the basis for links with chapters 3 to 9. It discusses the historical-comparative approach and examines the data gathering and methodology of analysis for chapters 3 to 8.

### **2.2 The Historical-Comparative Approach**

#### **2.2.1 The Historical Approach**

Warren (1998) highlights the value of history in meeting a basic psychological and social need in providing a sense of rootedness to help us cope with the changing world and argues that history is a shaper of national identity. We are a product of our past.

Gilderhus (2003) further supports the view that identifies knowledge of history with civic-mindedness and public responsibility. The validity of this claim can be appreciated in the conventional modern definition of history by contemporary American historian Paul Conkin (1971) who succinctly describes history as a true story about the human past.

Traditionally historians hold the view that history writing reveals the truth about a real past. However, the debate between Cambridge historians E.H. Carr and

Geoffrey Elton in the 1960s represent the radical and conservative historical approaches (Fulbrook, 2002).

Essentially they reflect differences between the empiricists (e.g. Elton) who believe that history writing is an honest attempt to find out what really happened through scouring over evidence from the archives and interpreting it with a critical eye to reconstruct a fuller picture of the past; and the post-modernists who question what constitutes a historical "fact" and how it is sifted from the past to weave into an accepted story in the present. Post-modernists have issues with the objectivity of history writing as the influence of bias, prejudice, self-interest and personal preference of the historian often distort the wholeness of the truth recorded and thus meaningful historical truths cannot be ascertained as there are a number of possible views presented (Gilderhus, 2003).

Despite the "paranoid fears" of Carr in re-asserting the primacy of political history to negate the worthiness of history writing in helping us to understand the present, much history in past decades had been written in the Elton way, grounded in the archives, and empiricist in its academic stance (Cannadine, (ed.) 2002).

The researcher will also adopt the empiricist's Elton way in presenting a historical approach. In gathering evidence, a collection of primary sources of documents are crucial in helping to establish the facts, the connecting process of

understanding the facts and judgment in drawing conclusions about the issues at hand. This method is constrained by problems of availability of documents. Researchers have been frustrated in their attempts when faced with lack of resources (Stanford, 1986).

One of the limitations of this study are the above-mentioned constraints of primary documents available. Attempts have been made to uncover as many documents as possible within the researcher's confine of time, space and finances afforded. The researcher could not afford to go to Hong Kong to retrieve some important documents not available in Singapore and was fortunate to have liaised with a lecturer in Hong Kong who obliged in sending relevant documents. Most of the primary sources of information are obtained from the government websites and in the libraries.

Primary sources in history writing are by definition the sources closest to the events and people whose stories researchers seek to tell. While good history is built on primary sources, secondary sources of documents are also essential to a historical approach (Marius et al, 2002). Both primary and secondary sources of information are used.

### **2.2.2 The Comparative Approach**

The generic heading of *comparative education* carries with it different labels in different institutions. Its most common designations are *comparative studies in*

*education and development education: comparative and international education: and comparative and international research in education* (Mazurek et al, 2000, Arnove and Torres, 1999).

In our world that is becoming more increasingly interdependent, it is imperative that the same educational problems faced in for example North America can also be better understood by how the Japanese, Hungarian, South African or Chilean attempt to solve these problems. Their perspectives provide valuable insight in understanding educational issues. (Daun, 2002).

So the issue of comparison is not one of finding out the better or best solutions. Rather it is comparison as juxtaposition which enables one to see alternative perspectives and to take note of issues in one's education system which would otherwise go unnoticed because they are taken for granted and remain unquestioned.

Broadfoot (1977) and Parkyn (1977) assert that comparative education is a field, not a discipline. As an interdisciplinary field, comparative education draws upon varied disciplines (e.g. economics, political science, sociology, psychology) to better examine the complexity of education issues in both developing and developed countries.

It is argued that the interdisciplinary nature of comparative education heightens our capacity to think (Eckstein, 1983). Particular theories or models are put forth to explain educational phenomena and encourage interdisciplinary critique (Klein, 1990, 1996). In addition, it has practical usefulness in informing educators and policy makers on what issues are of primary importance and factors considered to improve educational practice (Epstein, 1983).

Due to its eclectic interdisciplinary nature, there are virtually as many approaches as there are practitioners of comparative education (Beauchamp, 2003).

In fact, comparative education is not only beneficial to scholars and policy makers but also to teachers themselves. Gutek (1993) argues that teachers function in two dimensions – both as citizens of nation-states and a global society that transcends national boundaries.

As a result, teachers cannot afford to look only at their own cultural setting but will need to examine international settings for a more comprehensive educational outlook.

Thus, Comparative Education has been defined as the analysis of education systems in their historical, economic, social and cultural contexts. It has pedagogical and research purposes.

The researcher has adopted a historical-comparative approach to the topic on citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong.

#### **2.2.2.1 The History of Comparative Education**

A paradoxical effect of internationalization and globalization is that in order to resist the effects of these phenomena, politicians try to enforce the institutions of individual states. Education systems which are political in agenda, often play an important role in this process. Yet globalization also necessitates that exchange of ideas that appear sound in one context is borrowed into another. Experts are invited and education ministries also send out their officials to other countries to learn what can be applied. This phenomenon is not new. The genesis of Comparative Education can be traced to the early nineteenth century when specialists in education brought home information of other ways of educating than those established in their countries. During colonization, "systems of education from colonizing powers were also imposed on the colonies". (University of Durham, Byram, 1999).

Kubow and Fossum (2003) outlined three stages of the historical development of comparative education with each stage driven by a different motive of its study. The first stage has been called "the period of travelers' tales" (Noah and Eckstein, 1998) where explorations to different parts of the world take place, spurred on by curiosity and interest in the unknown.

The second stage began in the nineteenth century. Educational borrowing was the prime feature of comparative education (Guteck, 1993; Noah and Eckstein, 1998). Educators and politicians examined educational systems in other countries in an effort to identify what techniques and practices might be useful in their own countries. At this stage, comparative education literature was still descriptive, especially the work of Horace Mann who felt that important features of the Prussian system might be useful for the American education (Kubow and Fossum, 2003).

The third stage of comparative education arose with the 20<sup>th</sup> century developments with the recent transitional period of international cooperation when comparative education is perceived as contributing to international peace and understanding (Arnove and Torres, 1999).

The post-World War 1 and World War 2 era saw a need for education to serve national economic and political development. Isaac Kandel highlighted the political dimension and its impact on education. Neocolonial linkages from colonizers in recent years raise issues regarding educational policies and practices particular to developed nations for those countries that have received independence (Kubow and Fossum, 2003).

Marc-Antoine Julien de Paris foreshadowed a trend toward systematic and scientific methods in comparative education with his pragmatic work on



educational borrowing though there were serious sociocultural limitations. Noah and Eckstein (1998) asserted that comparative education in the 20<sup>th</sup> century attempted to distinguish the driving forces that shape foreign education and employ quantitative methods to explain education-society relationships. Their study of comparative education was restricted mainly to scientific comparisons between Western countries.

It was viewed that the scientific method would increase comparative education's credibility as a field among social scientists. Brian Holmes conducted a detailed definition of his problem approach, stating the key point in his technical specification of what counts as "a problem". His work is very quantitative and positivist. (Alexander et al, 1999).

On the other hand, King (1968) proposed a "forward-looking comparative research", recognizing schools as social organisms with human and socio-cultural element that often defies predictability.

#### **2.2.2.2 Comparative Education in the Globalisation Era**

There have been sweeping changes in the state, education and theories following World War Two. Theories of education come under the umbrella of social theories that are embedded in modern Northern philosophy. The human capital theory, rational/public choice theory and organizational theory provided theoretical foundations for educational restructuring. De-institutionalist theories

likewise contributed to legitimate depreciation of the state, neo-Marxist and some branches of post-modernist analysis legitimize the platform to criticize educational restructuring. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the nation-state as the primary unit for social analysis and educational policies had been questioned or rejected. (Daun, 2002).

This challenge was brought about by globalization processes and ideological shifts in educational paradigms. Scrase (2002) describes globalization as a world-wide phenomenon, with dimensions felt at national, regional, local and individual levels. The processes of globalization may be viewed as an economic, political and cultural phenomenon (Water 1995).

Bray (2003) noted that the 1990s witnessed the growth and spread of comparative and international education from both the historical and sociological perspectives. The operational definition of international education is the application of descriptions, analyses and insights learned in one or more nations to the problems of developing educational systems and institutions in other countries (Wilson, 2000). Increasing global presence of comparative and international education and educators will give rise to insights and practical findings. Epstein (1994) also observed that international educators use findings derived from comparative education to better understand the processes they examine and enhance their ability to make policy. What appears to be the dividing line between international and comparative education is the distinction

between researchers (either descriptive or analytic) and practitioners directly linked with policy and practice (Wilson, 1994).

Arnove and Torres, (1999) postulated that it had been argued that just as postmodernism was the concept of the 1980s, globalization may be the concept of the 1990s, a key concept to help us with the transition into the third millennium. Globalization has a history linked to the mid-twentieth century, overlapping postindustrialization, postmodernization, post-Fordism and the information society. It is defined as "a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding" (Waters, 1995).

A worldwide economic restructuring involving the globalization of economies, science, technology and culture as well as profound changes in the international division of labour has resulted in the birth of economic globalization (Arnove and Torres, 1999).

Taylor et al (1997) observed that by the 1990s, globalization was placing the notion of the state under pressure. Pannu (1996) argued that globalization along with the market ideology have challenged the hegemony of the state, giving rise to a new hegemonic status.

Since globalization has implications for the nation-state, factors affecting globalization need to be incorporated into any policy analysis of national developments (Taylor et al, 1997).

As a result of globalization, the role between the nation-states/governments and education institutions have evolved and become elusive (Lee, 2003).

Castells (1999) states that globalization and liberalization do not remove the nation-state, but that these processes have transformed its role and affected its operation. This argument is supported by researchers who affirm that the state remains strong instead of being disabled and hollowed out by globalization (Gopinathan, 1997; Green, 1997; Lee 2003).

With accelerating globalization in the international scene, national societies are being transformed and their educational systems have to adapt to changes in the market and civil spheres. Educational restructuring is driven by response for global competitiveness and post-modernist demands for local decision-making and autonomy. Educational theories are undergoing a process of differentiation, convergence and widening of scope. A spectrum of different theories and methods are used for different types of research. Yet there is convergence in increasing consensus on the research methodology. Large scale quantitative oriented studies are combined with small scale case studies. Case studies and qualitative methods are largely employed more than before. The scope of

educational studies has also enlarged in territories to include global or international aspects (Daun, 2002).

On the other hand, Crossley (2000) decries the current press for more useful and accessible studies that are relevant to the needs of policy-makers. Decision makers for education are pressured to seek more visible returns from research, and better value for money as budgets tighten and accountability is emphasized. This focus on cumulative policy-oriented research is largely quantitative and positivistic in paradigm. It is carried out at the expense of alternative perspectives and has real limitations.

Thus it can be argued that the study of comparative education is a progression from accurate description to analysis and from that to the forming of generalizations (Corner et al, 2004) about the different settings of educational systems in the international arena; although the methods for achieving these aims differ widely in practice.

The researcher agrees with Bray (2003) that the surge in the growth of qualitative methods of comparative education from the historical and sociological perspectives can provide insights into understanding educational issues on the international scene and will adopt this method for the thesis.

### 2.3 The Historical-Comparative Qualitative Approach

Though qualitative research does not claim to identify universal laws for the social sciences, as the positivists seek, improved knowledge and understanding can lead to powerful insights into educational issues and dilemmas. Since the qualitative evaluation movement that sprang up on the Atlantic during the 1970s, qualitative research techniques in comparative education have grown from strength to strength (Burns and Welch, 1992).

Crossley (1984) commended qualitative research as having strength in vitality combined with sensitivity to educational processes, while also demonstrating greater responsiveness to contextual factors and barriers for successful innovation. Another advantage of qualitative research relates to its presentation and mode of dissemination. As ethnographic research and evaluation is both descriptive and analytic, the reporting style is narrative which allows for more effective communication over quantitative and statistically oriented studies. The challenge however is that valid qualitative research requires careful training and rigorous effort in design and execution (Burns and Welch, 1992).

One qualitative research that was carefully and thoroughly executed is Wong Ting-Hong's (2002) work on *Hegemonics Compared – State Formation and Chinese School Politics in Postwar Singapore and Hong Kong*. Apple (2002) in his foreword to the book has aptly hailed it as among the very best research we have to date. By decentering the West to focus on Asia, Wong's analysis is

differentiated by its creative merger of both a fresh perspective of the state theory and the critical sociological work on curriculum, pedagogy and identity of Bernstein. Wong's historical research on the struggles of the state, and of the implications for understanding of hegemonic struggles over culture and institutions in the state and civil society is truly enlightening.

Like Wong Ting-Hong, the researcher has also focused her work on a historical-comparative qualitative research comparing Singapore and Hong Kong, on the theme of citizenship education. It is a qualitative research and case study of the evolution of citizenship education in building national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong. The next section will demonstrate how the qualitative research is carried out in the methodology.

## **2.4 Methodology**

After reviewing historical and comparative approaches to research in education, it is now possible to describe the approach taken here.

To compare the evolvement of citizenship education in building national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong, a comprehensive understanding of the historical developments of the political, economic and social factors that influence nation-building in the two territories is necessary, as well as an examination of the syllabi of the citizenship education in both territories that contribute towards building national identity. This will be done for a defined historical period in each

case. For Singapore, the period 1960 –2005 is selected as 1960 was the earliest year of documents that the researcher could locate on the archives although the independence and birth of the nation-state of Singapore occurred in 1965. By the year 2005, Singapore has seen three generations of political leadership, held mainly through the three Prime Ministers.

Hong Kong's political transition from 1997-2005 is featured as 1997 was the year of reunification with China and the appointment of the first Chief Executive who acted under the instructions of mainland China.

With respect to the nature of data collected, this research is essentially qualitative in nature and the tables drawn up are generally descriptive, except for table 8.3 in chapter 8.6 where percentages are calculated with respect to the type of civic values learnt. As the researcher has adopted a historical-comparative approach, primary and secondary sources related to this approach were scoured and examined.

## **2.5 Data Gathering (Primary and Secondary Sources)**

Different sets of secondary sources of books were first gathered from all public libraries and the British Council and National Institute of Education libraries on a broad understanding of a historical approach and the comparative education approach to the thesis.



The researcher also undertook thorough research on the primary historical data in Singapore and Hong Kong and reviewed major secondary resources. Various major types of primary sources were examined. They include published official documents; confidential document files of Singapore and Hong Kong (e.g. some files on citizenship education from Hong Kong were not allowed to be printed); and Singapore and Hong Kong newspapers. Access to the confidential document files from Hong Kong was made through copious handwritten notes made from the files that could be viewed but were protected from printing.

Official documents are important as they reveal the political climate and circumstances that led to the evolvement of the implementation of citizenship education in building national identity in the two post-colonial settings. The annual political speeches (especially the National Day speeches and speeches made during times of political precariousness e.g. then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's explanation to the United Nations with regards to internal political struggles in 1962) of past and present Prime Ministers in Singapore since 1960 to 2005 and policy statements of then Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa from 1997 to 2005 were retrieved from archives of websites. These documents reveal the political, economic and social status and concerns of the two territories for the due periods after colonization. Some of the policy statements of both countries were available in book form in the National Institute of Education Library in Singapore.

Official documents on citizenship education policies were also downloaded from websites from the Ministry of Education in Singapore; and Education and Manpower Bureau, and Hong Kong Institute of Education Center for Citizenship Education websites from Hong Kong. While some documents on curriculum issues were available in book form in the National Institute of Education Library in Singapore, not all the important documents, especially from Hong Kong, were located. The researcher was fortunate to receive some requested printed important documents from a lecturer from the Economics and Public Affairs Department, Hong Kong Institute of Education, who was also completing his thesis for his doctorate in education.

Due to the concerns of the researcher that official documents may not be fully comprehensive enough, an extensive amount of secondary sources of historical accounts of political and economic factors that shaped nation-building; and studies carried out on citizenship education in Hong Kong and Singapore were reviewed.

To ensure a more current focus on the leadership changes in Singapore and Hong Kong, especially for the years 2004 and 2005, the researcher consulted daily the following English newspapers:

The Straits Times

Hong Kong Herald

**2.6 Methodology : Analysing Theories of Nationalism**

As data were collected, the researcher was guided by her theoretical concern about the building of national identity through citizenship education and the political influences that impacted its evolvement.

In Chapter 3, the researcher categorized the readings of the different theories of nationalism, nation-state and national identity into :

**2.6.1 Theories of Nationalism**

**2.6.2 Globalised Nations**

**2.6.3 National Identities**

- (i) Objective/Globalised National Identity
- (ii) Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity
- (iii) Objective/Globalised National Identity in Singapore
- (iv) Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity in Hong Kong

Two tables of the characteristics of Objective/Globalised National Identity (Table 3.1), Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity (Table 3.2) were summed up in chapter 3.4 and applied to both Singapore and Hong Kong in chapter 3.5. While Hong Kong share some Objective national identity features, the Objective identity features in Singapore are more prominent, whereas the Subjective/cultural elements in Hong Kong exceeded those of Singapore. Both

territories seek to work towards coping with the challenges of globalisation and thus the researcher eventually categorized Singapore under Objective/Globalised National Identity and Hong Kong as Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity. These categories of theories of nationalism and national identity will then help throw light into understanding how the political, economic and social conditions of nation-building in both territories have influenced the evolvement of the politicized citizenship education, which contributes to building of national identity for both Singapore and Hong Kong.

## **2.7 Analysing Political, Economic and Social Factors that Influence Nation-Building in Singapore and Hong Kong**

When the researcher collected primary sources of data, she made handwritten notes from official documents from Singapore and Hong Kong because some of the confidential materials, especially from Hong Kong, were not allowed to be printed from the websites. Also the amount of reading required from both primary and secondary sources was massive and notes taken helped with retention of salient points read.

The data were classified under the various sub-headings of the various chapters of the thesis and chronological review of the political circumstances. While processing the data analysis, the researcher deliberated on parallel and contrasted dynamics in the two historical settings. Insights gained from comparisons often threw light on modifying conceptual understandings of how

political and economic factors can play an important role in influencing the organic nature of citizenship education for both countries.

In analyzing the political, economic and social factors influencing Singapore, the researcher studied primary sources of the annual political speeches of Lee Kuan Yew before independence (i.e. 1960 was the earliest the researcher could locate in the archives), to political speeches of second generation of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, till the third generation of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in the year 2004 and 2005.

The researcher found that the early speeches of Lee Kuan Yew were particularly useful in understanding the early nation-building tenets as initiated by Lee Kuan Yew. An analysis of Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 National Day Speech in Chapter 4, using an adaptation of Flowerdew's (2004) strategies, revealed that politically, the goal of persuasion can be useful for building the ruling People's Action Party ideological conviction in Singapore.

Text extracts of National Day Rally Speeches related to "Nation-Building" and "National Identity" by the three Prime Ministers, Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong were examined to analyse their use of language to create their political perceptions of nation-building and national identity.

In Singapore, the early years of nation-building were then unpredictable; economic, political and social conditions were dire and needed urgent attention. It was a question of meeting basic survival needs that drove Lee Kuan Yew to craft the political ideologies that have become the political heritage of the Singapore government which is then transferred to the school population in the form of citizenship education.

Tung Chee Hwa was selected to be the Chief Executive by the Beijing government for Hong Kong during the handover of Hong Kong to China by the British government in a time of affluence and economic prosperity in 1997. The speeches made by Tung Chee Hwa did not have the similar sense of urgency that Singapore had. Instead, the political speeches of Tung Chee Hwa, for a large measure, focused on the economic development of Hong Kong and its cooperation with China for national identity building.

Text extracts of Policy Address related to "Nation-Building" and "National Identity" by Tung Chee Hwa (Chief Executive from 1997-2005) were also analysed to analyse the concepts linked to national identity with China.

## **2.8 Analysing Citizenship Education in Nation-Building in Singapore and Hong Kong**

National policy statements and curriculum documents are useful starting points for considering what citizenship education is about although such documents do not tell the whole story. (Gearon, 2003).

The concept of citizenship education was discussed as a link between nationalism and education. Citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong was analysed to show the creation of national identity and the support for the nation-state in nation-building.

### **2.8.1 Analysis of Citizenship Education – Two Areas**

The two areas examined are :

- i) Curriculum Analysis - the role of the politicians and its purpose.  
(chapter 7)
- ii) Curriculum Analysis - the relationship of curriculum to the historical developments in society. (chapter 7)

The category of purposes for citizenship education for Singapore and Hong Kong are tabled and linked to the political circumstances, economic reasons, social contexts and globalisation/internationalization factors which are related to the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.

Citizenship education is a legitimization of the knowledge produced from the political, cultural and economic circumstances of society (Apple, 1993). The education system has been used in nation-building in society in general which includes the creation of patriotism/national identity.

In analysing citizenship education curriculum, the researcher drew up the following :

### **2.8.2 Analysis of Citizenship Education Curriculum – Four Tables**

Four tables were drawn up to summarize the findings :

i) Table 8.1 in Chapter 8.4

Comparison of Key Messages, Aims and Goals of Moral and Civic Education in Hong Kong and Singapore.

ii) Table 8.2 in Chapter 8.5

Comparison of Civic and Moral Education Themes in Singapore and Hong Kong

iii) Table 8.3 in Chapter 8.6

Comparison of Individual-Growth and Nation-Building/National Identity Values in Singapore and Hong Kong



iv) Table 8.4 in Chapter 8.7

Comparison of National Identity Components of Citizenship Education in Hong Kong and Singapore.

## **2.9 Conclusion**

The above findings helped to work towards the Conclusion Chapter 9 which sums up the findings of the thesis and suggested the need to redefine citizenship education in future studies.

Chapter 3 examines literature on nationalism as a basis for an approach to analyzing national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong.

## **Chapter 3 An Approach to Analysing National Identity in Singapore and Hong Kong**

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on an approach to analyzing national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong after an introduction to the theories of nationalism, nation-state and national identity.

### **3.1 Theories of Nationalism, Nation-State and National Identity**

The term “nationalism” first appeared in 1774 in a text by Herder (Alter, 1989) and since then has been used to describe a spectrum of phenomena that are historical, cultural, political, sociological and universally widespread in societies. Hechter (2000) agrees with Alter’s (1989) suggestion that nationalism is one of the most ambiguous concepts in present-day vocabulary of political analysis because there is no consensus about what caused nationalism to be a modern phenomenon. This dissension is evident even though most scholars concede that nationalism has been established for the past two centuries. Thus the very meaning of nationalism is controversial, and scholars have not been able to adequately define and agree upon the key concept of nationalism and nation (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994).

The roots of modern nationalism can be found in the late eighteenth century in Western Europe and North America, spreading to the whole of Europe and the world. However, nationalism conceals extreme contradictions that can mean emancipation and oppression, dangers and opportunities. Thus a multitude of

manifestations of nationalism exist and it is appropriate to speak of nationalisms in the plural (Alter, 1994). While the founding fathers of nationalism, Rousseau, Herder, Fichte, Korals, and Mazzini propounded the ideological movement of nationalism for autonomy, unity, identity and self-government (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994), others incorporated different cultural, historical, political and sociological-economic, international, global aspects.

The concept of nationalism cannot be viewed in isolation. It is closely tied to related concepts of nation and state. Like the varied approaches to nationalism, the multifarious definitions of the nation are also keenly debated on different cultural, political, psychological, territorial, ethnic and sociological principles by scholars, politicians and political activists with disputed slants that define their scopes of discussions (Guibernau, 1999). Thus in the field of nationalist phenomena, the growth of nationalism, the nation-state, nation/ethnic identity is vast and invariably spills into many cognate subjects. As a consequence, different approaches to the theories of nationalism are often expounded by scholars from varied disciplines that include historians, political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, philosophers, anthropologists (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994).

Originally, the word "nation" stems from the Latin verb *nasci*, to be born, and it referred to a group of people who were born in the same place. Distinguishing features of nations today include (Armstrong 1982; Smith 1986) national

solidarity of ethnic distinctiveness, myths and symbols; Anderson's (1983) new communication technologies; linguistic and objective group characteristics; entities that are socially constructed; Chatterjee's (1993) territoriality as objective criterion; and nations as a subset of ethnic groups or minorities (Hechter, 2000).

The word "nation" also has a twofold meaning. It can be used synonymously with "state" or "country" to refer to a society united under one government. It can also signify an aggregation of individuals united by political ties, or ties of race, religion, language or tradition (Synder, 1964).

Hutchinson and Smith, (1994) examine and categorise the various definitions of nations as proposed by various scholars as "subjective" (i.e. the relationship of nations and nationalism to ethnicity) and "objective" (i.e. statehood) factors.

The researcher will in section 3.4 propose an extension of Hutchinson and Smith's (1994) categories of "subjective" and "objective" to include "subjective/objective" nations (i.e. a mix of nations and nationalism to ethnicity and statehood or political factors); and "globalised" nations in section 3.3 (i.e. nations that are adjusting to cope with the demands of the global era in the 21<sup>st</sup> century). Albrow (1996) argued that we have entered a "global age" where the emergence of a new political order is characterized by the pulling apart of society and the nation-state. Albrow introduces the concept of "global state" and asserts

that it exists every moment when individuals act towards a common global interest that spans the globe

### **3.2 Theories of nationalism**

Different scholars of different disciplines have proposed different theories of nationalism. The following theories on nationalism have been proposed by some contemporary scholars of different fields with different slants, and different approaches.

#### **Anderson's Theory of Nationalism**

Benedict Anderson's major contribution to nationalism, *Imagined Communities* (1983), has been often cited for its literary devices in depicting the nation and its concepts of "imagined community" and "print capitalism". He argued that the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the diversity of human language birthed a new form of imagined community, which gave rise to the modern nation.

These concepts have enlightened the cultural sources of nationalism and have been influential for post-modernist analyses (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994).

#### **Kellas's Theory of Nationalism**

James G. Kellas (1991), a political scientist, defines nationalism both as an ideology and a form of behaviour. An ideology is seen as a system of ideas.

Nationalism builds on the idea of a nation and makes it a basis for action. This action can be political or non-political. Most theories of nationalism seek to establish the relationship between politics, economics and culture that cause the transition from ethnicity to nationalism.

### Hayes' Theory of Nationalism

Carlton J H Hayes (1926), a historian, developed a descriptive approach with chronological framework to clarify historical trends in nationalism in Europe. He discussed the dual nature of nationalism. It is seen as a force for good or evil. Nationalism, when it becomes synonymous with the purest patriotism, will prove to be a blessing to humanity. However it can also be a mania, a kind of extended and exaggerated egotism. Nationalism can be a source of grave abuses and evils when the nation-state uses education to promote the spirit of exclusiveness; places a premium on uniformity; increases the docility of the masses and focuses on war. Political activities are important aspect of nationalism proposed.

Haye's theory of nationalism can be used to explain the abuse of evil power in waging wars, especially the first two World Wars. It can also be adopted by politicians to rid the society of what is perceived as evil forces, e.g. in Singapore where the communists are viewed as an evil force to be weeded.

### Hasting's Theory of Nationalism

Adrian Hastings (1997), also defines nationalism as a combination of theory and practice. As political theory, each nation should have its own "state". In practice, nationalism is strong in particularist terms, drawing its roots from belief that one's own ethnic or national tradition is valuable and needs to be defended at all costs. He argues for the shaping of modern history in Europe and the world by four distinct and determinative elements of nation, ethnicity, nationalism and religion.

While Hasting's theory of elements of nationalism applies mainly to Europe, it does not necessarily apply to all parts of the world. For example in some parts of Asia, like Singapore and Hong Kong, religion may not feature so predominantly.

### Deutsch's Theory of Nationalism

Karl W. Deutsch (1966), an American political scientist, wrote *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry in the Foundations of Nationality* in 1953 and produced a classic in the study of nationalism. He sought to quantify and measure the elements of nationality by looking at social communication whereby a people or nation is defined by the complementarity or relative efficiency of communication among individuals. He represented the school of thought which views nations and nationalism as the product of modernization (Kellas, 1991).

### Hechter's Theory of "Internal Colonialism"

Like Deutsch, Michael Hechter (1975), was attracted to the quantitative research methodology of providing evidence for the “modernization theory” or “diffusion theory”. However, Hechter reacted against diffusion theory and posited “internal colonialism”, citing examples of the Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism as the result of “internal colonialism” by the English core people (Kellas, 1991).

### Gellner's Theory of Nationalism

Ernest Gellner (1997) viewed nationalism as a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond. Thus nationalism is the necessary consequence or correlate of certain social conditions that are contextualized and rooted. Gellner divided the history of mankind into three stages.

The original stage of the foraging age was too small for the issue of nationalism when there was neither state nor formal education to favour any type of culture.

This was followed by the agrarian age where the expansion of human population by food production and storage saw the increase of division of labour and social organization.

The final stage to date is the industrial and industrializing world where industrial civilization is based on economic and scientific growth, capable of superseding the population growth. (Gellner, 1997).



In *Nations and Nationalism*, a well received text amongst political scientists and political sociologists, Gellner (1983) posited four types of nationalism : Satisfied nationalism, Classical Liberal nationalism, Ethnic nationalism and Diaspora nationalism.

Hall (1998) in *The State of the Nation : Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* revisited and challenged Gellner's theory which explains nationalism by means of socio-economic categories. The classical accusation levelled at Gellner's modernist theory includes the issue that nations are far older than Gellner's account. In response to John Armstrong's thesis of primordialism, Gellner referred to Anthony Smith and Miroslav Hroch's more subtle accounts of blending modernism and primordialism.

#### Anthony D. Smith's Theory of Nationalism

Smith (1986) argues in *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* that ethnic culture and social organization were persistent and widespread in Euro-Asian ancient past and the medieval era. Nationalism is perceived by Smith to be the transformation and universalisation of a preexisting political and social norm.

Even in the current world of global interdependence, Smith (1995) in *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* continues to sustain that the key to understanding nations and nationalism hinges on the persisting frameworks and legacies of historical cultures and ethnic ties. Smith (1995) advocates that nationalism in its

various forms should be separated from the nation-state, and national identity from state sovereignty. The aim of nationalism is to make the civic or ethnic nation the yardstick of the state and to make the state accommodate the will of the nation.

### Elie Kedourie's Theory of Nationalism

Elie Kedourie examined the metaphysical foundations of the nationalism ideology in his text *Nationalism*. Through the prism of philosophical tradition of Europe, he discussed the origin of nationalism as a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of nineteenth century. The doctrine holds that humanity is divided into nations and nations have known characteristics that can be ascertained. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment prevalent in Europe in the eighteenth century held that the universe was governed by a uniform, unvarying law of Nature. (Synder, 1964).

The various theories of nationalism can be broadly categorized as attributing to the cultural factors (Anderson (1983), Deutsch (1966), Smith (1986), Smith (1995); and political (Kedourie in Synder (1964), Hechter (1975) as well as cultural/political factors, often with cultural factors as the roots moving on to the political state (i.e. ethnicity to a political nation) (Kellas, (1991), Hastings (1997), Ernest Gellner (1997). That the two main sets of cultural and political factors are present are obvious. However there are times when there is a movement or transition from the cultural to the political state which gives rise to a combination

of objective/cultural combination of nationalism that can also be translated into theories of national identity as in the case of Hong Kong which will be examined in section 3.5.2. Singapore is still mainly a politicized nation-state as examined in section 3.5.1.

Both Hong Kong and Singapore have responded to the call to meet the challenges of the global era and thus have another factor of the Globalised National Identity built in. This global factor has not been prominently featured in the theories above as a crucial factor in determining the categories of nationalism.

The following section on the globalised nation is a new factor of nationalism to consider.

### **3.3 Globalised Nations**

Guibernau (1999) attributes the demise of the nation-state to the recent intensification of globalization processes. New political organizations such as NATO, the European Union and the United Nations are based on the principle of states surrendering some aspects of their sovereignty. With nationalist claims of democratic movements emerging in nations without states, Albrow's introduction to the concept of "global state" is viewed by Guibernau (1999) as a feasible challenge to the traditional nation-state.

While the forces of globalisation have brought forth the challenges of upholding the solidarity of the nation-state, the “global state” proposed by Guibernau (1999) is still idealistic in concept at this point, in that it is not spared of political challenges within the newly formed political organizations.

A case in point is the European Union formed in 1993. Ravazzolo (1995) stressed that “the global complexity creates crucial problems” (p16) and asserts that even if some rights of the members of the European Union have been specified, social rights and fundamental individual rights are “only implicit” (p16). Although it is an attempt to create a supra-national citizenship, the duties of the European citizen are not defined.

### **3.4 Categorising National Identities**

In general, theories of nationalism have also been broadly categorized as either subjective (i.e. ethnicity based) or objective (i.e. political or statehood factors) (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994). As analysed in section 3.2 the theories include subjective/cultural category : Deutsch (1966), Anderson (1983), Smith (1986), Smith (1995), and objective/political category : Kedourie in Synder (1964), Hechter (1975). While Hutchinson and Smith's (1994) subjective and objective categories neatly represent the typical classification of Western nations and nationalism into either the ethnicity or political factors, it is not adequate for the purposes of analyzing South East Asian “nations” birthed through transitology, in particular Singapore and Hong Kong.

Other theories include both cultural and political factors e.g. Kellas (1997), Hastings (1997) and Ernest Gellner (1997). They represent a closer match, especially for Hong Kong. The researcher has included the "globalised" section to the categories as it reflects the current global challenges experienced by both Singapore and Hong Kong.

The following two categories are identified to accommodate the national identity categories for Singapore and Hong Kong.

#### **3.4.1 Objective/Globalised National Identity**

Objective national identity is mainly the relationship of national identity to statehood, political and economic factors, with culture and religion taking secondary roles.

A combination of the relationship of the political, economic and cultural processes and events give birth to nationalism and the ensuing national identities of the nation-states.

This is a form of national identity peculiar to a nation-state where the state plays a major role in nation-building and national identity and is also fast adjusting to the global demands at the international scene. This type of national identity is especially evident in Singapore.

Tinker (1981) astutely observed that in nation-state building in Asia, the successful maintenance of the nation-state depends more on the development of the institutions of the state than the building of a national consciousness. Bureaucratic national planning has been essential in the development of the nations of Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This observation is especially true for Singapore. The administrative state has been perceived to be largely responsible for the sole monopoly of political power in the nation-states e.g. Singapore and India. The concept of economic survival is basic to the issue of whether Asian regimes can achieve sustained growth. Singapore is a prime example of excellent and sustained economic growth.

Kellas (1991, 2) in *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* argues for a political theory that "it is politics which gives the most powerful expression to nations and ethnic groups". For the political scientists, the focus is always on the state and the political power. Established politicians, civil servants and the military form the political elite. When the political elite fragments in its political struggle for national power, it allows the process and progress for nationalism and national identity to be birthed. The interaction of the economic factor is a necessary aspect that looks into the control of political resources. The economic elite is not nationalist if its global ties to wider markets are established. Culturally, the common elements of history and ancestry are not potentially nationalistic unless there is a strong national culture.

Kellas (1991) also distinguishes between three types of political nationalism: ethnic nationalism which has only one ethnic group; social nationalism which embodies several ethnic groups; and the official nationalism e.g. the United Kingdom where there is patriotism of the member states to a larger official state. He attaches a more noble status with this label as this type of official national identity is more encompassing, transcending different cultures with a common political focus.

Religion working together with the nation can also give rise to a sense of national identity and within a primary official national identity e.g. United Kingdom, it can give rise to secondary dual national identities . For example, nearly all Scots feel that they have a Scottish national identity but they also feel that they belong to Great Britain. Thus the term “national identity” can work together with religion to create a multidimensional concept

Kellas (1991) reinforces Tinker's (1981) observation that political factors or the political elite are crucial determinants of the process of nation-building and national identities. Tinker (1981) further adds that economic and cultural factors may play a potential role in determining the building of national identity if these factors have strong links with the nation. This is especially true for Singapore with regards to the economic growth being strongly initiated and controlled by the state.

Gellner (1997) classifies the third stage of human history as industrial society where the characteristic of economic growth requires the economy to adjust to changes and a mobile society. Along with economic growth is cognitive growth, resulting in costly educational infrastructure and political centralization. Though not specifically mentioned, it leads to global economic growth and meets the challenges of globalisation.

Although Singapore will be classified mainly as Objective/Globalised National Identity due to the highly political state governance, there are some cultural elements (e.g. Hroch, 1998; Kellas, 1991) in the process of nation-building efforts. Details of such explanation can be found in chapter 4.

The challenges of a global identity in the form of a supranational identity poses new ways of setting directions for the nation. While Cameron (1999) lists the Supranational identity as a characteristic of globalisation factor in the example of the European Union, the researcher has proposed an Intranational identity approach in section 3.5.1 to explain how the current Singapore government proposes four introspective principles of leadership to meet the challenges of globalisation.



**Table 3.1 Researcher's Representative Characteristics of Objective/Globalised National Identity**

| <b>Characteristics</b>   | <b>Examples</b>  | <b>Author</b>         |
|--|--|-----------------------|
| Development of the apparatus of the state to maintain nation-state         | The development and organization of the state is more crucial than a national consciousness in nation-building.  | Tinker (1981)         |
| Bureaucracy as structural support of nation-state                          | National planning has become essential in developing the state.<br>Bureaucracy of plans strengthens or weakens national unity.   |                       |
| The administrative state   | Echoes of pre-colonial dynastic political leadership that monopolize power. E.g. Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Indira Gandhi in India.  |                       |
| Survival   | Most Asian regimes are aware that the appeal of nation-building is that of economic survival. Most have not achieved sustained growth except Japan, Singapore and Taiwan.  |                       |
| Politics//Political Elite  | Gives the most powerful expression to nations and ethnic groups. Political scientists focus on the state and political power.<br>Political elite of established politicians, civil servants and military. The political elite is crucial as only when it struggles for power that nationalism is able to progress. | Kellas (1991)         |
| Economic/<br>Economic Elite  | Struggle for control of political resources.<br>Economic elite of businessmen and trade union leaders. The economic elite is least nationalist if links with wider markets and firms are strong.   |                       |
| Culture/<br>Cultural Elite   | Community ties of history, culture and ancestry.<br>Cultural elite of teachers, writers and clergy.<br>The cultural elite is nationalist if there is a strong national culture.  |                       |
| Official Nationalism   | Nationalism of the state or patriotism/loyalty to the state and has a more noble status than ethnic or social nation that may seek disintegration of the state. It encompass all legally entitled to be citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, national identity and culture.  |                       |
| Industrial Society:<br>Economic/Global economic growth<br>Cognitive growth | A growing economy and a mobile society with standardized educational system to turn out adaptable personnel for marketplace<br>Costly educational infrastructure that leads to political centralization  | Ernest Gellner (1997) |
| Global/<br>Supranational Identity  | Closer economic, social, political, and cultural integration of member states. E.g. members of the European Union.   | Cameron (1999)        |
| The Arts   | National identity identified through a variety of national activities, national symbols in different countries and preservation of theatre in Austria.   |                       |

|                                      |  |              |
|--------------------------------------|--|--------------|
| Global/<br>Intranational<br>Identity | Political elite factor e.g. political leadership renewal. Bureaucratic national planning. Economic survival stake for all. | Teo (2005)   |
| Social composition                   | Fully formed social composition that include an educated elite and entrepreneurial class.                                  | Hroch (1998) |
| Community with rights                | Community of citizens who enjoy equal rights.  |              |
| Language                             | A body of "higher culture" in the national language.   |              |
| Common origin and destiny            | Awareness of common origin and destiny to create a historical collectivity.  |              |

**3.4 .2 Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity**

Subjective national identity refers to the relationship of national identity to ethnicity and culture.

Subjective/Objective national identity is a mix of both types of national identity.

The researcher will discuss in general the studies about the various types of subjective/objective national identity proposed by Cameron (ed.) (1999), Liah (1994), Hroch (1998), Smith (1991).

Cameron (1999) in *National Identity* examines national identity from five eclectic sociological-political-economic perspectives – language, the political entity, the arts, money and the public figure. National identity has been synonymous with stereotypes and caricatures (e.g. the French eating snails), sentimental and patriotic rather than rational (e.g. late Diana, Princess of Wales is an idolised symbol of the English Rose; money can be an ethnic symbol in using the new Euro currency for UK). Once the varied factors are assimilated to be part of

man's conception of national identity, it is difficult to distinguish between the myth and reality of its origin.

Liah (1994) suggests that national identity in its modern sense is an identity that derives from membership in a "people", the fundamental characteristic of a "nation". National identity is related and tied up with a community's sense of uniqueness and inherent qualities contributing to it. These qualities include social, political, cultural in the strict sense or ethnicity that are important in the nurturing of a specific nationalism. The birth of a new national identity stems from a crisis of identity where there is dissatisfaction with traditional identity, and a new system of workable values is formed.

Hastings (1997) in *The Construction of Nationhood : Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* examined how national identity was formed in Western Europe. He argued that the Germans had to appeal strongly to a single ethnic origin, ethnic purity and resort to a national identity based on blood so that other races, especially the Jews could be excluded as the Germans did not have the unity of the state. France, on the other hand, could afford to have a nationalism and national identity grounded explicitly on the French language as they were united. The French-speaking society had political and cultural identity established through its characteristic literature.

However France today is battling at the highest political level with the latest government enquiry into France's education system. A new report recommended making English a compulsory subject in all schools in France so that it can stay relevant in the global scene. It has come to acknowledge that when it comes to technology, knowing French is increasingly an unnecessary luxury while using English is an absolute necessity. The mentality that French was the tongue of everything refined no longer holds true (The Straits Times, 27<sup>th</sup> Oct 2004)

Smith (1991) in *National Identity* highlights the importance of closely relating the historical sociological concept of national identity to nationalism, the ideology and movement. National identity is defined as a multidimensional concept which includes a specific language, sentiments and symbolism. Ethnic origins, language, shared symbols and religion can provide a healthy sense of national identity, nation or it can be transformed into a hostile nationalism.

National identity is treated as a collective cultural phenomenon. Fundamental features of national identity include a historic territory or homeland; common myths and historical memories; common, mass public culture through public education and the mass media. A political community has a code of rights and duties and definite space or territorial mobility for all. (Smith, 1991).

All of the above are deemed necessary features of the national identity although Smith (1991) recognizes the complex and abstract nature of national identity

where permutations with other ideologies like liberalism and communism also thrive.

Hroch (1998) showed how national identity forms a relationship with a large social group with social, legal, cultural and ethnic features. An educated and entrepreneurial elite form the social composition. The community has legal rights and an elite culture is evidenced from the national language adopted. There are three phases in the mass movement towards national identity. Phase A is devoted to an inquiry into the propagation of awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social, economic and historical attributes of the non-dominant group. Phase B sees the effort of spreading the idea of national identity in an environment that supports distinct identities (e.g. ethnic identity). Phase C witnesses the creation of a modern nation and national identity.

Hroch's (1998) explanation of the three phases of the process of building a new national identity parallels Liah's (1994) demonstration that a crisis of identity is often the seed of dissatisfaction sown that sets the stage for political transformation of a new nation-state. Both recognize the interaction of social, cultural and political factors at play.

(Hui et al, 2004) suggest that Parekh (1999) has synthesized the "real" and "imagined" account of a nation by viewing national identity as three dimensional. The dimensions are cognitive as they assert something about the community and

are not fictitious; affective because they arouse emotions; and conative as they inspire action. Its dominant self-image is generally benign although it is not always so.

This mix of subjective/objective category as discussed above alone is not sufficient to define the national identity category for Hong Kong as we shall see in section 3.5. The researcher has to include the more objective category scholars like Tinker (1981) and Kellas (1991) to explain more comprehensively the ideologies of the politician as he proposes his theories on nation-building. Details of this explanation can be found in section 3.5.2.

The globalisation characteristic can be seen from the power of language as an important component of national identity, even in the global era. Anderson (1999) asserts that language provides an important entry into the target community, especially print language. Williams (1999) notes that Anderson (1999) is referring to the assimilatory function of language which is incorporated into the community of those individuals or groups that belong to some other community. Though it is not easy for individuals and groups to abandon one linguistic identity in favour of a new language, "the language barrier need only apply to the first generation" (Williams, 1999, 16). For example with the introduction of linguistic immersion in Catalan for children between three and eight years of age, it will result in the future generations favouring the Catalan language over the Spanish language and a Catalan identity over a Spanish identity.

On a larger scale, the impact of globalisation in the formation of the supranational identity of the European Union throws up the controversial debate on what characteristics constitute the European identity. Burgoyne et al (1999) highlights the practical dimension of one becoming pro-Europe for instrumental and economic reasons, without feeling any cultural or political identification with the other 14 states of the European region. Burgoyne (1999) argues that the use of the single currency Euro that was meant to achieve greater economic stability and project "an enhanced sense of European identity" (Dedman, 1998, p5-7) is still far from what "Europeaness" means. It is not just a question of cultural integration, but rather the debate on issues "about closer economic, political and social integration" that will continue in the future that can possibly unlock the key to understanding what supranational identity of being European really means (Burgoyne et al, 1999).

Gleaning from Williams (1999) and Burgoyne et al (1999), characteristics for globalisation include the more traditional concern about a common language for political and cultural integration to a deeper and wider breath of more meaningful closer economic, political, social and cultural integration at the supranational level.

In defence of the plural order of nations and the unlikelihood of "any early supercession of nations and nationalism" Smith (1999, p153) argue that nationalism is politically necessary, national identity is socially functional and the

nation is historically embedded. The past shapes its future as much as present global trends challenge its identity.

**Table 3.2**  
**Characteristics of Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity**

| Characteristics  | Examples  | Author         |
|--|---|----------------|
| Language   | Language is testimony of their cultural heritage. Language is used as a process of assimilation to construct a single cultural identity to fit the new political identity e.g. non-English regions of the United Kingdom.   | Cameron (1999) |
| Political Entity   | The reunification of East and West Germany revealed that they had earlier forged separate identities.   |                |
| The Arts   | National identity is identified through a variety of national activities, music, national symbols in different countries and even the preservation of the theatre in Austria.   |                |
| Money  | Money as an ethnic symbol is associated with national identity. E.g. the Euro as threat to national identity of the members of European Union.  |                |
| The Public Figure  | National icon symbols through people or institutions can evoke a public sense of national identity. The death of Diana, "England's Rose", Princess of Wales culminated in a rite of passage in which the nation is reminded of its cultural heritage and a common symbol of national identity.  |                |
| Global/ Supranational Identity   | Closer economic, social, political, and cultural integration of member states. E.g members of the European Union.   |                |
|  |   |                |
| Ethnic character through:<br>i)Public education<br><br>ii) Mass media<br>iii) Cultural & social policy | Rootedness in pre-modern ethnic symbolism in building national identities.<br>Public education helps to produce literate culture and a homogeneous nation with moral and emotional attachment.<br>The state uses mass media to promote social consciousness.<br>Myths, memories and symbols provide basis for social cohesion and political action. | Smith (1991)   |
| Territorial political community  | Ethnic model – A popular community of descent and vernacular culture seeks political autonomy in its homeland<br><br>Civic model – Territorial community of citizens bound by common laws and shared public culture and civil religion.   | Smith (1995)   |
|  |   |                |
| Community's uniqueness &   | Qualities include social, political and cultural/ethnic   | Liah (1994)    |



|  |  |                       |
|--|--|-----------------------|
| qualities  |  |                       |
| Dissatisfaction of previous groups                         | A change of traditional identity presupposes a crisis of identity. It is a psychological state.  |                       |
| New values   | New system of values that could solve the crisis results in the adoption of national identity.   |                       |
| Distinct character   | Transfer of values, structural and cultural aspects of settings create a distinct national identity.   |                       |
|  |  |                       |
| Social composition   | Fully formed social composition that include an educated elite and entrepreneurial class.  | Hroch (1998)          |
| Community with rights                                      | Community of citizens who enjoy equal rights.  |                       |
| Language   | A body of "higher culture" in the national language.   |                       |
| Common origin and destiny                                  | Awareness of common origin and destiny to create a historical collectivity.  |                       |
|  |  |                       |
| Ethnicity  | People with shared cultural identity and spoken language.  | Hastings (1997)       |
| Ethnic purity  | Germans' single ethnic origin. National identity based on blood. Excluded others, e.g. the Jews.   |                       |
| Religion, culture & politics interact                      | Birth of the English nation, nation-state and identity that gave birth to nations and the birth of nationalism.  |                       |
|  |  |                       |
| Industrial Society: Economic growth/Global economic growth | A growing economy and a mobile society with standardized educational system to turn out adaptable personnel for marketplace.   | Ernest Gellner (1997) |
| Cognitive growth   | Costly educational infrastructure that leads to political centralization   |                       |
|  |  |                       |
| Bureaucracy as structural support of nation-state          | National planning has become essential in developing the state. Bureaucracy of plans strengthens or weakens national unity. E.g. Singapore   | Tinker (1981)         |
| Survival   | Most Asian regimes are aware that the appeal of nation-building is that of economic survival. Most have not achieved sustained growth except Japan, Singapore and Taiwan.  |                       |
|  |  |                       |
| Economic/ Economic Elite                                   | Struggle for control of political resources. Economic elite of businessmen and trade union leaders. The economic elite is least nationalist if links with wider markets and firms are strong.  | Kellas (1991)         |
| Culture/ Cultural Elite                                    | Community ties of history, culture and ancestry. Cultural elite of teachers, writers and clergy. The cultural elite has a strong national culture.   |                       |
| Official Nationalism                                       | Nationalism of the state or patriotism/loyalty to the state and has a more noble status than ethnic or social nation that may seek disintegration of the state. It encompass all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, national identity and culture. |                       |

### **3.5 Applying The Categorisation to Singapore and Hong Kong**

Now that the categories of national identity have been presented, the researcher will explain in this section how they apply to both Singapore and Hong Kong.

#### **3.5.1 Objective/Globalised National Identity in Singapore**

The following studies will contribute towards understanding of how Singapore is categorized as Objective/Globalised National Identity. The studies below will be analysed to validate this category.

Woon and Ali, (1998) argues that it is possible to conceive of a state existing without a nation. Singapore is an example where state-building has outpaced nation-building. Singapore's short journey to the road of independence did not follow the conventional path of many Third World countries whose experience of decolonization was marked by a strong sense of the masses involved in crafting their national destiny. The main strategy was to build up the infrastructural level of a nation, paradoxically postponing nationhood. Nationhood becomes a problem of managing human resources for the state. National identity is built upon economic survival and succeeding in a changing global scene. The cultural and human element of national identity was not adequately developed. Being shaped mainly by politics and economics, it is often said that Singaporeans have yet to develop a strong sense of national identity.

Woon and Ali's (1998) argument of the state consolidating before the nation concurs with Tinker's (1981) characteristic of the development of the state to maintain the nation-state even before national consciousness in nation-building. The development of the state is uniquely achieved in Singapore through the monopoly of the People's Action Party rule since independence.

Devan (2004) echoes the same sentiment that a Singaporean state exists, a Singapore national identity is budding, forming and will take generations to build. This concept is deduced from the "nation" being distinct from the "state". Citing Max Weber, the sociologist's definition of a state as a human community that successfully claims monopoly of legitimate use of physical force in a territory; the nation is contrasted as something larger than the state with a community bound by shared history and culture. It is state-building that has brought Singapore this far from the Third World to First World country.

State-building in Singapore can be attributed to the bureaucratic structural support of nation-state (Tinker, 1981) through paternalistic and efficient national planning. Tinker, (1981) further surmises that the monopoly of power attained by the People's Action Party is due to the characteristic of the administrative state that controls political leadership in a dynastic fashion.

Ngaim (2004), a former permanent secretary in the civil service aptly noted that Singapore has still to evolve its own national cultural identity, but having only

“Western DNA” in its blood will be detrimental in an era when China and India are gaining foothold in the international arena. Fortunately the government has recently strategised in providing a scholarship scheme to nurture a group of Chinese students who will be bicultural so that they can effectively engage China in depth. Ngaim’s (2004) personal belief in building the national cultural identity in Singapore is to value human life and respect the core of the person. In time to come, Singapore can then embrace all who have their hearts set in Singapore.

Here Ngaim refers to Western DNA as Western influence that may not be culturally relevant or advantageous to Singapore, in the wake of China and India’s potential international sphere of economic influence. If Singaporeans do not appreciate their Asian roots, they will lose out to other Asian countries.

What Ngaim (2004) is essentially driving home to Singaporeans is the message that Singapore is lacking in a Singaporean cultural identity, that is primarily the Chinese culture close to that of China, so that it can reap long term economic benefits. Though the DNA is in name a cultural identity, it is in essence a means to an economic “survival” characteristic suggested by Tinker (1981).

This concept of DNA is used in Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s 1974 National Day Rally speech to refer to the verve, vitality and drive in Singaporeans that is the most precious asset Singapore has. Without any natural resources, the only way forward towards nation-building is for the Singaporeans to diligently strive

hard with the government, unions and employers to ensure survival and economic prosperity for the nation (Lee K Y, 0818, 1974).

Here, Lee Kuan Yew (1974) refers to DNA as a more direct source of “survival” characteristic by Tinker (1981), and the abstract concept of “drive” is used to persuade Singaporeans to work hard with the government towards nation-building as there is no other alternative to survival.

During the launch of National Education (see chapter 7.3.2.7 for details) for citizenship education in 1997, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong recounted that the younger generation's lack of understanding of Singapore's history will hinder the effort to develop a shared sense of history. Through National Education, the instincts to bond and survive as one nation will be part of the cultural DNA which makes them Singaporeans.

Here the cultural DNA refers to the loosely defined cultural heritage, a necessary set of values transmitted through National Education.

The DNA cultural heritage that is advocated here by Lee Hsien Loong (1997) can be a reflection of both Tinker's (1981) characteristic of “survival” where National Education is promoted as a means for the survival and unity of the nation; and Kellas' (1991) culture/cultural elite characteristic where Singapore's national history is preserved for posterity and also an attempt is made to produce a

cultural elite out of this history that is mainly centred on the struggles and achievements of the ruling political party that has brought Singapore out of the slums to affluence and prosperity.

To date, only one master's research thesis has been carried out by Chiew Seen Kong (1969) on "Singaporean National Identity". Even though Singapore was independent for about four years, a random sample of 990 Singaporeans of voting age exhibited high levels of national identity on the basis of eight indicators with regards to identity as Singaporeans; symbols of nationhood; national symbols; feelings towards symbols and symbols of national development; issue of separation with Malaysia; and willingness to die for Singapore (See Appendix 3.1 for details of findings).

The indicators used by Chiew were limited. They were factors that related to being Singaporeans; identification with different races; awareness, knowledge of, and affection for nationhood symbols; feelings of pride for national development symbols (e.g. industries and Housing Development Board flats), and separation from Malaya; loyalty to Singapore. But it served its purpose then as Singapore was a young and struggling nation.

Chiew's (1969) factors bear resemblance to Cameron's (1999) characteristic of "the arts" where national symbols are used in countries to preserve national identity. The factor on the willingness to die for Singapore can be classified as a

version of Kellas' (1991) characteristic of "official nationalism" where patriotism is involved and there are many races living in harmony.

Chew's 1969 survey was not replicated but in 1989, Chew and Tan carried out a national survey of a random sample of 706 Singaporeans for the Institute of Policy Studies. It was observed that inter-ethnic friendships between the Chinese and Malays, the Chinese and Indians, and the Malays and Indians have increased significantly since 1969. There was a large measure of social cohesion. However the English educated young, singles, better educated, those with higher income and politically alienated have considered emigrating, mainly to Australia and Canada. Factors contributing to their move include their children's education with problems in second language; overseas university education; socio-economic and political environment.

Kellas' (1991) characteristic of "official nationalism" of social cohesion appears to be satisfactory in Chew and Tan's (1989) survey, except for the discontent of the English educated young.

Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew (2000), wrote in *From Third World to First, The Singapore Story : 1965-2000*, acknowledging that while Singapore has made material gains from the Third World to the First World by 1990, it will however take another generation before Singapore's arts, culture and social standards can match the First World infrastructure they have installed.

Prime Ministers who succeeded Mr Lee Kuan Yew are aware of the need to build deep cultural roots to anchor our Asian heritage and identity. The Prime Ministers see a need to build a cultural elite as described by Kellas (1991) to compensate for the lack of strong cultural heritage that is uniquely Singaporean.

During Mr Goh Chok Tong's last National Day message on Aug 9<sup>th</sup> 2004 (he had served Singapore as the second Prime Minister since Mr Lee Kuan Yew retired as Prime Minister in 1990), Mr Goh spoke on the need to root Singaporeans to Singapore not just on material wealth alone and examined three critical factors in building the nation Singapore.

The first important factors include the emotions and intangibles like values, memories, families, friends and common commitment that bind Singaporeans to their country. Singaporeans who feel valued and have the opportunity to shape its future. The second critical factor is trust between the different communities and trust between the people and the government. With the discovery of the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network after the Sep 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack shocked Singaporeans and the trust level between the Muslim and other communities had to be carefully handled. To ensure Singapore's success, the third critical factor is the quality of national leadership. As Singaporeans are not naturally drawn to politics, the People's Action Party (PAP) has to systematically comb for good and capable people to become Members of Parliament and Ministers. What



distinguishes Singapore from other countries is that there is leadership self-renewal in a planned, orderly transition resulting in "politics of consensus and convergence". (The Straits Times, Aug 9<sup>th</sup> 2004)

Goh (2004) is asserting that while material wealth or the economic characteristic identified by Kellas (1991) matters, it is not sufficient. What Singaporeans are found wanting is the subjective characteristics of Smith's (1991) affective attitudes and emotional ties that are necessary to foster social and national cohesiveness. This is especially important when new forms of external threats are real challenges.

Singaporeans are also apolitical and are not naturally or culturally drawn into politics. This is inevitable because the authoritative PAP has dominated the political scene since independence. Goh (2004) is referring to the perpetuation of Kellas' (1991) characteristic of the political elite in the continuation of the administrative state characteristic mentioned by Tinker (1981). The renewal of political leadership within the monopoly of the ruling party is part of the bureaucratic national planning in support of the nation-state (Tinker 1981).

Current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong provides continuity in leadership for the nation-state Singapore. Lee (Oct 2004) spelt out key principles guiding leaders of Singapore in his address to the Commonwealth Association of Public Administration and Management biennial conference. There are three major

effects of globalisation that no country is exempt from. First it makes the task of the government more complex because of the variables that affect a much closely-knit world. Secondly, globalisation makes good governance a shared concern. Finally globalisation restricts the degrees of freedom as capital and talents are now globally mobile.

With regards to Singapore, the principles of governance that have evolved are both universal and unique to its context. There are four principles that lead the way. First, leadership is key in providing the vision to inspire and mobilize Singaporeans. The second universal principle is to "anticipate change and stay relevant". The third principle is "reward for work and work for reward". Singaporeans have learnt to be self-reliant. The fourth principle is to create "a stake for everyone, opportunities for all" (Lee, Oct 2004).

The researcher observes that while Cameron (1999) lists the Supranational Identity as a characteristic of globalisation factor in the e.g. of the European Union, the approach adopted by Singapore to tackle globalisation appears on the contrary to be "Intranational Identity" (Teo, 2005), a new version of national identity characteristic added by the researcher to suit the purpose for Singapore. The Singapore government, while recognizing the challenges of globalisation, appears to take a rather introspective bureaucratic stance in the four principles. The first principle of leadership renewal is the political elite factor (Kellas, 1991); the second principle to anticipate change and remain relevant refers to the

bureaucratic national planning support from the state (Tinker, 1981); the third principle is again the direction of the state in economic planning for work incentives (Tinker, 1981) and the fourth principle is in essence an economic survival stake for all (Tinker, 1981).

As the current Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong is faced with the task of steering the nation ahead in the midst of the demands of globalisation in a global world. Lee's maiden speech supports the researcher's classification of Objective/Globalised National Identity for Singapore. The PAP government is now bracing itself to take on the challenges of globalisation that includes not just the need to change and work hard to remain economically viable; but also to remain rooted in heart and soul in Singapore.

It is interesting and paradoxical to note that even though economic priority is paramount in the nation building strategies of Singapore, prime importance is mentioned for the more subjective and affective aspect of emotional bonding and ownership or sense of belonging. Lee (Oct 2004) underlined the end goal of any governance system as nation-building defined as creating an inclusive society where citizens not merely enjoy economic wealth, but also feel a sense of ownership and belonging. There is a need to "promote a sense of collective responsibility in an age of individual empowerment"; to build emotional stakes in the global era; and to preserve core values as a nation amidst a sea of changes and influences.

### **3.5.2 Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity in Hong Kong**

The following section will contribute towards understanding of how Hong Kong is categorized as Subjective/Objective National Identity. The studies below will be analysed to validate this category.

Hui et al (2004) in a study on the impact of study trips to China and the development of Hong Kong students' national identity, defined national identity as one's moral and emotional identification with the internalized image of and the relationship with his/her political community. The students' sense of national identity is manifested by his/her cognition of, affection for and behaviour towards his/her political community. Cognition refers to significant knowledge and understanding about the political community, China, and its underlying philosophy such as Chinese history, culture, government's political ideology and structure, society's problems and ways of carrying out the citizen's responsibility (Curriculum Development Council, 1996). Affection refers to one's emotional attachment to the nation. Behaviour varies from active acquisition of the knowledge of the nation and willingness to carry out one's responsibility towards the nation. These three dimensions are inter-related in the building up of national identity (Fok, 1997).

Results from Hui et al (2004) indicate that though the study trips help to nurture the cognitive and affective dimensions of national identity, there are limits and other critical possibilities involved.

Hui et al's (2004) dimensions for national identity can be found in one of Smith's (1991) characteristics of ethnic character, the public education factor where public education helps to induce in the young generation moral and affective behaviour towards the nation.

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government views education as the key to success in building human capital and expanding the pool of talents to maintain Hong Kong's economic development in the international arena. It is the single largest item of public expenditure at 19% of total Government expenditure. Education not only helps the people to realize their potential, but also helps individuals develop core values that are essential for guidance in an ever-changing global world (Tung Chee Wah, April 19<sup>th</sup> 1999).

Hong Kong student leaders who attended the National Education Course in Beijing were exhorted by Tung Chee Wah to equip themselves for the future by knowing the motherland China and building a sense of national awareness and identity. They were sent to Beijing to learn more about the developments and profound cultural heritage of China. The course covers a wide range of topics, including visits to China's manned space flight technology center, military camps and some sites for the Olympic Games facilities with dialogues with Olympic gold medallists and top China scientists (Tung Chee Wah, Jul 6<sup>th</sup>, 2004).

Public education is viewed as a means to provide core values to cope with the demands of the global identity as discussed by Cameron (1999). Learning the cultural heritage of China is part of the cultural and social policy (Smith, 1991) of rooting Hong Kong to China.

Kuan and Lau (1997) conducted a large-scale longitudinal survey investigating Hong Kong Chinese people's political attitudes in national identity. Research findings revealed that people in Hong Kong preferred to identify themselves as "Hongkongese" rather than Chinese. To address the gravity of the problem of national identity in Hong Kong, Ma (2000) used the term "re-nationalisation" to give it its due focus.

This need to unify Hong Kong to China can be categorized under the "political entity" characteristic suggested by Cameron (1999).

Lee (1999) found that Hong Kong students are weak in national identity despite emphasis of the official curriculum. The practice of nationalistic education is not well understood as teachers face difficulties of receiving and giving de-politicised education. This situation can be further explained by a recent study conducted by Leung and Print (2002) who discovered that while civic educators in secondary schools are willing to implement nationalistic education, the support shown in lending it as the core of civic education was inadequate. Thus Hong Kong

students have been schooled to be politically indifferent and attempts are being made to address this issue.

Again the characteristic of Smith's (1991) public education factor is mentioned here although it has not satisfactorily served its desired purpose of promoting nationalistic education for Hong Kong yet.

However, Tung Chee Hwa (Mar 15<sup>th</sup> 2004), the Chief Executive of Hong Kong attempted to quell any dispute about any lack of sense of national identity of Hong Kong people in his speech at a seminar. He claimed that since Hong Kong's return to the motherland China, the sense of national identity and national consciousness has increased among the people of Hong Kong. He cited a recent government survey which revealed that 78% of Hong Kong people would assume some duties and responsibilities for the country. Another majority of 66% agreed on more patriotic education to be introduced in Hong Kong. These figures are used as an indication that rational discussions on the principles of Hong Kong's constitutional development not only increases their understanding of the Basic Law, but is a form of civic education.

However there is no release on details of the data and modes of data collection to validate the conclusion derived by the Chief Executive that the sense of national identity has increased.

Here it can be suggested that Smith's (1991) "territorial political community" exists where the civic model of a community of citizens bound by laws share a public culture of allegiance of a sense of duty and responsibility to the nation.

Since Tung Chee Hwa became Chief Executive designate of post-colonial Hong Kong, he has been known to pledge great loyalty to Beijing (e.g. in his address to Chinese audience he would often remark, "Whatever we do in Hong Kong, we must think of the national objective"); yet at the same time vow to protect freedom for Hong Kong before international media. Tung Chee Hwa is advocating for Cameron's (1999) "political entity" characteristic in exhorting the people of Hong Kong to consider the national objective of the interests of China in whatever they undertake in Hong Kong.

Described as "Hong Kong's man on a tightrope", with a shipping magnate background whose business was once bailed out by Beijing, the issue of whether he would have the moral strength to stand up against China if a crisis arose over democratic principles and human rights was debated by CNN In-Depth Specials (1999).

Given pragmatic Tung Chee Hwa's track record as a business tycoon, his prime role in his office as Chief Executive was viewed with delight by the business community that economics and prosperity was key to Hong Kong's future development (CNN In-Depth Specials, 1999). The economic emphasis as key to



future development for Hong Kong can be classified as Hroch's (1998) social composition of an entrepreneurial class that is important for nation-building.

With full support from Central Government in China, two modern economic vehicles, CEPA (Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement) between Hong Kong and Mainland China; and Pan-PRD (Pan-Pearl River Delta Regional Co-operation and Development Forum) are known to break down obstacles to trade and reinforce the status of Hong Kong as one of the most dynamic economic centers of China and the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Tung Chee Hwa, Jul 12<sup>th</sup> 2004).

Chief Executive Tung acknowledged at the United Nations Sustainable Development Leadership Forum that Hong Kong's future depends upon finding a balance between the creation of wealth, equal opportunities for their citizens and respect for their natural and cultural heritage; and education is key to equip themselves for the knowledge-based economy (Tung Chee Hwa, Feb 25<sup>th</sup> 2004). It is obvious that the vision of Hong Kong being economically vibrant is more significant than been socially inclusive and valuing its cultural heritage.

Tung Chee Hwa's (2004) criteria for Hong Kong's future corresponds with Hroch's (1998) characteristics of social composition, community with rights and opportunities; as well as common origin and destiny with the motherland China.

That Hong Kong's destiny is inextricably intertwined with China's is inevitable as often reiterated by Tung Chee Wah (Feb 6<sup>th</sup> 2004) when he stated that his statement on "When Hong Kong succeeds, China will benefit. When China succeeds, Hong Kong will prosper" has come to pass. This is especially significant when China's GDP is expected to reach US\$4,000 billion by 2020.

When Tung Chee Hwa highlights in his statement the symbiotic relationship of dependency with mainland China, he is essentially creating a new set of values as discussed by Liah (1994) that could solve the crisis of recent identity when Hong Kong was handed over to China. In stating and annually reiterating that Hong Kong's economic interests rest in China's larger economic performance in the global scene, there is a transfer of values in creating a distinct national identity with China as one in economic purpose and direction.

Apart from support in the economic infrastructure from mainland China, Hong Kong continues to draw strength and pride in China's international achievements. Tung Chee Wah (Oct 1<sup>st</sup> 2004) glows with radiance at the mention of Hong Kong people feeling the impact of the surge in China's overall strength. China's first astronaut Yang Liwei and the Olympians who won 32 medals have visited Hong Kong one after the other.

National icon symbols through the astronaut and Olympic sportsmen from China have been used to garner pride and support in Hong Kong so that a national

identity can be forged. It reflects the public figure characteristic identified by Cameron (1999). These symbols and memories that are transmitted by the mass media are part of the cultural and social policy and together with the earlier discussed public education efforts, constitute the sum of total ethnic character characteristic discussed by Smith (1991) to provide political unity between Hong Kong and China.

The aspired national identity that Hong Kong seeks to build is being the world city of Asia, similar to the role of New York in North and South America and London for Europe. The world city that will be the envy of the world is defined by Tung Chee Wah (Jan 12<sup>th</sup> 2004) as a city that has developed great strengths in internationally oriented service industries and high level corporate service functions that include financial and business services, corporate and regional headquarters, news and information services, tourism and cultural activities. It has outstanding infrastructure, both in terms of "hard" infrastructure like transportation and telecommunications; and "soft" infrastructure, such as education, research and urban planning. It is underpinned by the rule of law, freedom of expression and free flow of information. It is also cosmopolitan and outward looking with a relationship with its hinterland.

This aspiration to assume a distinct national identity in the form of the world city in Asia is akin to the acquiring of transfer of values and structural aspects of setting (Hroch, 1998) where Hong Kong becomes renowned for its international

reputation as a service and financial center with a cultural hub. It is an ideal state to work towards and it involves the implied shedding of its previous less known and reputable status.

The sum total of Tung Chee Hwa's political speeches underline the importance of building an Objective/Subjective nation where Smith's (1991), Hroch's (1998), Liah's (1994) and aspects of Cameron's (1999) arguments of the main elements of ethnic, social, political, common origin, distinct character are predominant. Although the need for national identity is important when Hong Kong is returned to China, the greater need for objective nation-building is evident from the amount of economic investments prioritized and implemented. In fact the term "national identity" is loosely used and not directly appropriate for Hong Kong as it is returned as a region to China, not a nation on its own. (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994).

In order to prepare students to cope with the demands of the global economy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Hong Kong has reconceptualised its citizenship education into a multidimensional approach. It is appropriate to then categorise Hong Kong's identity as Objective/Subjective/Globalised National Identity.

### **3.6 Summary of National Identity Features of Singapore and Hong Kong**

Singapore and Hong Kong seem to have many similar features of national identity and nation/state-building as propounded by the scholars and their

respective politicians. Both countries have a common official language (Cameron, 1999) that unite the masses. For Singapore, English Language is the main official language that is widely used and internationally recognized, although the mother tongue languages (i.e. Malay, Mandarin and Indian languages) are also officially acknowledged. In Hong Kong, Mandarin and Cantonese continue to be common language and English Language is fast being promoted, as the current government's language policy is to enable students and the working population to be biliterate (in Chinese and English Language) and trilingual (in Cantonese, Putonghua and English Language) (Education Commission, June 2003).

Both countries also have Smith's (1991) elements of ethnicity and cultural heritage (more so for Hong Kong with ties to China that go a long way into history, than Singapore where nation building is still evolving) and a strong sense of political crafting (Tinker, 1981) in its state building. For Singapore, the ruling party, People's Action party has been responsible for the economic progress and political stability. The public figure (Cameron, 1999) who has been internationally known to have successfully created a successful nation-state in Singapore is Minister Mentor Mr Lee Kuan Yew (Rees-Mogg, 2000).

Hong Kong is now dependent upon the motherland China for its future economic and political progress. China is currently courting Hong Kong to win over its loyalty and pledge of patriotism amidst the latter's struggle for more democracy.

Religion and ethnicity in the strict sense do not feature prominently in Singapore and Hong Kong as discussed by Kellas (1991), and Hastings (1997). The reason could be that Singapore has always worked towards racial and religious harmony and there is a current perceived healthy measure of social cohesion in a multiracial society. Since the racial riots in the 1960s, there have not been any significant racial tensions in Singapore. Hong Kong has been a rather homogeneous society with the same racial population and religion has not been an issue.

To date, the only concern, at least for Singapore, is the fear of terrorism as Singapore is surrounded by mainly Muslim neighbours and physical security measures have recently been beefed up in public and private areas. Singapore also believes in total defence, which includes psychological defence, (which involves not just the Singapore Armed Forces but also the entire civilian population playing its part) partially transmitted through compulsory National Education in schools; National Service and Civil Defence. (Total Defence, 1997).

Political leaders from Singapore and Hong Kong tend to gravitate their concept of state/nation-building and national identity through economic means as a primary source of investment, especially in a global era where competition to survive in the international scene is demanding. Both of them acknowledge that there is an important need to be socially inclusive, to build greater cultural Asian/Chinese roots (more so for Singapore than Hong Kong because the history of

independence for Singapore is much shorter). Yet in practical terms, the leaders have been known to be more pragmatic than democratic.

It can be argued that democracy is not a factor in nationalism. None of the theorists have mentioned it so far and the lack of democracy is a characteristic which does not affect the definitions and characterizations discussed.

Chapter 4 will provide a historical explanation of how Singapore and Hong Kong got those national identity characteristics.

## **Chapter 4 Factors Affecting Nation-Building in Singapore**

### **4.1 Political, Economic and Social Factors that Influence Nation-Building in Singapore**

Outlining the transitology (as explained in chapter one) of the historical background of nation-building in post-colonial Singapore and Hong Kong, chapters 4 and 5 will serve as a link between chapter 2; methodology and data and chapter 3 on an approach to analyzing the theories of nationalism, nation-state and national identity, chapter 6 on citizenship education on the one hand; and the discussion of how citizenship education contributes to building national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong in chapter 7 and 8 and conclusion in chapter 9 on the other.

After analyzing the different theories of nationalism and national identity so far, the researcher has described Singapore and Hong Kong in terms of the characteristics of the different national identity categories.

This chapter will then provide the explanation of those characteristics i.e. the historical explanation of how Singapore and Hong Kong got those national identity characteristics.

Nation-building or state-building, as asserted before, is a concept that is derived from the multiple theories of nationalism. The researcher had earlier classified



## Singapore's nation-building as Objective/Globalised National Identity in chapter 3.4.1

To appreciate how Singapore strove and subsequently thrived from a third world country to the first, it is imperative to examine the political, economic and social factors that govern the circumstances of nation-building and relate it to transitology.

This chapter is structured with an account of the history of nation-building, followed by an analysis of the language of nationalism as delivered by the politicians of Singapore. The history of nation-building is examined through the political, economic and social factors as they are crucial factors that shape the birth of a new nation. An understanding of the language of nationalism by the politicians of Singapore can allow us to glean insights into the political ideologies that dominate the political climate and circumstances of the nation and which will be shown in later chapters to be present in the education system and in education for citizenship.

### **4.2 History of Singapore – An Overview**

When PAP ascended office in 1965, the political principles and practices were moulded by Lee Kuan Yew and his Cabinet out of the colonial legacy, adjusting to the pulls of diverse ethnic cultures and responding to the demands and constraints of the political circumstances. The colonial values and precepts that supported the foundation to the administration were modified to meet the

demands of a dynamic post-colonial government engaged in the rapid transformation of society and a search for effectiveness. (Chew and Lee, 1991).

In 1965, the total population in Singapore was 1.886.9 million, compared to the latest population count of 4.351.4 million for year 2005. (Statistics Singapore, 2006). The population is largely composed of descendents of immigrants from the China, Malay Peninsula and Indian sub-continent. Since 1957, when the PAP government took political control from the British government, the racial pattern has been about 75% Chinese, 14% Malay, 9% Indian, and 2% others (George, 1992). Projected as a multi-racial nation, the official languages include English as a language of administration, Chinese (Mandarin), Malay (National Language) and Tamil.

The challenges that faced a newly birthed nation of Singapore were economic, social, political. Singapore's first task was to change from a traditional commercial and semi-industrial city-state into an accelerated industrialized and competitive commercial state. In 1965, Singapore handled the second largest shipping in the Commonwealth. (George, 1992). The economy recovered from a drop in GDP and grew by 8% in 1965 due to the expansion of the manufacturing and construction sectors. Contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP for 1965 was \$465.1 million, a significant increase of 10% from 1964, following the resumption of trade with Indonesia. It was also followed by a high level of education and literacy. (Chew and Lee, 1991).

The Singapore Housing and Development Board (HDB) was set up in 1960 to cater to the housing needs of the growing population. There was extensive developments of housing estates and by 1965, 54,430 housing units were built. (Chew and Lee, 1991).

A second sacred duty of the government was to defend the nation. And since August 1965, the defence of the nation rested with the Ministry of Defence, which introduced National Service for every able-bodied man between 18 to 45 to be skilled in the techniques of modern weaponry. (George, 1992).

The issue of immigration was also welcomed by Lee Kuan Yew. Lee Kuan Yew (1965) reported that in 1964, 10,000 immigrants from Malaysia in the age group of 20 to 30 changed their Malaysian for Singaporean identity cards, and they represented 25% of that young adult age group. Significantly, Lee (1965) was optimistic that there could be 100 to 150 trained technocrats like engineers, doctors, lawyers and teachers who could make contributions to Singapore. Thus the whole notion of netting the best expertise with an underlying view to potential leadership from the young immigrants can be noted in the early years of nation forming.

The researcher postulates that the gestation of Singapore's nation-building began after World War Two. In an instinctive response to the unquestioning trust

on British protection that was shattered, the seeds of nationalism were sown and political parties in Singapore suddenly mushroomed.

Soon after the return of the British after the defeat of Japan, Singapore's first political party, Malayan Democratic Union, was formed in December 1945. Then came the Singapore Progressive Party and the Singapore Labour Party. Between 1948 and 1955, when the first General Election for the Legislative Assembly was held, the Labour Front led by David Marshall and People's Action Party (PAP) founded by Lee Kuan Yew emerged. (Singapore, 1998; Lau 2004).

Lee Kuan Yew personally acknowledged that the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) filled him with hatred for the atrocities inflicted on Asians, aroused his nationalism and self-respect, and the resentment of being subjugated. His four years as a student in Britain after the war also strengthened his resolve to remove the British colonial rule (Lee K Y, 2000; Mauzy et al, 2002).

David Marshall, Singapore's first Chief Minister led the First All-Party Mission to London for talks on self-government.

Lau (2004) suggests that Marshall's agenda was for an independent Singapore and it was only then that Singapore's nationalism was forged. Failure on Marshall's part to secure self-government prompted Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of the Federation of Malaysia to welcome Singapore into the

Federation, like Malacca and Penang. The concept of linking independence with merger was generally welcomed and not unique to the people of Singapore (Singapore, 1998).

In 1957, a Second All-Party Mission led by Lim Yew Hock (from Singapore People's Alliance) to give Singapore internal self-government was successful. Tay (1999) asserts that Lim Yew Hock was successful in negotiating the main terms of a new Singapore Constitution. External affairs and defence would still come under the purview of the British. 1957 was also the year that PAP came into power. In 1959 when Lee Kuan Yew was elected as the first Prime Minister and the Citizenship Bill was passed. 325,020 new citizens had the right and duty to vote. This was significant as the drive for citizenship started with the Citizenship Bill. (Singapore, 1998).

In May 1959, when the PAP swept into victory, the National Loyalty Week followed Lee Kuan Yew's inauguration and the flag, crest and Malay anthem *Majulah Singapura* of the new State of Singapore were revealed for the first time. The red in the flag, the colour of blood, symbolizes universal brotherhood and equality of man and the colour white, purity and virtue. The crescent symbolizes a country that is eternally young in spirit and outlook. The five stars represent the ideals of democracy, peace, progress, justice and equality. The state crest has a lion which represents Singapore and a tiger to represent Singapore's links with

the Federation of Malaya. They were symbolic of Singapore's hopes for merger which materialized in September 1963 (Singapore, 1998).

Lee Kuan Yew, in his new bearings address to principals of schools in Singapore on August 1966 lamented that the Singapore community then lacked in-built reflexes of loyalty, patriotism, history or tradition. The education system was not designed to produce people who could cohesively act together in collective interests for the new nation. One of the ways to build national consciousness was to require the students to take the oath or Singapore pledge daily with due respect and appreciation. The flag raising and flag lowering ceremonies was a good start to produce a community that can feel for and protect the country. Mr Lee exhorted the principals and teachers to feel the spirit of nation-building, its urgency and importance, otherwise the flag-raising and flag-lowering ceremonies would not be meaningful (Lee K Y, 1966).

Chiew (1990) supports the rituals of the daily national ceremonies in the schools by asserting that they are outstanding examples of national values which give rise to the emergence of a Singaporean identity. Inoguchi (2000) also accentuates national markers as symbols of nation-building and national identity in Japan. Notable symbols in Japanese education include the national flag, the national anthem *Kimigayo*, the national flower, and the cherry blossom are highlighted in ceremonies of compulsory education.

After 1966, the objective of inculcating national identity and patriotism was instilled through the daily pledge and flag-raising ceremony during which the national anthem is sung. Work on a new series of history textbooks in the four languages for primary schools told the story of the various immigrant races in Singapore and their descendants who had a pioneering spirit and were model successful businessmen. With the development of the total defence concept, (which includes psychological, social, economic, civil and military defence) principals were informed of the need to regard national service as an extension of schooling. It reflects the nation's preoccupation with national defence filtered down to the school level. (Gopinathan, 1990). This need to defend oneself as a new nation was presented as a consequence of the vulnerable geographic location amongst Muslim neighbors and its small size.

Until today, the practice of taking the Singapore pledge, flag-raising and flag-lowering ceremonies is carried out dutifully daily in all the schools and serves as a visible instrument of building national identity.

With the acquisition of power by the PAP in 1959, the nature of politics and direction of socio-economics began to change. Until today PAP is viewed by many Singaporeans as the unchallenged national political party. PAP now views itself as the sole custodian of the Singapore nation, its integrity, prosperity and welfare. Vasil (2000) and Ho (2003) asserts that for Singapore, political leadership in the PAP is of the utmost importance in making the country what it is

today. Although the roles played by dominant politicians set the tone for the national agenda and politics, it is the political executive in the Prime Minister that dominates the public policy-making process.

#### **4.3 Nationalism as Anti-Communism**

Immediate tasks ahead for the newly elected PAP in 1959 were challenging. Two important tasks were to promote a sense of nationalism among the various multi-ethnic sectors in society; and to reorganize an economy that was dependent on trade into one of manufacturing of goods. Before PAP could effectively embark on these tasks, certain internal political struggles had to be tackled. PAP was at first formed as a coalition of English-educated social democrats or moderates and left-wing Chinese-educated pro-communists. (Vasil, 2000).

Chew et al, (1991) discuss Britain's keen interest in Singapore's internal security in relation to the communist threats; as manifested in the wait for independence in 1963 for Singapore, compared to Malaysia's earlier independence in 1957. Britain was apprehensive about Singapore's ability to handle the communists, let alone consolidate independence.

The account of this period in Singapore (1998) suggests that while both political groups were united in their aim at ending the colonial rule so that Singapore could become independent, the left-wing pro-communists had an agenda of a communist takeover.



However Singapore (1998) is a primary government document and not an independent secondary academic analysis. It reflects the ruling party's political view of the situation where threats of communism loomed large. Subduing and controlling the communists was and is still presented as an important political agenda for the English educated professional group of the PAP.

However the two groups needed each other. Without the left-wing group which consisted mainly of trade unionists, the English-educated moderates of professionals could not attract the majority Chinese-speaking voters. Without the moderates, a PAP led by pro-communists would not be accepted by the British. The differences between the groups became apparent when the issue of merger with Malaysia became a possibility between 1959 and 1961. The pro-communists did not want a merger with Malaya as they did not want to come under the anti-communist Federation of Malaya. (Mason, 2000). The intra-party struggle became obvious when the 13 pro-communists members were sacked from PAP in July 1961 and in August 1961, registered the Barisan Sosialis with Lee Siew Choh as chairman. PAP's fear of losing control to the leftists was real. In 1957, the pro-communists actually took control of internal governing (Mauzy et al, 2002; Wang 1994).

In July 1962, 19 Barisan Sosialis members presented a memorandum to the United Nations Committee on Colonialism objecting to the way the Referendum on merger with Federation of Malaya was worded and had campaigned against

voting for merger. Tunku Abdul Rahman's proposal of merger was a perceived welcomed opportunity by PAP and Singaporeans in general to bring about a closer political and economic association between Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei, the Federation and Singapore (Singapore, 1998).

The researcher notes that this serious issue of settling the memorandum with the United Nations was not mentioned in the local or foreign historians' record of history, Lee Kuan Yew's National Day speeches or even in his *Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew* (2000). The researcher discovered it while she was combing the archive of Lee Kuan Yew for all his official primary documents that were released. The document (LKY/1962/LKY0726A.DOC, 1962, p 1) entitled "*The Position of the Government on the Singapore National Referendum Ordinance, With an Explanation of the Internal Political Situation in Singapore, 1961-62, Which Led to the Present Petition to the United Nations Committee of 17<sup>th</sup> on Colonialism*" was introduced with background information that behind the petition, "lies a record of bitter political struggle that had been waged in Singapore during the last 12 months". It could be that since it was a sensitive issue of internal political struggles that was brought to the international level, it had to be immediately arrested. It serves as a reminder that PAP will not tolerate foreign intervention in its domestic struggles in nation-building.

In a 34 page official document submitted to the United Nations, Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee went to New York to explain in detail the position of the

PAP government on the Singapore National Referendum Ordinance, with record of the internal political situation in Singapore, 1961-1962, which led to the pro-communists' petition. Lee Kuan Yew provided background information that the pro-communists was seeking external consolation by bringing issues into the international arena. Mr Lee assured the United Nations that the Referendum would be conducted scrupulously and advised the United Nations against interfering over Singapore's internal-party quarrel in which the pro-communists had already left the governing party. The Barisan Sosialis' petition did not warrant attention from foreign parties. (Lee K Y 0726A.DOC, 1962)

Since then, the PAP has been very careful to ensure that Singapore would be free from communist subversion. Lee Kuan Yew's National Day speech on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1963 urged Singaporeans to treasure their military, economic and political assets and warned against allowing their assets to be frittered away by the communists and racialism. In spite of anti-national pro-communist elements that attacked the economy through strikes and disruptive activities, Singapore had survived the odds (Lee K Y 0603, 1963; Mauzy et al, 2002).

This call to safeguard Singapore against the communists has been echoed through the decades by the Prime Ministers. E.g. Lee Kuan Yew again reiterated in his National Day broadcast in 1970 that the communists were out to exploit racial and other conflicts. They had resorted to violence, blown booby trap bombs and burnt community centers and buses. The PAP government would have to

deal with them. (Lee K Y 0809, 1970). When faced with serious threats from the communists, PAP resorted to the use of harsh policies to curb the deadly threats. Ho (2003)

On Jan 1980, at the PAP 25<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Rally, Lee Kuan Yew's speech reflected on the lessons learnt from the past. When the British colonialist withdrew, they conceded power to nationalists and trends were clear that nationalism would triumph in Singapore. Nationalism in Singapore had to slog it out with communism for the hearts and minds of the people. The nationalists in Singapore came close to being defeated by the communists as the latter mounted vicious attacks daily between 1961 to 1962. Singaporeans witnessed for themselves who had what it takes to be their leader in suppressing the communists (Lee K Y 0120, 1980; Chew et al, 1991).

Goh Chok Tong, Singapore's second Prime Minister who assumed office on November 1990, belonged to the second generation of PAP leaders that bridged the pre-independence and post-independence period. In his National Day's Rally Speech in 1996, he spoke of the witness of communists' attacks and racial tensions that shaped his outlook of life. The post-independence generation born after 1965 grew up in peaceful and prosperous times without experiencing the trials and tribulations of pre-independence and early nationhood. There is a need to put in extra effort to stay socially cohesive. (Goh C T, 1996; Chong, 1991).

Lee Kuan Yew, as Minister Mentor in his 2004 National Day celebration speech mentioned again that his generation of leaders went through “the fire of baptism when they were faced with the terrors of communist insurgency, communal bloodshed”. These events had steeled them for life (Lee K Y, 2004; Lau, 2004).

In the above speeches made by both Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong on the need to fight communism at all costs to protect and defend Singapore, nationalism has been implicitly defined as anti-communism. Although PAP started out by including the pro-communists, they are presented as a threat to the political stability and nation-building progress of Singapore.

This definition of nationalism corresponds to Hayes' (1926) depiction of the dual nature of nationalism which can be perceived as a force for good or evil. Here in the Singapore context, the communists with all their violent attacks, are presented as an evil obstacle that has to be weeded out so that the new nation can have a chance to survive.

#### **4.4 The Singapore Story – Creation of a Myth of Nationhood**

Historically, Singapore's dubious and reluctant birth of independence in 1965, was initially regarded by other nations as a nonentity. Mr Lee Kuan Yew recorded in his memoirs (Lee K Y, 2000) that he personally shared the gloomy sentiments of foreign reporters. Denis Warner wrote in Sydney Morning Herald (10 August 1965) that an independent Singapore was not viable. Richard Hughes further

commented in the London Sunday Times (22 August 1965) that Singapore's economy would collapse if the British bases were closed. Not wanting to demoralize the people of Singapore, he kept the fears to himself. On the 9<sup>th</sup> August 1965, Lee Kuan Yew admitted that he started out his duties for the newly birthed sovereign state with great trepidation on an uncharted journey (Lee K Y, 2000).

Ho (2003) agrees that separation from Malaysia was the most traumatic event in Singapore's political history. Leifer (2000) conveyed a similar sentiment when he noted that the initial image of political feebleness was shown, when Lee Kuan Yew was reduced to uncontrollable tears at a televised conference immediately after the public announcement of separation.

True to Lee Kuan Yew's foresight, the PAP government wasted no time in building up a core of leadership expertise through the various government institutions that are vital in working with the people in Singapore to transform Singapore from a Third World country to the First World within 35 years.

In order to educate the younger generation of Singaporeans on the early struggles of communist instigated unrest, racial riots, hardships and ravages of the Japanese Occupation, the National Education Exhibition was officially opened by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1998. The exhibition tells *The Singapore Story*, from the time of colonial rule to the present and a recurrent

thread that weaves through the story is Singapore's vulnerabilities and constraints (Goh C T, 1998). The introduction of National Education which was aimed at informing the public about Singapore's uniqueness and vulnerability, has a major history component (Ho, 2003).

The *Singapore Story* thus became an institutionalised platform of public education through which political ideologies are communicated to the future generations on the struggles and achievements of the ruling political party and the birth and success of the nation-state Singapore.

A fuller account of National Education will be analysed in chapter 7.3.2.7 .

The account of history given in the *Singapore Story* says that the short-lived merger with Malaysia was fraught with problems. The strongest reasons for merger were economic. Instead the expectations of the benefits were not realised and Singapore found itself at an economic disadvantage. But it was the grave concern of Tunku Abdul Rahman's fear of the potential violent racial tensions between the Chinese and Malay communities that prompted him to ask Singapore to leave. For Mr Lee Kuan Yew, the moment of anguish in receiving the news was heartbreaking because merger stood for everything that he believed in politically for that period. (Singapore, 1998; Lee K Y, 2000).

The *Singapore Story* is a device for crafting the history of the birth of the nation-state Singapore. It fits into Kellas' (1991) and Hroch's (1998) history

characteristics of culture and common origin and destiny where shared history is a characteristic of a new nation.

#### **4.5 Nation-Building Through Economic Means**

A key Singapore icon, the Economic Development Board (EDB) appeared in 1961 on the advice of Dr Albert Winsemius, a Dutch economist on the first United Nations economic mission to Singapore, who became a consultant to the government. The establishment of the EDB was instrumental in building the economic infrastructure of the economy. It is a one-stop investment agency with authority to move in multifarious areas ranging from financing to clearing land for factories. (Singapore, 1998). It was the main instrument that brought about massive investment in the private sector (Chew et al, 1991). By 2001, the EDB's strategy in courting multinational corporations had reached a new dimension of 6000, including projects like "fabless" wafer fabs that did not require heavy physical investments ( Mauzy et al, 2002).

Another venture of success in the harnessing of crucial leadership is the winning over of the Unions by PAP. Lee Kuan Yew started out his political career fighting for the unions as their legal adviser. Having witnessed how the communists had a hold on the unions, leading to endless strikes and riots, Lee dealt with the Public Daily Rated Cleansing Workers' Union's workers strike head-on in 1967. An amendment was made to the labour laws to ban all strikes in some essential services and each statutory board had its own union. Management had to



undertake their new role of winning worker cooperation. It was a necessary action to restore international confidence in Singapore. The National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) is now a household name in Singapore. Its success is largely due to the credit of PAP's close involvement in selecting the leaders. Lee Kuan Yew himself personally handpicked and groomed choice leaders, at times selecting only the best overseas scholars with interpersonal skills. NTUC's positive approach to solving problems helped to significantly reduce unemployment from 14% in 1965 to 1.8% in 1997 (Lee K Y, 2000; Chew et al, 1991; Mauzy et al, 2002; Han et al, 1998).

Just as the Singapore government cannot allow any margin of error for the threat of communists to threaten its very survival in nation-building, it is also clear about the need for the Workers' Union to work alongside the government, and not against it. Otherwise, if the Workers' Union is allowed to conduct strikes, then it will undermine the political stability of the nation. This philosophy has dominated the political scene from the very beginning, has proven effective and continues to be perpetuated. Thus the NTUC is a good example of how the PAP has not only tamed the Workers' Union, but had a stake in moulding it to be very successful in nation-building.

Separation from Malaysia had deepened the economic woes that already existed before the merger. From 1959 to 1965, economic planning was based on access to a domestic market that included Malaysia. With the separation from Malaysia,

this market was lost and a new strategy focused on the export of labour-intensive manufactures. Until the 1950s, Singapore functioned mainly as an entrepot, heavily dependent on trade. The decision to industrialise took place soon after the PAP government came into power in 1959. Industrialization was seen as the only way out of a vicious cycle of poverty, unemployment, labour unrest and political turmoil. (Pang, 1982). Quah (1990) affirmed that the main foundation of PAP's nation-building is the promotion of economic growth.

The second stage of economic development strategy was timed when the world economy was booming. From 1966 to 1973, Singapore experienced the fastest period of growth in its history. Entrepot trade was replaced by a diversified economic structure based on manufacturing, trade, finance and transportation. The diversification of the economy changed the demand for various types of workers. Demand for high-level manpower – professionals, technicians, administrators and managers grew rapidly in an increasingly complex economy. To accommodate the changing manpower needs, much manpower planning was emphasized on the supply of manpower development through the expansion of formal schooling and training programme. Changes were made in the education system to meet the perceived manpower needs of rapid industrialization. In the early 1970s vocational education was apparently a success as vocational graduates were hired quickly in the labour market and their earnings exceeded those of other school leavers. The trend toward English-stream education was also apparent in 1966 and accelerated. In 1979 over 90% of the parents chose

to enroll their children in English-stream in Primary 1, compared with less than 50% two decades earlier. (Pang, 1982; Gopinathan 1974; Soon 1988).

In 1971 when the British forces pulled out, security was not the only concern for Singapore. Investors in the manufacturing plants and other business needed a boost of confidence that Singapore could survive without the British military umbrella, without a hinterland. Lee Kuan Yew was adamant about Singapore not becoming dependent on perpetual foreign aid. There is nothing that Singapore gets for free, even the water has to be paid for. Immediately the government formed the Bases Economic Conversion Department with Hon Sui Sen in charge of retraining and redeploying redundant workers. Singapore had to build an army from scratch with help from the Israelis who were competent not only in transmitting military skills but also imparting doctrines which they used for their training. By 1990, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) had grown into a respectable professional force operating modern defence systems that was capable of defending the territorial independence of the state. SAF's readiness continues to be rated highly by defence journals e.g. *Asia Pacific Defence Reporter*. (Lee K Y, 2000; Mauzy et al, 2002; Quah, 1990).

This philosophy that Singapore has to continually work hard for its own economic survival and protection has become a deep seated ideology that is transmitted to the citizens at large and students in the schools as we shall see in the analysis in a later chapter. This ideology is one that is deliberately created by the



government. It relates to the economic characteristic discussed by Kellas (1991) and the survival characteristic proposed by Tinker (1981) in chapter 3.4.1. Both characteristics are typical of the elements identified in transitology of political and economic struggles faced by new nations after colonial transitions.

In the speech to mark the 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of Singapore in 1969, Lee Kuan Yew took pride in proclaiming how right it was that Singaporeans sweated on the assumption that no one owes them a living and that they strove to become rugged, robust, resilient and resourceful as a nation (Lee K Y 0206, 1969; Han et al, 1998). It provides data to show that the deliberate policy on economic and survival characteristics are working and will continue to work for Singapore.

#### **4.6 Nationalism As a Rationale for Elite Government**

Goh Chok Tong in the 2002 National Day Rally address stressed the need for Singaporeans to change negative mindsets in remaking Singapore in the new phase of challenging global economic situations. The future is what Singaporeans make out of it. When Singapore faced the oil crisis in 1973 and the first recession in 1985, the government intervened. Likewise with the growing economic competition from globalisation, economic measures to cope with the pessimism about Singapore's future would again be meted out by the government, headed by the Economic Review Committee. The social and political counterpart of the Economic Review Committee is another important

Remaking Singapore Committee which looks into how to root Singaporeans to Singapore (Goh C T, 2002; Quah, 1990).

While Bastion (2004) argues that the Remaking Singapore will help Singapore reinvent themselves to stay as a relevant nation in the future in the areas of economy, social cohesion, racial harmony and more demanding citizenry; Ho (2003) is of the opinion that the Remaking Singapore movement is more of a political exercise than a genuine effort to seek solutions for Singapore's future because of Singapore's smallness of size and PAP's intolerance of failure and dissent.

While it can be concurred that Bastion's (2004) view of Remaking Singapore is an economic characteristic designed by the government in nation-building for Singapore; Ho's (2003) opinion that it is a political exercise to reinforce the power of the PAP further accentuates it as another political instrument in nation-building.

The effort of the Remaking Singapore committee is one of hegemony, where political ideologies can "lead to social and cultural transformation" (Ting-Hong Wong, 2002, vii) . To date, 55 out of 91 proposals from the youths to reshape Singapore have been accepted. One of the top 5 recommendations is to outsource National Education in schools to commercial providers. The government wants more youth groups involved in future issues as they gain

insight into policy-making. (The Straits Times, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2005). This strategy is one way of recruiting potential leadership for PAP to maintain the elite leadership.

Lee Hsien Loong, the current Prime Minister who took over the office from Goh Chok Tong in August 2004, reminded Singaporeans in his first National Day Rally speech that Singapore was referred to as a mere little red dot by Dr Habibie from Indonesia. Ho (2003) in describing Singapore's constraint of its tiny size, again quoted President Habibie's cynical comment that Singapore is only a small red dot on the map. If Singaporeans do not defend their own interests, no one will. This creation of a virtual state of war and justification for the elite rule is a theme that runs across all the three generations of leadership. The struggle for continual survival and national identity is still paramount. It is reflected in Mr Lee's priorities which include external relations, building the economy and investment in education to develop their character and emotional roots in Singapore (Lee H L, 2004).

Here is another of the government's ideological devices for justifying the elite leadership to combat the creation of a virtual war so that the nation-state can maintain its survival. It is again related to Tinker's (1981) survival and Kellas' (1991) political elite characteristics which also presumes an economic characteristic of Kellas (1991) where the nation can thrive economically as a result of good governance. It is an example of the characteristics identified in

transitology of political and economic issues for nation-building after the colonial transition.

#### **4.7 Social Factors that Influence Nation-Building and Education**

Just as political and economic factors influence nation-building in Singapore, social factors also impact the circumstances of nation-building and give rise to new beginnings in education.

The original compartmentalized system of education in Singapore in the early 1900s consisted of different streams of the English Christian missionary schools, colonial government Malay schools, community-run Chinese schools and estate-run Tamil schools. "Education was socially divisive, separating the English and the vernacular educated, widening the gap between the different communities except at the highest level, accentuating racial, cultural, and linguistic differences..." (Gopinathan, 1990, 10).

The fostering of national identity through education would entail working towards a single national educational school system with common public schools attended by students of all races. The point is supported by reference to Hobsbawm (1994) who refers to the use of education by the French government to turn peasants into Frenchmen and good Republicans. Smith (1991) also proposes that public education can be used to produce literate culture and a

homogeneous nation. It is an example of the cultural dimension in transforming the new nation through public education as identified in transitology.

An attempt to work towards a national education system was proposed in the 1956 All-Party Report on Chinese Education, produced by the All-Party Committee with Lee Kuan Yew as a member. The report stressed the need for an integrative approach in education to play an important role in nation-building. Bilingualism was promoted; there was equality of treatment for all streams; and civics was given importance in school curriculum to teach moral education. In 1969 and 1970, the second language was given a practical application when civics and history were taught in the mother tongue in some English-medium schools, while some Malay and Tamil-medium schools taught woodwork, metalwork and basic electricity in English (Gopinathan, 1990; Quah, 1990).

Whilst English Language is the language of commerce and has international utilitarian value, the policy of bilingualism can help to anchor the Asian cultural heritage. This is evident in the rationale for studying Education for Living in the mother tongue in the 1970s to help students better appreciate Asian moral and social values; and to foster a stronger sense of nationhood (Gopinathan, 1990; Bastion, 2004). The use of language as an important component of nationalism is argued for by Cameron (1999), Anderson (1983) who highlight the function of language as a cultural source of nationalism; which again reflects transitology characteristics of transition.



It is an example that a discourse of nation has been created by the political leaders, local and foreign writers about Singapore. It is one of State-building nationalism where the state is heavily involved in the political stability and economic prosperity of the nation. There is an element of Unification nationalism and patriotism as in the earlier section 4.3 where anti-communism is used as a form of nationalism. The importance of social cohesion is emphasized in part through education.

The language of nationalism needs to be analysed because it reveals the ideology and the deliberate crafting of nationalism by the politicians. The politicians' interest in public education in moulding the interest of nationalism is further examined in chapters 7 and 8.

The concept of nationalism has been commonly referred to as a major concept by scholars as "nationalist ideology and language", viewed with equal importance as the other two concepts of "national sentiment" and "nationalist movements". (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994).

#### **4.8 Discourse of Nationalism**

In this section the researcher will analyse official documents of the politicians. This is one approach to understand the views of politicians and to establish acts about the ways in which politicians think about nationalism; and relate them to the political, economic and social factors would involve having access to

confidential government or personal papers of the respective politicians which is not at the moment possible.

So the next best alternative in analyzing the politicians' thinking behind the ideologies would be to do an analysis of the language in the public documents. It is hoped that through the analysis, the thoughts of the politicians will be understood more clearly than in confidential documents.

The researcher will deal with two parts on the language of nationalism. The first part dwells on the basic principles of early nation-building, initiated by the first Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew in 1967.

The second part focuses on the language of nation-building and national identity as delivered by the three Prime Ministers.

#### **4.8a Analysis of Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 Speech on Nation-Building**

Two years after independence, Mr Lee Kuan Yew spoke on the basic principles of nation-building for Singapore:

"First, the people must have the will to be a nation.  
This is our first problem: the will to be a people. That we must have.  
... without the will, the collective will to assert our right mind to be ourselves, then we must perish.  
There is always a hard core of people who represent that will, people whose instinctive reflexes are those of the national interests. You must have that.  
Tonight, the people around me on the stage represent that embryonic will of a people. ... In Singapore, at the top, it is about 200 people.

and at grass roots another 2000. If you kill the 200 on the top and the 2000 on the ground in one blow you will have destroyed Singapore. ... Over the years, we must consolidate this will and the mechanics by which this will is able to express itself: We must institutionalize the various organs of leadership.

All this adds up very simply to on to one thing: have we got the will in the community to and the leadership to give expression to that will. If we have, and our people have got the stuffing that is required to ride the kind of problems in a turbulent world, then we begin to be a nation". (Lee K Y 0815, 1967).

See Appendix 4.1 for the full speech

Flowerdew (2004) critically examined the discourse of first Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, Tung Chee Hwa in his first five year period in office. Using four discursive strategies, Flowerdew (2004) examined how Tung's speeches mirrored that of Chris Patten in creating a myth of Western values and how Tung added new emphases.

The researcher will adopt two of Flowerdew's (2004) strategies, i.e. presupposition and lexical reiteration to examine Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 speech on nation-building as they throw light on how Lee Kuan Yew initially crafted his ideology in persuading the Singaporeans to collectively bond as one people and look to PAP for directions in nation-building.

#### **4.8ai Presupposition**

Presupposition refers to the background assumptions that speakers make about their audience when they speak. One of the features of presupposition is that of economy (Levinson 1983) cited in Flowerdew, (2004). The degree of explicitness required would depend on the shared knowledge of the interlocutors. When

speakers make assumptions about their audience which they know is not the case of presupposition, it may turn into manipulation (Flowerdew, 2004).

Politically, the goal of persuasion can be construed to build ideological conviction as in the case of Singapore.

In Lee Kuan Yew's discourse, there is evidence that he has made assumptions concerning the degree in which his audience shared his conception of nation-building. The 20 paragraphs of speech alternate between statements of facts, uncertainties, threats and the proposed solution in the exclusive form of a combination of "the will" of the people that is directed by the leadership of PAP. This is in spite of the fact that the ideology of "the collective will" is abstract, not concretely defined or easily understood; and an alternative perspective of solution is closed or not entertained.

For example, Lee Kuan Yew starts off the first paragraph by painting a rather bleak future about the uncertainties for Singapore. He follows by stating the fact that there are too many "imponderables" to consider. Here the audience would be able to identify the yet raw experience of being evicted from Malaysia in 1965 and the consequences of the then impending British withdrawal of forces. Immediately, Lee introduced an urgent step to counter the imponderables by warning them that if they are not organized, there is no hope for their future generations.

Probably Lee was trying to set the scenario for urgent political intervention and garner the support of the public in working towards a future for their families. It was an effective means of getting their attention to listen up to what seemed like a hopeless political and economic situation that concerned their immediate future.

Paragraph 3 and 4 stated facts that though the colonial government had contributed to building and ordering their colonies, when the colonial powers leave, many new nations cannot manage on their own.

Paragraph 5, 6, 7 highlight the only way in which Singapore can forge ahead. Singaporeans need to have the collective will to cooperate with the PAP government.

Paragraph 8 and 9 extend and validate "this will" to other established countries like Japan, America, Britain. It is depicted as a universal ideology.

Lee Kuan Yew uses the following presuppositions which are imposed on the listeners by taking them for granted even though they in fact may not be shared by the audience who are the common people listening in.

The first presupposition is that "there are too many factors, too many imponderables" in Asia and the world in 1985, 20 years from 1967; and unless

Singaporeans “organize ourselves and anticipate quite a number of problems which we know are coming”, their children would have no future in Singapore. (Lee KY, 1967 para 1, 2). There is no discussion about this, it is taken for granted. It presumes that the audience know that not only Singapore as a post-colonial nation, but Asia and the world are heading for a very bleak future. Unless something is done through the form of organized leadership, Singapore cannot possibly survive with the perceived impending worldwide calamity. This statement sets the platform for discussion of the argument that a political organized government can be the solution to their plight.

While acknowledging that the colonial rule has “built up the apparatus of a modern state.... It does not mean that therefore you can take over, ... and things will go on just as before”. Lee KY (1967, para 4) further strengthens his case that Singapore cannot just continue to strive on its own after the post-colonial transition without any organised effort as witnessed in Asia and Africa. Implied in his statement is that without strong political acumen and bureaucracy on the part of the local people, Singapore cannot survive. The audience would not know what the colonial rulers had done for other Asian countries and how the new governments had failed in their endeavour to be successful in taking over. At this point, Lee is still vague about what PAP has to offer but the presupposition is that once the first presupposition is accepted then the second – that someone must organize and that it has to be Lee KY from PAP is also imposed on the listener.

Immediately in the next paragraph five, Lee specifies what could possibly provide them with hope – in the form of an abstract “will to be a nation” that is found lacking in parts of Africa where there is civil war. The issue is then applied to Singapore because Singaporeans also lack “the will to be a people”. Lee cautions Singaporeans that since “we continue to be just so many individuals without the will, the collective will to assert our right to be ourselves, then we must perish”. (Lee KY, 1967, para 5, 6). Lee presumes that this newly coined political term “will” which is not defined in a concrete manner is understood by the audience as it is of utmost importance and the life and death of a new nation hinges on its very existence.

This “will” is then vaguely explained in paragraph 8 as “people whose instinctive reflexes are those of the national interests” where Lee Kuan Yew now refers to the successful leadership of the established countries like Japan, Britain, France and America. Examples are given of the supposed will that exist in the political and economic leaders of America and Japan; and “deep down inside, there is a hard will in all Japanese to be a strong nation”. What is understood as a “hard will” could be translated into a large measure of loyalty to the nation. How this will is measured as “hard” is not clear, especially when the audience is told that the will is not present in Singapore. (Lee KY, 1967, para 8, 9).

What is noteworthy is that as Lee moves from the scene at Africa and Asia which does not have “the will” to the established countries of America and Japan

that has “evidence” of “the will” and even “hard will”, the argument takes on a legitimate ground to apply this will to Singapore’s leadership. All is not lost for Singapore when Lee announced that the supporters at the stage who attended the National Day celebrations “represent that embryonic will of a people” who are the 2,200 elite and grassroots leadership personnel of the PAP. This presupposed “very fragile foundation” of leadership that is solely PAP’s (of which the audience had no clue until it was made public that night), has to be consolidated over the years or else Singapore will be destroyed.

Finally Lee sums up his message in “All this adds up very simply to one thing: have we got the will in the community to be a people and the leadership to give expression to that will. If we have, and our people have got the stuffing that is required to ride the kind of problems in a turbulent part of the world, then we begin to be a nation”. (Lee KY, 1967, para 12). This statement is not a question for them to ponder if they actually have the will to survive. It is a rhetoric to introduce to them that the then future generations of Singaporean boys and girls are “achievement-oriented” and survivors who “... will not die quietly. If there is no food they will do something, ...” (Lee KY, 1967, para 16). Moreover, it is ultimately presumed that “... the boys and girls who have been born here have nowhere to go to. Therefore, they have to stand up and fight. Therefore, I think we will succeed because they have no choice, but to succeed”. (Lee KY, 1967, para 20).



The stage is now set for the audience to believe that given the political and economic constraints that the post-colonial nation Singapore faced, the people had no choice but to be guided very closely and cooperate with the new ruling government so that their posterity can have a future like the established countries of America and Japan.

Lee concluded that there is no alternative to the solution. The arguments sounded logical and convincing in that it had the interests of Singaporeans at heart. It is an argument that this elite leadership embodies the “will” and is an implicit justification for the elite to undertake authority and power to direct the community.

#### **4.8a ii Lexical Reiteration**

The pattern of lexical reiteration is an obvious way of establishing the major theme in a corpus. It is a systematic way in which a politician can naturalize the ideology created through concentrations of interrelated terms (known as word family or lemma) which occur as markers of a fundamental preoccupation of the given discourse. (Flowerdew, 2004).

##### **The will to be a nation**

Results from analysis of Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 speech reveal that members of the word family, or lemma, **the will/this will/that will/we will be/there will be/will it be/they will** occur 38 times, and that the semantic environment or

prosody, which is a consistent aura of meaning formed by its collocates (Louw, 1993) is mainly positive.

The lemma in these members of “the will to be a nation” are considered positive because they represent the desired individual and collective state of drive, loyalty, measure of patriotism in working towards the interests of the nation-state in nation-building.

As shown in Table 4.1, the lemma in Lee’s speech is often collocated with the words like **the will** (3), **the collective will** (1), **this will** (4), **that will** (8), **a hard will** (1), **that embryonic will** (1), **a will** (1) which are abstract nouns; and **they will not** (1), **they will do** (1), **we will** (1) which are modal auxiliary verbs.

Table 4.1

Positive environments of Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 text extracts containing the lemma *the will*

|  | Paragraph |
|--|-----------|
| 1 <i>the will</i> to be a nation                                     | 5         |
| 2 <i>the will</i> to be a people                                     | 6         |
| 3 <i>the collective will</i> to assert our right to be ourselves     | 6         |
| 4 How do we express <i>this will</i> ?                               | 7         |
| 5 How does a nation express <i>this will</i> ?                       | 7         |
| 6 no means of expressing <i>that will</i>                            | 7         |
| 7 Is there such <i>a will</i> today                                  | 7         |
| 8 who represents <i>that will</i> ?                                  | 7         |
| 9 core of people that represent <i>that will</i>                     | 8         |
| 10 the French leaders with him have got <i>that will</i>             | 8         |
| 11 <i>that will</i> does represent                                   | 8         |
| 12 there is <i>a hard will</i> in all Japanese to be a strong nation | 9         |
| 13 <i>that embryonic will</i> of a people                            | 10        |
| 14 we must consolidate <i>this will</i>                              | 10        |
| 15 the mechanics by which <i>this will</i>                           | 10        |
| 16 <i>that will</i> in our whole community to be a nation            | 10        |
| 17 have we got <i>that will</i> in the community                     | 12        |
| 18 the leadership to give expression to <i>that will</i>             | 12        |
| 19 <i>they will not</i> die quietly                                  | 16        |
| 20 <i>they will do</i> something                                     | 16        |
| 21 <i>the will</i> of a people to be a nation                        | 17        |
| 22 <i>we will</i> succeed  | 20        |

Table 4.2

Negative environments of Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 text extracts containing the lemma **the will**

|  | Paragraph |
|--|-----------|
| 1    what kind of future <b>we will</b> be giving to the children            | 1         |
| 2 <b>What will</b> happen in 1975?   | 1         |
| 3    What kind of Asia <b>will it be</b>                                     | 1         |
| 4    what kind of world <b>will it be</b> in 1985                            | 1         |
| 5 <b>there will be</b> a lot of unhappiness                                  | 2         |
| 6    things <b>will go on</b> just as before. It is not true.                | 4         |
| 7    we continue to be just so many individuals without <b>the will</b>      | 6         |
| 8    Somebody <b>will come</b> in, smack us down                             | 6         |
| 9    I (Japanese Imperial Army) <b>will take</b> this over                   | 6         |
| 10   In some countries there is no such thing as <b>the will</b> of a people | 7         |
| 11   So is there <b>that will</b> ?  | 8         |
| 12 <b>will be</b> unemployed   | 11        |
| 13 <b>the drains will</b> clog up  | 14        |
| 14 <b>traffic will</b> snarl up  | 14        |
| 15 <b>there will be</b> flies, plague and pestilence                         | 14        |
| 16 <b>we will</b> become permanently a chronic society: sick                 | 15        |

Lee Kuan Yew also uses the lemma in the negative contexts, with negative collates, such as **the will** (2) (an abstract noun), **that will** (1) ; and **we will** (2), **what will** (1), **will it be** (2), **there will be** (2), **will go on** (1), **will come** (1), **will take** (1), **will be** (1), **the drains will** (1), **traffic will** (1) (modal auxiliary verbs). Though “will” here is used in the future tense, it is used as a rhetoric in the context of an implied bleak future portrayed for the citizens because there were just “too many imponderables”. The issue is that whatever the future holds for Singaporeans and the world, unless something is done to address the imponderables, there is simply no future. So the distinction between the negative lemma of **the will** and use of future tense is blurred. Implicit in the message is

that whatever happens, the immediate onus is on the citizens to respond to the positive lemma of **the will** to cooperate with the government.

The researcher feels that the deliberate use of **the will** even in the negative future tense serves its purpose of reinforcing **the will** in its positive lemma, as it is a subtle way of preparing the audience to buy into the need for elite government leadership.

The lemma in these members of "**the will** to be a nation" are considered negative because they represent the desired drive that is crucial but does not exist; and also the creation of an unbearable future that will be harsh, unpleasant and subject to destruction because the people lack "**the will**" to function as a nation.

When Lee Kuan Yew speaks of **the will** on a positive note, he is giving justification for an ideology of the drive and determination of the Singaporeans to succeed at all costs. This will has to be guided exclusively by the PAP government so that there can be a sense of direction. Failure to do so as seen in the negative environments of the text, will leave Singapore with no future.

By initially giving the impression that **the will** is an abstract and independent entity which Lee Kuan Yew and other countries are following and realizing, Lee appears then to naturalize the ideology, and a process of hegemony that Lee and others are just carrying out **the will** of the people, although there is no

evidence that **the will** actually exists. In fact he is creating **this will** by lexical reiteration under the persuasion that it already exists.

Lee Kuan Yew asserted that there must be the prescribed collective will of the people to be a nation so that they could even exist. Lee Kuan Yew deduced that those leaders who attended his rally that night on 15<sup>th</sup> August 1967 represented that embryonic will of the people. The elite team of leaders would have to be consolidated over the years and the mechanics institutionalized through the various government organs of leadership. It is only when the Singaporeans trust, submit and cooperate with the government to lead them that Singapore can begin to thrive as a nation (Lee K Y 0815, 1967).

Han et al (1998) and Ho (2003) quoted from *Lee Kuan Yew: The Man and His Ideas* (1998) that Singapore only had 300 leaders in politics, economics and security and the need to renew an elite political leadership was urgent.

This view is also perpetuated by local writers who do not question the assumption for the need for paternalistic elite leadership and that PAP should take full charge. However, Ho (2003) acknowledged the prevalence of elite dominance, bureaucratic omnipotence and political indifference in Singapore as a result of the continuous autocratic political leadership.

Twelve years after independence and ten years after introducing the basic tenets of nation-building, Lee Kuan Yew asserted that the formula of the collective will of the people and the government's guidance had worked. In the 1979 National Day Rally speech, Lee took stock of the desperate state Singapore was in when other nations wrote Singapore off in 1965. Singaporeans had been encouraged to give of their best and trust the government in its navigation towards nation-building. The combination of the will of the loyal citizens of Singapore and the government's pragmatic policies worked (Lee K Y 0819, 1979; Mason, 2000).

Lee Kuan Yew affirmed that his 1967 ideology on nation-building worked:

"We dared to achieve.... People wrote us off in 1965. They said: "No chance." We couldn't accept that verdict. We decided to make it. Our people had the guts and gumption; the government provided practical policies. The combination worked. New problems are on the way; they can be solved; they will be solved. The nub of the problem is how to find new problem solvers,... There comes a time when the baton must be handed over."

(Lee K Y 0819, 1979)

The themes of Singaporeans working together with the government towards nation-building and the need to harness elite leadership still prevail. The following

language used in 1967 and 1979 of Lee Kuan Yew's speeches are similar in their message:

| 1967  | 1979  |
|---|---|
| the collective will to assert our right to be ourselves   | We dared to achieve;<br>We decided to make it   |
| Here, they (young Singaporeans) will not die quietly. (Future tense used as rhetoric)   | We couldn't accept that verdict   |
| If we have that leadership and that will in our whole community to be a nation, there is no problem which we cannot overcome. | The combination worked. New problems are on the way; they can be solved; they will be solved. |
| Over the years we must consolidate this will (elite leadership)   | There comes a time when the baton must be handed over.  |

The above mentioned combination of qualities is reminiscent of Winston Churchill's rhetoric during World War 2 when Winston Churchill and a small group of men around him gave the nation courage and resolution to fight against all odds and Britain triumphed (Han et al,1998). Here there is no physical warfare for Singapore, except the internal psychological persuasion to convince the people that PAP's formula works, especially in 1967 when the usage of *the will* was highlighted to justify the ideology.

Through the language of nationalism, there was deliberate use of persuasion or "manipulation" (Flowerdew, 2004) by Lee Kuan Yew to logically argue for the support of the public for a political minority elite in lending their cooperation to the government to work towards a thriving new nation-state that can be comparable to that of established countries.



**4.9 Analysis of the Language of Nation-Building and National Identity**

The researcher will again use Flowerdew’s (2004) lexical reiteration to establish the main theme of nation-building and national identity as spoken by the three Prime Ministers. Through constant reiteration of the same themes, politicians seek “to naturalise the myths they create” (Flowerdew, 2004, p 1565) by developing concentrations of interrelated terms which occur as markers of the politicians’ fundamental preoccupation of the discourse.

There are three tables (i.e. Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5) created for the respective three Prime Ministers’ National Day speeches.

Table 4.3

Text Extracts of National Day Rally Speeches Related to “Nation-Building” and “National Identity” by Mr Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister from 1965 to 1990)

|   | Date  |
|---|-------|
| 1 The answer lies within ourselves – the capacity to turn a people of largely immigrant stock into a people with enough cohesiveness, <b>with a national identity of their own</b> , able to pursue <b>their national interests</b> regardless of outside pressures.  | 1974  |
| 2 But there is one fundamental quality we have, which nothing can change, and that is the verve, the vitality, the drive in our people. Call it what you will – <b>the DNA</b> , double helix – whatever you like to call it, is in us. That is <b>the most precious asset</b> we’ve got – but it can <b>only be used if there is organization, there is cohesion, there is unity of purpose and objective between government, people, between union and employers.</b> | 1974  |
| 3 The trends, however were obvious and clear. British colonialism was on the way out, <b>nationalism would triumph</b> ; and <b>nationalism would then have to slog it out with communism for the hearts and minds of the people.</b>   | 1980* |
| 4 In Hong Kong, because it was <b>not allowed to develop a separate national identity</b> , there is <b>no civic pride, no sense of personal pride in the progress of Singaporeans as a whole</b> , not just of their own families. I believe the differences arise also from the structure and distribution of wealth and power in our societies. We have <b>given every Singaporean a stake in our progress and prosperity.</b>                                       | 1984  |
| 5 From the <b>politics in the 1950s and 1960s</b> , we have moved <b>to the politics of progress</b> , from the <b>politics of desperation</b> , to the <b>politics of hope</b> ; from the <b>politics of squatters</b> , to the <b>politics of owners</b> . You have more at stake than ever before. The nature of our politics has undergone a profound change. Before, we had little to lose. Now we shall destroy everything we have if we are stupid or reckless.  | 1984  |

1980\* This is the only speech that comes from the PAP 25<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Rally. The rest are from National Day Rally Speeches.

The term “nationalism” was used once to refer to the birth of a new nation with the British rule leaving Singapore. Here, communism, seen as an evil force, is to be rid of immediately if Singapore is ever to survive.

“National identity” was used first in 1974 to refer to building social cohesiveness amongst various immigrant stock so that they can live and work together in harmony. It was more of an issue of racial harmony, learning a lesson from the racial conflicts and racial riots in the 1960s.

In 1984 however, national identity takes on a different definition of the lack of civic pride, lack of sense of personal pride in the progress of the nation as a whole that is found wanting in the Hong Kong society. By stressing what is lacking in Hong Kong, Singaporeans are led to understand that they are much more fortunate in having a national identity by having what the people of Hong Kong do not have. Thus national identity is implicitly defined as having civic pride and personal pride in the progress of Singapore as an independent nation. Implicit in the understanding of Hong Kong’s situation is that although the Hong Kong people have done well materially, they are not united as a nation and do not have national identity.

The biological reference of DNA as a quality asset or as the crucial drive of the people in nation-building is only of use if there is unity of purpose and direction between the leadership of the government and the cooperation of the people. Implicit in the understanding is that even if the people have the drive, but do not work in unison with the direction of the government, there can be no success. It justifies the legitimacy of the elite leadership rule of the PAP government.

Kellas (1991) asserts that the focus of nationalism and nation-building is on the state and political power. This assertion is true for Singapore. Nation-building has been referred to as a strictly political agenda in item 5 where the different eras of political concerns (i.e. areas of the slums, desperation, poverty were progressed to areas of hope, progress and owners of properties) have highlighted the achievements of the ruling PAP government and it consolidates their ruling authority. Cobban (1994) further asserts that the term “nation” has become exclusively political in meaning that a particular government is associated with the criterion of nationhood.

**Table 4.4**  
**Text Extracts of National Day Rally Speeches Related to “Nation-Building” and “National Identity” by Mr Goh Chok Tong (Prime Minister from 1991 to 2004)**

|   | Date |
|---|------|
| 1 ... my main objective has been people bonding – involving Singaporeans in discussing major long term issues, <b>forging national consensus and bonding us together as</b> | 1991 |

## **Singaporeans.**

- 2 Workers, employers and Government share a common objective – **national well-being through economic progress**. We all belong to **one nation, one Singapore**. 1991
- 3 Perception of Singapore's China policy and need to **maintain Singapore identity**. 1993
- 4 We are developing a **common Singaporean national identity** to unite the different races and religions and to give all communities the space to live the way they wish to and the chance to play equal roles in Singapore. 1993
- 5 We must retain **our unique, distinct Singaporean identity** as we go regional. 1993
- 6 With **each year of nation-building**, we approach closer to the ideal of one people, **one nation, one Singapore**. 1993
- 7 We have a built-in set of **traditional values** that have made our families strong. ... We must keep them as the bedrock values of our society for the next century.  
... To continue to succeed, we have to uphold these values **which bond the family and unite our nation**. 1994
- 8 **Senior Minister** (i.e. Lee Kuan Yew) led the pre-independence generation and **built today's Singapore**. My task is to lead the post-independence generation into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. 1996
- 9 You can fulfil your aspirations, your **Singapore Dream**, but only if you keep Singapore strong and **socially cohesive**. 1996
- 10 We have to heighten the sense of being a Singaporean. The reaction to Senior Minister's comments on the possibility of re-merger with Malaysia showed that a **Singaporean identity** is emerging. 1996
- 11 One important part of **education for citizenship is learning about Singapore** - our history, our geography, the constraints we face, how we have overcome them, survived and prospered, what we must do to continue to thrive. This is **national education**. 1996
- 12 We must also maintain this **Chinese heritage** because 1997

it is an important strand in the strength and stability of our multi-racial society. The sense of **rootedness and identity**, the social instinct to work together.

- 13 ... to involve everyone in building our best home – will only succeed if we become **one people, one Singapore**. 1997
- 14 During difficulties with Malaysia, **Singaporeans of all races stood up for Singapore**. This showed how far we have come in drawing the races closer to one another, towards a **single Singaporean identity**. 1997
- 15 The **National Education Exhibition was a serious effort at nation-building**, as the 6000,000 Singaporeans who walked the show found. 1998
- 16 But Port of Singapore Authority is only able to do this (i.e. number one transshipment port in the world) **because the whole of Singapore works like this too**. The same **values underpin our nation – meritocratic, rational, fair and cohesive**. 1998
- 17 Together, rich and poor, we are **building a nation that has allowed many Singaporeans to prosper**. Let us show that we are a **caring nation**. And that there is a **Singapore Heartbeat**. 2000
- 18 But above all, **Singapore will have a home for Singaporeans**. It will be the best home for us to raise our children, a warm and safe home with a good heart and sound values, and where **strong bonds unite us as one family**. 2001
- 19 Singaporeans must believe that the **building of Singapore is an exciting enterprise**. For Singapore to survive the longer term, we must have a core of Singaporeans who feel passionately that **this place is worth fighting for**. To succeed, we must be **proud of who we are, of our country and our fellow citizens**. We must feel that together, **we have created something precious that belongs to all Singaporeans**. 2001
- 20 No wonder young people fear that this is the **end of the Singapore Dream**. 2003  
We have suffered **one setback after another** in the last few years... To these young Singaporeans, I say no,

**the Singaporean Dream is not shattered.**

The common Singaporean national identity mentioned in 1993 that unites the different races and religions is similar to Lee Kuan Yew's definition of national identity used in 1974 to refer to building social cohesiveness amongst the various early immigrant stock of citizens. This concept of national identity is also equated with being a single Singaporean identity where all races are united in the face adversity in item 14.

Gellner (1983) shares the conviction that the men in a country must feel that they belong to the nation. A sense of belonging is crucial in nation-building. In the call for unity amongst the races, there is emphasis on "one people", "one nation, one Singapore, one family" (items 2, 6, 13, 18) and this is reminiscent of fascism – Hitler always spoke of One country, One people, One leader; although there are four main races. It is a rhetorical statement to demonstrate that there is a unique Singaporean identity that transcends all races (item 14). Yet there is reference to the preservation of Chinese heritage (item 12) as Singaporeans, without explicit reference to the other races. The rhetoric hides the weaknesses in the logic of "one nation" by constantly using the lexis and the lemma of nation.

Though there is mention of the need to preserve the Chinese cultural heritage to have a sense of rootedness in item 12, and that they must keep traditional values (item 7), to retain their unique Singaporean identity (item 5), there is no depth or richness of the Chinese culture mentioned. In fact, in item 3, where

Singaporeans are exhorted to maintain a Singaporean identity that is distinct from that of China, or China's Chinese culture. It is interesting to note that though many Singapore forefathers came from China and the Chinese cultural heritage that they possess originated from China, yet when it comes to nationalism and nation-building, Singaporeans are called to keep to traditions that first originated and yet cannot be the same as that of China's. It is done in the interest of politically protecting Singapore from been viewed by others as an extended part of China. (e.g. Hong Kong is part of China or even Taiwan has been viewed as belonging to China).

Another item where a Singaporean identity is emerging is when it is faced with the prospect of another adversity of re-merger with Malaysia. There was a reaction from Singaporeans who did not welcome the prospect of retrogression of a less desirable state of prosperity and affluence.

Nation-building for Singapore was made possible due to the political leadership of the state, specifically Mr Lee Kuan Yew was implied to be solely responsible for the building of today's Singapore in item 8. Synder (1964) highlighted that the existence of the sovereign nation-state as the political unit of political organization is a key concept in modern history. Kellas (1991) distinguishes this type of nations as the "official nation" for the nationalism of the state.



Building one nation and one Singapore is done pragmatically through economic means to enhance prosperity (items 2 and 17). Building nationalism through economic means has been elaborated earlier in section 4.5. This ideology that economic prosperity has justified the ruling PAP nation-state rule is created by the PAP and serves as a quantifiable measure of the success of the ruling party. It is an example of Tinker's (1981) survival characteristic in building national identity where economic survival is important.

One example of economic success cited with pride is in the example of the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA). It legitimizes the role played by the government in leading the workforce and strengthens the case for elite leadership as elaborated in chapter 4.6 "Nationalism As a Rationale for Elite Government". Here is a case in point where Kellas' (1991) two characteristics of political elite and economic elite are demonstrated in nation-building and national identity in Singapore. The political elite of PAP has worked hand in hand with PSA, a government-economic elite to build economic prosperity so that the political power and authority vested in the state is further heightened.

Goh (1998, *Efficiency PSA*) stated that "Singapore has grown and prospered" due to the extra performance provided by "our business environment, efficiency and productivity" and PSA "is a prime example of this". The only reason why PSA is a "star performer" is because "the whole of Singapore works" with the same values that underpin our nation – "meritocratic, rational, fair and cohesive".

Obviously PSA's exemplary success was attributed to the government's guidance in its performance and values ethos.

The idea that Singapore is an island that must be defended at all times and at all costs even in times of peace is pervasive in its political call to psychologically engage the citizens to protect the interests of Singapore as a territorial and economic nation. Here is a case of strong political leadership, bureaucratic national planning and administrative state which are characteristics that Tinker (1981) identifies, and which are elements of a territorial political community characteristic of Smith's (1991) civic model. The issue is that Smith's (1991) political community was already to be found in Singapore during the transition of the post-colonial era for Singapore. Singapore was then already territorially independent in 1965 with its own government. Yet the present perceived need to continually defend itself is a very introspective stance, one which the researcher has termed Intranational Identity, Teo (2005).

Another aspect of the nation-building is presented in a rather abstract concept – that of the Singapore Dream (items 9 and 20) or aspirations. What exactly is the Singapore Dream is not clearly spelt out, but it is likely to focus on the economic affluence that the Singaporeans have grown accustomed to. Economic setbacks like the financial crisis and threats of unemployment are likely to affect their hopes for a bright future. What appears to be abstract in its construct for nation-building is actually materially tangible in its expectations. It is another rhetoric for strengthening the case for “Nation-Building Through Economic Means” in

section 4.5. and it is an objective political statehood factor (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994).

This abstract concept of the Singapore Dream can also be linked to the creation of *The Singapore Story* which was analysed in section 4.4 as the creation of the history of Singapore as constructed by the PAP. It is another myth that sustains a nation, or what Hobsbawm (1994 p76) would term as “the nation as invented tradition”, an exercise in social engineering, which is deliberate and historically innovative.

The Singapore Heartbeat (item 17), another abstract concept, is linked to a caring nation where the people have compassion for the less able and fortunate. Love and compassion is another politically socialized means of uniting the people.

Both the Singapore Dream and the Singapore Heartbeat are abstract creations of myths by the PAP to socialize and build a nation. They serve as examples of Hobsbawm's (1994) “invented tradition” of a nation.

**Table 4.5**  
**Text Extracts of National Day Rally Speeches Related to “Nation-Building” and “National Identity” by Mr Lee Hsien Loong (Prime Minister from Aug 2004 onwards)**

|  | Date |
|--|------|
| 1 One critical aspect of <b>rooting Singaporeans</b> here is to empower them, to give them a say in their lives, to make them feel that they can make a difference.  | 2004 |
| 2 Engage your ideals, your energies, <b>build a new generation, build tomorrow’s Singapore</b> . Don’t wait or depend on the Government. Politics is not the only way you can do it. There are many ways to contribute. But politics is one way to do it and it’s important enough people come into politics so that we have self-renewal and we have <b>a new leadership team</b> . <b>Political self-renewal</b> is critical to Singapore. | 2004 |
| 3 And we are <b>strengthening our national identity</b> day by day. It’s not yet a very long history, but year by year, <b>with each crisis, with each joy and sorrow, we build on it</b> .  | 2004 |
| 4 We are deepening our <b>sense of shared destiny</b> , and maturing as a nation.  | 2005 |
| 5 We also need to <b>remake our city</b> so that it is vibrant, cosmopolitan and throbbing with energy, <b>with our own distinctive X-factor</b> that makes us stand out from other cities.  | 2005 |
| 6 This is part of our transformation into <b>a leading city</b> , a first-class environment for talent and enterprise, and <b>a home for Singaporeans of all races and faiths</b> .  | 2005 |
| 7 Most important of all we’ve created <b>a Singapore spirit</b> . We’re <b>courageous</b> but <b>compassionate</b> , we’re <b>confident</b> , never complacent. It’s a spirit which will hold us together as <b>one united people, each one doing his part</b> , each one contributing to <b>remaking our nation and building our home</b> .   | 2005 |

The dominant metaphor here is building a home and it is extended to the idea of uniting the people. There is the implicit notion of the metaphor of the family which lives together in a home though there is no explicit reference to the family as a home. The researcher surmises that the general metaphor of the home is a rhetoric to drive home the importance of unity as a nation. The idea of a “home” is a domestic concept that the public can identify with, and that is also where the hearts/seats of emotional attachment belong.

This notion of the home metaphor starts off with the need for a “paternalistic” renewal of leadership (item 2) with a difference, by rhetorically “empowering” them to help them contribute, sharing woes and joys together (item 3); deepening the created myth of a “shared destiny” (item 4); transforming their home with another myth of an abstract “distinctive X-factor” (item 5) and be united as one (item 7).

When Lee Hsien Loong uses the term “national identity” in 2004, he differs from the earlier two Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong; the latter referring to social and racial cohesiveness while Lee Hsien Loong talks about strengthening national identity through crisis.

Bastion (2004) also supports the argument that national identity for Singapore is built through bonding through the travails of terrorism, SARS, regional economic crisis and bickering bilateral relations with Malaysia.

Implicit in the understanding of Lee Hsien Loong's speech is that national identity already exists in nation-building; and that it needs only to be strengthened through shared woes and joys. What exactly is the base of national identity that is to be strengthened is not captured here. It is assumed that it is understood when actually he could have referred to a number of challenges that Singapore faces in the 21<sup>st</sup> century era of globalisation.

There is a sense of creating a link with the past, and this is a common device and part of the theory of nation-building. Kellas (1991) refers to this characteristic of national identity as "culture" where there are community ties of history established from one leadership to another. There is continuity in the political focus of binding the people together. Smith (1991) also refers to such memories edged as a social policy to provide social cohesion.

After a year of National Day Rally Speech from 2004 to 2005, Lee Hsien Loong mentions about Singapore maturing as a nation, although he had earlier remarked that in 2004, 39 years of history is not a very long history. Thus he could not be referring to the time span of Singapore maturing as a nation with a long history. It is this myth of a "shared sense of destiny" that is apparently bringing about the maturity of the nation. This myth of a common destiny is referred to by Smith (1991) as a cultural policy for a political agenda.

This form of destiny is going to be accomplished by remaking the city and bringing out an elusive “distinctive X-factor” that will distinguish Singapore from other cities. This rather abstract “**X-factor**” can be compared to the earlier speech by Lee Kuan Yew in his 1967 National Day Rally speech when he spoke elaborately on the “**the will** to be a nation” in section 4.8a<sup>ii</sup> and to the metaphor of DNA as the drive in the people by Lee Kuan Yew (1974).

Likewise, the abstract term “a Singapore spirit” is another way of describing **the will** and passion of the people in working together with the government.

How this X-factor can be achieved will necessarily depend on how the political self-renewal of elite leadership in Singapore is able to work together with the people’s support as mentioned in 2004 (item 2).

The researcher notes that there is greater sophistication in the language used to persuade the people to work harder with the government for the nation. In their contribution to the nation, the people are urged to come forward on their own to have a stake in making a difference for the nation. There is ownership and acknowledgement of their will to participate in nation-building and it need not be in politics. Implicit in the understanding is that only a certain calibre of elite people are suited for the jobs of the politicians and it should remain that way. Here again, nationalism as the rationale for elite government is again subtly put across as elaborated in section 4.6 The political agenda is best left to the PAP

which is presented as identical with the state and statehood factors are critical in determining the destiny of the nation.

It demonstrates Kellas' (1991) feature of the crucial need for political elite in nation-building; and Tinker's (1981) features of bureaucracy as structural support of nation-state and the administrative state's roles in nation-building.

#### **4.10 Summary of Analysis**

In the analysis of the language of nation-building and national identity of the three Prime Ministers, it appears to be an eclectic collage which takes into account

1. the need for political renewal and elite leadership,
2. to preserve the racial cultures of communities,
3. citizenship education through National Education,
4. unity of purpose between government and people,
5. civic pride,
6. sense of ownership and belonging,
7. community achievement and group accomplishments,
8. multi-racial and multi-religious society,
9. the drive to maintain the economic competitive edge amongst regional neighbors,
10. and emotional bonding during times of crisis.

It has elements of characteristics of the category of Subjective/Objective National Identity as expounded in chapter 3 and also the newly introduced category of



Intranational Identity (Teo, 2005). While Subjective National Identity refers to the relationship of national identity to ethnicity and culture (items 2, 7, 8 in the above summary list); Objective national Identity relates national identity to statehood factors (items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 in the above list). Overall, it is still predominantly Objective National Identity in its features.

In all, the analysis has thrown light into the hidden ideology and the manipulative use of language (Flowerdew, 2004) to defend the political elite of PAP and its unchallenged authority in creating a nation. The leaders have a certain theory i.e. characteristic of the concept of Intranational Identity (Teo, 2005) that consolidates the political elite factor in bureaucratic national planning, just as other countries in the past have created theories of the nation and created myths to support their theories (Hobsbawm, 1994; Kellas, 1991; Tinker, 1981; Smith, 1991).

The researcher reasserts the classification of Objective/Globalised National Identity for Singapore as elaborated in chapter 3 where the state plays a major political and economic role in nation-building and national identity, while also fast adjusting to the demands of the globalisation in the international scene. The chief reason is that from the early years of independence, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the PAP, in particular Lee Kuan Yew, has crafted the basic tenets of nation-building by exhorting the people to have the collective drive, will to fight for the nation's survival and trust in the government to set directions for them. Lee Kuan Yew's pragmatic approach to national identity in promoting unity of

purpose and cohesion between government and the people in 1974 served the practical needs of Singapore politically and economically.

Goh Chok Tong who succeeded Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister testified to the good works of the first generation leadership. Mr Goh remarked that the second generation leaders did not have to make fundamental changes in direction because the earlier political and economic institutions and public policies are right. Only refinements to the policies are made. Thus changes made are evolutionary and not revolutionary. There is continuity in setting directions for the nation (Goh C T 0830, 1994)

In Singapore, so long as there is social cohesion and racial harmony, the cultural and ethnicity aspects of Subjective National Identity will likely continue to be of secondary importance in focus in practice; and naturally evolve with time and history.

This analysis of the category of Objective/Globalised National Identity for Singapore will necessarily impact the type of citizenship education curriculum in schools.

The PAP have a theory that a nation must have a past so they have created *The Singapore Story*. This *Singapore Story* has to be taught to all present and future Singaporeans through public education in the form of National Education as citizenship education to safeguard political renewal. They theorise that

Singaporeans should have the abstract "distinctive X factor", "the will", DNA or "Singapore spirit" or drive to distinguish their passion for their nation. They theorise that a nation should be one people so they create a language of persuasion to equate the different races as one people staying in one home. They have a theory of cultural heritage but refer only to the preservation of Chinese heritage that is likened to be uniquely Singaporean. Their theory is that there should be a "foe" so that "we" can be distinguished from "them" is presented so that reference is made to Malaysia and Indonesia as the enemies against which "we" must defend themselves against. They have a theory that the political elite is responsible for guiding the economic elite to build economic prosperity for the nation and economic success of the nation is crucial to the nation's survival.

The next chapter 5 will focus on a discussion of the factors affecting nation-building in Hong Kong.

## **Chapter 5**

### **5.1 Political, Economic and Social Factors that Influence Nation-Building in Hong Kong**

While chapter 4 focuses on Singapore, chapter 5 is an extension of analyzing the political, economic and social factors that influence nation-building in Hong Kong and provide an explanation of the characteristics of national identity described in Hong Kong . This chapter will provide a historical explanation of how those characteristics are formed. It will also show how the theory of transitology helps to explain the changes which have taken place.

### **5.2 History of Hong Kong - An Overview**

While Singapore's colonial transition took place before it experienced rapid economic growth, Hong Kong's colonial transition took place after it had attained international renown as one of the four "Asian Tigers" (Tan, 1997). Chung and Schwarzer (1997) reported that the British colony left Hong Kong as an affluent city-state, ranking as the world's number one port and tenth largest trading state. The inhabitants of Hong Kong earned more per capita (US\$18,000) than those of Britain (US\$16,600) and forty times as much in the People's Republic of China (US\$435).

In 1997, Hong Kong had a population of 6.617 million with 3.3 million people living in public housing, 45.7% occupied by owners and 49.6% by tenants and 4.8% rent-free or employer provided. 95% of the population was of Chinese

descent and the others were mainly foreign passport holder groups from Philippines, USA, Indonesia, Canada, UK, Thailand, Japan, India, Australia and Malaysia. The predominant religion and custom were the Buddhists and Taoists. The major employment sectors included wholesale, retail and import/export, trades, restaurant and hotel industry; (34%); finance, insurance, real estate and business services (13%), community, social and personal services (5.8%), and transportation and communications (5.5%) and unemployment (2.9%). (Hong Kong Yearbook 1997).

With the historic reunification of Hong Kong with mainland China in July 1997, confidence in the symbiosis relationship with China has strengthened – not only in terms of business ties but also in the context of government contacts and flow of people. (Hong Kong Yearbook 1997). The close relationship works towards the product of a common culture and heritage with mainland China.

Brown et al (1997) noted that unlike other British ex-colonies, Hong Kong will revert to a political regime that is more authoritarian than the colonial one and also have a level of prosperity greater than most independent countries

When contrasted with Singapore, it is true that Hong Kong was much more prosperous than Singapore as a new nation struggling to survive during independence; and also true that while Singapore became independent on its

own, Hong Kong reverted its sovereignty to its motherland China, with much less freedom and rights that it could call its own

Hong Kong was founded in the 1840s to serve the British interests that was solely commercial. As early as 1923, the leader of China's Republic revolution, Sun Yat-Sen acknowledged that it was Britain's achievement that had turned Hong Kong, a barren island into the modern Hong Kong in seven to eight decades, something that China had failed to achieve in its 4000 years of civilization. From the late 1940s until the early 1990s, Britain sought to maintain its sovereign position in Hong Kong by avoiding policies that would provoke China. The tolerance of British possession of China was due to the combined effect of caution exercised by Britain in Hong Kong, its economic role as a source of foreign exchange and its separation from Chinese politics. (Tsang, 1997).

Even though the British left the Hong Kong people very much to themselves politically, the Hong Kong people often felt discriminated against in terms of policies implemented. Throughout the nineteenth century, Chinese voices were often raised in protest at the discriminatory policies of the British Hong Kong government. But the protest remained only verbal. It was only before the Revolution of 1911 in China that nationalism began to emerge as an obvious marker of being Chinese in Hong Kong. After the Second World War in 1945, Hong Kong was war-torn and economically devastated, but the new generation that followed was more optimistic. With the emergence of a Hong Kong educated

generation, there was a change in mood in the 1960s. The post-war baby boomers entered into the economic miracle of the 1970s. Political issues were raised in the 1970s. There was interest generated over the use of Chinese as an official language. (Brown et al, 1997).

Economic reintegration with China was also followed by a growing interest in Chinese politics (Hook, 1997). Economic links with China would create a symbiotic relationship between Hong Kong and China and help create the national identity bonds.

Leung (1997) explains the adoption of a grassroots approach in massive expansion of social service delivery under the governorship of Sir Murray MacLehose and the era under the British governor Sir Murray MacLehose appealed to the Hong Kong residents. He stood up for the grass roots; overhauled housing, transport, education, labour, legislation, social welfare and the process of representation in the 1970s. However, under the motto of "peace and prosperity", Hong Kong priority went from prosperity to prosperity with little concern for political allegiance with China. Being Chinese in Hong Kong was just an ethnic affiliation, a distinct form in Hong Kong was created that was once Chinese but "stands out in sharp relief against the mainland in political, social, and economic aspects" (Leung, 1997, 37). Hong Kong's economic supremacy in the China arena gave the Hong Kong residents a sense of pride. They viewed the new mainland China immigrants as the country bumpkin, an image that was

reversed only in the 1990s when South China took off into its economic growth. (Tsang, 1997).

A strong sense that the Hong Kong people might be culturally Chinese without necessarily accepting the Chinese regime in mainland China, and that Hong Kong had achieved more in terms of economic growth than China shaped the rhetoric of Hong Kong identity of the 1980s, a time when the negotiation started between China and Hong Kong over the return of Hong Kong. When negotiations took place, Hong Kong people were generally apolitical and wanted to be left alone to carry on with their lives. The Hong Kong Chinese's struggle to earn a living resulted in them immersing themselves in economic activities, and the political framework of the British colonial rule barred them from political participation (Leung, 1997). It is little wonder that there was no channel for development of civic culture and they were politically alienated. "Without the cultivation of national identity and the study of real life politics, students have become alienated by the increasing inflow of negative messages about both the Hong Kong and the Chinese governments". (Leung, 1997, p168).

So long as China was not their nationality, only by an eventful shock such as the Tiananmen Square Incident of June 1989 would the Hong Kong residents be jolted spontaneously into mass response. However from 1<sup>st</sup> July 1997 when Hong Kong was returned to China, the Hong Kong people were immediately not just Chinese by culture but also by nationality. Even with concession given by



the mainland China for Hong Kong to retain a high degree of autonomy for the next 50 years, it is implicit that China has not only every right to rule but also the right to demand and debate in the name of Chinese identity and culture. The Hong Kong Chinese people have realized that integration of Hong Kong into China demands that politics does matter in the context of nationalism. The central tenet of change in political culture is not just respect for the culture but patriotism. With the announcement of Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong "politics was taken more seriously in the territory than it ever had been before".(Brown et al, 1997, p7). From China, the Tiananmen incident and disintegration of the Soviet Union has also contributed to China's leaders placing "greater emphasis on nationalism or, more specifically, patriotism as a unifying theme within the country" (Yahuda, 1997 p197) and this emphasis on nationalism would inevitably influence Hong Kong as it is China's most important gateway to the Asia-Pacific and global economies (Yahuda, 1997). The pillars for nation-building and national identity with China would necessarily involve both political ideology and cultural affiliation for bonding.

The expectation of a change of political culture through sowing the seeds of patriotism and national identity with China is reflected in the latest syllabi of civics education in Hong Kong (see chapter 8 for details).

### **5.3 Analysis of Concepts of Identity in Hong Kong at Handover**

Mr Tung Chee Hwa, the first Chief Executive of Hong Kong acknowledged that as they face the political and historic change of being united with China, there is a need for every individual in Hong Kong to get to know and appreciate Chinese history and culture so that there can be a sense of belonging. While Hong Kong people deepen their understanding of Chinese history and culture, they will also continue to develop their own diverse cultural characteristics. As China's culture grows and changes into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Hong Kong is in a unique position to act as the center of exchange for China to be exposed to western culture and serve as a platform for the world to learn about Chinese culture. (Tung C H, Policy Address 1997).

Tung Chee Hwa's implied definition of nationality and theory of nationalism parallel that of Max Weber's "prestige community" which has a sense of cultural mission unified by a common descent and the nation has a political project (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994). Hong Kong becomes the "prestige community" of belonging to mainland Chinese history and cultural heritage and also stands to gain in international repute by being the political platform of cultural exchange for the West. This national identity characteristic of a distinct cultural factor is what Smith (1991) defines as ethnic character through cultural and social policy. This ethnic character is uniquely Chinese with the traditional culture that descends from mainland China and it moulds the social policy of both China and Hong Kong. It also corresponds to Liah's (1994) theory of the community's cultural/ethnic uniqueness and distinct character of cultural values in promoting

national identity. China's long history and ancestry and Hong Kong's affiliation with the mainland further supports Hroch's (1998) common origin and destiny factor where there is historical collectivity through common ancestry.

It is categorized as Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity form of nationalism in chapter 3 Table 3.2 It also affirms that Hong Kong in its post-colonial transition, exhibits cultural issues in building national identity.

Although a transitology study of nation-building in post-colonial Hong Kong begins with the political transition when China officially resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1997, preparation for this momentous event began in 1984, some 13 years earlier when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed between Britain and China.

In 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Peking to agree on how the two countries would enter diplomatic talks with the aim of maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Formal talks on the future of Hong Kong started in July 1983. Britain argued for continued British administration after 1997. The arrangement was not acceptable to China and both sides explored the Chinese government's concept of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. (BusinessWorld online : The Hong Kong Handover - The Joint Declaration, 1997)

With the Joint Declaration, provision was made for China's exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong as well as restoration of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China by the United Kingdom. It outlines China's policies towards Hong Kong that Hong Kong will enjoy a high degree of autonomy for 50 years. Rights and freedom for the Hong Kong people will be protected by the Basic Law. (BusinessWorld online : The Hong Kong Handover - The Joint Declaration, 1997)

Eleven articles of general principles guide the Basic Law . Article 5 states that the socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life will remain unchanged for 50 years. Article 10 makes provision for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to use a regional flag and regional emblem apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the People's Republic of China. The regional flag of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a red flag with a bauhinia highlighted by five star-tipped stamens. The regional emblem of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a bauhinia in the center highlighted by five star-tipped stamens encircled by the words "Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China" in Chinese and "HONG KONG" in English. (BusinessWorld online : The Hong Kong Handover – Basic Law, 1997)

Essentially these two articles create a rather unique situation for Hong Kong in its political transition from a British colony to a region within the national country of

China. The study of transitology for Hong Kong does not witness the usual nation building in the conventional sense even though Hong Kong is allowed to exist for another 50 years in its normal social and economic state. There is no independence for Hong Kong. It is a form of transition that uniquely allows for the reunification of Hong Kong to mainland China. In this aspect, it reflects Cameron's (1999, 39) characterization of national identity in a political entity such as the example of reunification of East and West Germany was discussed where "the German Democratic Republic (GDR) disintegrated and its territory was absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), ...That this was possible, owed much to the fact that such a reunification has always been a central political goal of the FRG itself..."

In the aspect of political goal, Hong Kong's reunification with China parallels that of East and West Germany. China had impressed upon the then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that there was "no doubt of China's determination to recover sovereignty over the colony in 1997" (Brown, 1997, 10).

Article 10 indicates clearly that Hong Kong's flag signals a regional identity within the national identity of its motherland China's national flag. The two flags represent the two systems within one national country of China and may pose the issue of divided loyalty between the region and country; when compared to Singapore which is independent and has the usual one national flag.

This definition of nationality for Hong Kong through the use of the two flags representing the two systems within one national country is again unique and not represented in any of the theories of nationalism or national identity.

Cameron's (1999) "the Arts" and Smith's (1991) "cultural and social policy" characteristics of national identity include the use of symbols like national flags to build national identity for the respective countries, but none have mentioned the use of a new regional flag within the motherland identity.

Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa mentioned about building a vision of Hong Kong as a society proud of its national identity and cultural heritage during the handover ceremony of Hong Kong to China in 1997 (Tung, 1997). Actually Mr Tung was in essence referring to building a regional identity of Hong Kong within the larger national identity of China.

The theory of national identity that Tung Chee Hwa is promoting appears to approximate that of Smith (1991) where national identity is treated as a collective cultural phenomenon. Important features of national identity include a historic territory or motherland; common historical background; mass public culture; common legal rights and duties and common economy with territorial mobility for all. All the above features are deemed necessary. Hong Kong has the above features and the added "flexibility/autonomy" to exist on its own for another 50 years.

Chapter 4 in the Basic Law focus on the political structure, specifically defining the role of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Chief Executive is selected by election or through consultations held in Hong Kong and appointed by the Central People's Government, serving a term of 5 years. He is assisted by the Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in policy-making (Business World online : The Hong Kong Handover – Basic Law, 1997).

In accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the President of China, Mr Jiang Zemin gave the assurance that after the return of Hong Kong, the Chinese government will unswervingly implement the basic policies of the “one country, two systems”, “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong”, and a “high degree of autonomy” and keep the socio-economic system and way of life of Hong Kong and laws unchanged. While the Central People's government would be responsible for the foreign affairs and defence of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) will be vested with executive power, Legislative power and independent judicial power, in accordance with the Basic Laws. The Hong Kong people will enjoy various rights and freedom according to the law; and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will gradually develop a democratic system that suits Hong Kong's reality. (Jiang, 1997).

Mr Jiang's statement about Hong Kong developing a democratic system was rather vague, suggesting that it should suit the political circumstances of Hong

Kong's "reality" which could refer to the reality of Hong Kong being subjected to China's control in its values system.

The values system advocated for Hong Kong was spelt out by Mr Tung Chee Hwa, the first Chief Executive during the handover ceremony when he advocated the practice of eastern values, although they had long embraced western culture. This is especially significant as Hong Kong strides into the new era with a new identity, one that is now free from the British colonial rule. While Hong Kong may continue to encourage diversity in the society, but the Hong Kong people must reaffirm and respect the fine traditional Chinese values that include filial piety, love for the family, modesty, integrity and continuous improvement. They value "plurality but should discourage open confrontation; strive for liberty but not at the expense of the rule of law; respect minority views but are mindful of wider interests; protect individual rights but also shoulder collective responsibilities." (Tung C H, 1997).

The subtle message transmitted with the repeated emphasis on the five conjunctions "but" indicate that submission to the central authority of China is essential. The form of democracy that can be practised in Hong Kong is Chinese oriented, has its limitations, as interpreted within the political parameters of Hong Kong's "reality".

This form of nationalism is linked with Smith's (1995, 111) discussion of "the



nationalist drive to attach national identity to a territorial political community" with both the civic or ethnic nationalism. The ethnic model fuses the popular ethnic community and the civic model unifies the community with shared symbols, myths and memories to form a common culture community. The civic or ethnic nation is made the yardstick of the state and the state accommodates the will of the nation.

Hong Kong's reunification with China reflects a combination of both of Smith's (1995) ethnic and civic models. It is "ethnic" in that though both Hong Kong and China come from the same Chinese ethnic descent, Hong Kong's predominantly Cantonese sub-ethnic social composition is now fused with China's main Putonghua ethnic. It is also "civic" as new sets of symbols e.g. new regional flag and the national mainland China flag are now used to form a common culture

In summary, the national identity characteristics analyzed during the Hong Kong handover to China reveal some parallels with Smith's (1991) collective cultural phenomenon; Liah's (1994) community's cultural/ethnic uniqueness; Hroch's (1998) common origin and destiny; Cameron's (1999) political entity; Cameron's (1999) use of national symbols, and Smith's (1995) territorial political community.

#### **5.4 Nation-Building Through Economic Means**

Like Singapore, nation-building in Hong Kong is very much tied up with economic viability and prosperity. Politicians from both Singapore and Hong

Kong use the economic yardstick as a measure of the success of nation-building and consolidation of national identity.

Economically Hong Kong would retain its status of a free port, continue to function as an international financial, trade and shipping center and maintain its economic and cultural ties with other countries, regions. (Jiang, 1997).

In Tung's first speech as Chief Executive, the view put forward was that the foremost task ahead during the time of handover was to enhance Hong Kong's economic vitality and sustain economic growth. It is only through the creation of material wealth that the living condition of the people of Hong Kong can improve. The Special Administrative Region Government would create a good business environment, uphold the principles of free trade, fair competition and non-interference in the market; strive to enhance Hong Kong's position as an international financial center and a cosmopolitan city. (Tung C H, 1997).

Tung (1997) was trying to propose an approach to post-colonial status which corresponds to Tinker's (1991) theory of "survival" national identity characteristic in nation-building, where the appeal of nation-building is that of economic survival. Given the uncertainty of Hong Kong's future at the time of political transition, meeting the basic economic needs of the Hong Kong people would have appealed to the Hong Kong society.

In a speech by one of the highest political officials, Mrs Anson Chan (1997) argued that in economic areas, some of the focused attention on Hong Kong's transition had overlooked the symbiotic relationship which had developed between Hong Kong and China over the past 20 years before 1997. By 1997, China was Hong Kong's largest trading partner, and Hong Kong is China's third largest trading partner. Hong Kong was the largest external investor in China, accounting for about 60% overall with a high of 80% in Guangdong Province. China is also one of the largest investor in Hong Kong. (BusinessWorld online : The Hong Kong Handover – Speech by Chief Secretary, Mrs Anson Chan, 1997).

Like the annual reports made by Tung Chee Hwa, this report by Mrs Chan is primary data and serves as political speech to promote the economic factor of nation-building in Hong Kong as a region within the mainland nation of China.

Here, this means of economic survival for Hong Kong is theorized through a politically arranged form of economic partnership with mainland China, termed as the "symbiotic relationship" that had already existed prior to the handover to China in 1997. This co-dependency theory of symbiotic relationship is emphasized to drive home the implicit understanding that Hong Kong is economically dependent on the fortunes of China's economic success and is not likely to survive on its own.

Though it is presented as a “mutually rewarding economic relationship”, there is an underlying understanding that the national planning of China as a structural support is essential and responsible for the economic survival and prosperity of Hong Kong. Mrs Chan’s (1997) report supports Tinker’s (1981) theory of bureaucracy as structural support of nation-state which is a characteristic of nation-building.

This symbiotic relationship has led Helmut Sohmen, vice-chairman of the 30<sup>th</sup> annual general meeting of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) to say that from 1997 onwards, Hong Kong would be more like China eventually, due to the interactivity between and interdependence of Hong Kong and China. The Chief Secretary Mrs Anson Chan had already assured businessmen that Hong Kong will keep its underlying philosophy to leave business decisions to businessmen and not to bureaucrats. Mr Sohmen pointed out that as China changes in the next 15 years after 1997, the two cultures of Hong Kong and China will meet somewhere down the road because Hong Kong cannot be immune from what happens in China. Social and legal norms would gradually approximate those of China and Hong Kong’s businesses will be adaptive of China’s changes. Mr Sohmen’s conviction was that Hong Kong would be more of a Chinese city and businesses would take more of a national view rather than a regional view. (BusinessWorld online : The Hong Kong Handover – Updates by Young, 1997).

Here Sohmen is proposing a theory of the assimilation of the economic activities of Hong Kong with China to lead to a merge and blend with the cultural ties of China that will become so naturalised that ultimately, there will be no distinction between Hong Kong and China. It demonstrates a combination of Kellas's (1991) economic factors in the control of political and economic resources; to the binding of community ties through culture and daily activities. Economic factors and cultural activities are two national identity characteristics proposed by Kellas (1991) for nation-building.

Seven years after the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China, the symbiotic relationship is evident as reported by Chief Executive Mr Tung Chee Hwa in the Chief Executive Policy Address 2005. The staunch support of the Central government of mainland China had seen Hong Kong through difficult times. These include the signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), allowing more Mainlanders to visit Hong Kong under the Individual Visit Scheme. The increasing pace of modernization in China, the size of its economy and increasing market opportunities provide strong support to Hong Kong's economic growth (Tung C H Policy Address, 2005).

Here Tung (2005) is implicitly asserting that the theory of national identity characteristic of economic survival (Tinker, 1981) has worked. This success is owed largely to the "staunch support of the Central government" (Tung, 2005,

A12) or the characteristic of bureaucracy as structural support of the nation-state (Tinker, 1981).

Leyden Jr (2005), the former executive director of the Hong Kong-United States Business Council, reported in the United States Section of the 2005 White Paper that there is a dynamic process in the economic integration between Hong Kong and China which produces distinct benefits for both Hong Kong's and China's economies. "A symbiotic relationship is developing where each provides the other with key elements necessary for economic progress". Hong Kong's economic position is interlinked with China's and mirrors China's "positive economic trajectory".

Manning (2005) also affirmed that Hong Kong has been vital to China's economic takeoff, from which it had also "benefited handsomely", transforming itself from a manufacturing center into a service and financial hub. Over the past decade, "a symbiotic relationship" had taken shape between Hong Kong and China where 1,800 China firms had officially registered in Hong Kong with assets worth more than \$42 billion.

Both Leyden (2005) and Manning (2005) affirm that Tung's analyses of economic partnership with China is correct. Tung is using the economy as a dimension of building his theory of regionalism/nationalism; and is arguing that the success of

the economy is part of the building of national identity in the region-building of Hong Kong and nation-building of China.

Introduced only in 2004, Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) has helped to foster economic growth in Hong Kong. More than 660 Hong Kong registered enterprises had been issued with Certificates of Hong Kong Service Supplier. In addition to implementing CEPA, the government will continue to promote co-operation between Hong Kong and Guangdong. The scope of co-operation has expanded beyond trade and boundary-crossing facilities to many areas which include logistics, tourism, regional planning, technology, intellectual property rights, education, transportation, environmental protection, health, culture and sports. (Tung, 2005).

These extensions of co-operation in the many areas seem to validate Mr Sohmen's conviction that Hong Kong will eventually become more like China in a number of ways. It has been argued that since the late 1980s, Hong Kong has already built up a viable economic symbiotic relationship with South China. What appears lacking is an equally viable political and social symbiosis with China. The Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration have provided the political framework for Hong Kong to exist as Special Administrative Region under the broad principle of "one country, two systems". In the first few years after the handover to China, Chinese officials have been strictly forbidden to interfere in the affairs of Hong Kong, revealing to the world that Hong Kong people ruling

Hong Kong is for real. Yet the dilemma of the rather awkward political circumstance arises when the need to abide by the Sino-British Joint Declaration allows for Hong Kong's institutions not requiring to evolve in such a way to accommodate those from China while, at the same time, Hong Kong is not supposed to develop a distinct political national identity of its own. (Gungwu et al, et al, 1999).

Eventually the two systems in one country are supposed to merge as one, either with China and Hong Kong converging or with Hong Kong being absorbed into China's own institutional structure. The convergence model looks more practical than the absorption model. But it is still too early to describe how this process will eventually unfold. At this stage, teething problems still exist and it hinders lending credence to the convergence model. Hong Kong's main operating institutions – from public administration, the legal system, financial and monetary regulatory authorities, the education system to the media were mainly the products of British colonialism; and they are largely different from their counterpart operating systems in China. Hong Kong's institutional structures have not been adapted to facilitate closer political and social integration with China. The continuing use of Cantonese (rather than Mandarin) as the medium of instruction in schools is one example. Hong Kong people want to reserve an institutional status quo to maintain their social Hong Kong way of life. (Gungwu et al, 1999).



Nevertheless, even as Hong Kong discovers its equilibrium in converging with China as one country, given all the opposing inherent factors; "economic symbiosis with China inevitably generates an impetus for closer political and institutional integration with China" (Gungwu et al, 1999, 12). The basis for this theoretical statement is that the economic symbiosis will bring about more pressures for a gradual or incremental political and institutional harmonization with China. This integration will take time to develop incrementally, e.g. measures to raise the consciousness of the Chinese identity of the Hong Kong people or more harmonization of education between Hong Kong and China. (Gungwu et al, 1999).

It is in the area of education, specifically citizenship education that would be significant in bringing about a "national identity" for Hong Kong, in relating to China.

Gungwu et al's (1999) theoretical statement corresponds to Stalin's argument that a nation is born when important elements of economic life, language and territory come together (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994) in chapter 3.

Smith (1991) also echoes both cultural and political elements in his definition of a nation as a population sharing a historic territory, culture, a common economy and legal rights.

Gellner (1997) mentions the significance of industrial civilization based on economic and scientific growth as the final stage of history of mankind.

Thus (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994), Smith (1991) and Gellner (1997), Tinker (1981), Kellas (1991) all stress the importance of economic factors in nation-building. Implicit in the understanding is that economic factors appear to be a greater measure of success in nation-building than political factors. While political stability is a necessary condition for nation-building, economic success is the critical yardstick for measuring how far the nation has progressed.

## **5.5 Analysis of Language of Nation-Building and National identity**

### **Text Extracts of Tung Chee Hwa (1997-2005).**

As with the analysis of political speeches by the Prime Ministers in Singapore on national identity and nation building in chapter 4, the researcher will also examine how Tung Chee Hwa from Hong Kong discusses the usage of national identity.

Since it is not possible to access confidential government papers to establish the ways in which politicians think about nationalism and related them to the political, economic and social factors; the researcher will analyze the politicians' thinking behind the ideologies in the public documents. It is than hoped that through the analysis, the thoughts of the politicians will be stated more openly.

The researcher will again use Flowerdew's (2004) lexical reiteration to establish the main theme of nation-building and national identity as spoken by Tung Chee Hwa. Through constant reiteration of the same themes, politicians seek "to naturalise the myths they create" by developing concentrations of interrelated terms which occur as markers of the politician's main preoccupation of the discourse.

There is no Policy Address released for the year 2002 from Tung Chee Hwa. The term of office for the Chief Executive is five years, and Tung was elected uncontested and appointed to serve as the second term Chief Executive from March 2002. There was a report on the first five years of Hong Kong SAR of the Republic of China released on July 2002. (Tung, 2002).

Tables 5.1 to 5.5 are created for Tung Chee Hwa's Policy Address from 1997 to 2005. There are several concepts that Tung Chee Hwa links to national identity for Hong Kong. They include economic success; Chinese heritage, cosmopolitan city; symbiosis with China and public education.

Hayes (1926) as discussed in chapter 3.2, proposed four shades of nationalism, of which political activities is one of them. With political activities, nationalism and the building of national identity refers to the activities of a political party with its ideologies and historical process. Politicians create theories of nationalism and

national identity and it is possible to analyse these theories to view how they use them to justify their actions, e.g. Stalin or Hitler.

Here Tung Chee Hwa as the appointed politician of Hong Kong, also creates theories of nationalism and national identity to justify political plans and actions for Hong Kong.

Table 5.1

Text Extracts of Policy Address Speeches Related to “Nation-Building” and “National Identity” by Mr Tung Chee Hwa (Chief Executive from 1997 to 2005) on Economic Success

|   |  | Date |
|---|--|------|
| 1 | Our foremost task is to enhance Hong Kong’s economic vitality and sustain economic growth. <b>Only through the creation of wealth</b> can we improve the living of the people of Hong Kong, and <b>continue to contribute to our country.</b>  | 1997 |
| 2 | ... <b>maintain the lifeblood of Hong Kong’s economic development</b>  | 1997 |
| 3 | The Government is committed to ensuring that we maintain our status as <b>an international financial center...</b>   | 1998 |
| 4 | Hong Kong already possesses many of the key features common to New York and London. For example, we are already an international center of finance and a popular tourist destination, and hold leading positions in trade and transportation. These are all <b>pillars of our economy.</b> ... we should be able to become <b>world-class.</b> ... we will <b>play a pivotal role in the global economy,</b> ... | 1999 |
| 5 | .... there is no doubt that our recent <b>economic performance has stood out from other Asian economies.</b>   | 2000 |
| 6 | ... if we are to preserve our economic vitality, create greater prosperity, and maintain living standards, <b>economic</b>   | 2001 |

**restructuring** is the only way.

...we should remain **confident about our economic prospects** because Hong Kong boasts many advantages.

- 7 The **greatest challenges** we have faced have been in the **economic realm**, rather than the political arena. We have to cope with not one, but two downturns in the past five years. 2002
- 8 Hong Kong's stability and continued development as an international city since reunification in July 1997 have depended upon the successful implementation of the principle "**One Country, Two Systems**". This framework ensures that Hong Kong retains its **distinct identity and strengths as an international business, financial, shipping and aviation center**. 2002
- 9 It is clear to me that the success of "One Country, Two Systems" involves maintaining our socio-economic systems and way of life and **ensuring Hong Kong's economic growth** and social progress. 2003
- 10 ... **globalisation brings not only opportunities but also severe challenges, such as intensified competition, corporate restructuring, loss of jobs, more poverty and the marginalisation of certain communities**. 2004
- 11 ... as a result of **globalisation**, structural employment has been caused by a serious mismatch of human resources.... Our policy vision is to first **promote economic growth** and create employment opportunities 2005

Tung Chee Hwa is proposing a theory of building national identity through economic success. The factors argued for include economic growth through the creation of wealth; international financial center; economic cutting edge in Asia and world; economic restructuring to meet challenges of globalisation.

Tung (1997) asserted that the most important task ahead for Hong Kong after the handover is the creation of wealth to sustain the economy. It supersedes all other social or political concerns. This priority given to the economic factor is similar to Tinker's (1981) survival characteristic where economic survival is crucial to nation-building for new nations.

Tung Chee Hwa also builds the identity of Hong Kong with economic success at the Asian, international or world level, e.g. Tung (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) with regards to business, financial center, economic performance. It is used as a rhetoric to set Hong Kong apart as an elite economic characteristic mentioned by Tinker (1981) for nation-building.

The challenges of globalisation are perceived to be economic in nature and unemployment is presented as a result of mismatch of human resources (Tung, 2004, 2005). Gellner (1997) in his third stage of human history classified as industrial society, mentioned the characteristic of an economic growth where the economy has to adjust to changes and a mobile society and there is political centralization. Though Gellner (1997) does not mention specifically the challenges of globalisation, it is implied and serves as a factor for nation-building.

In Tung Chee Hwa's Policy Address 2000, the underlying principle that strengthens mutual co-operation between Hong Kong and China is the firm belief that "when China succeeds, Hong Kong will prosper" (Tung, 2000, A101 *Our*

*Governing Philosophy*). Economically, when Hong Kong prospers, Hong Kong's residents, who are mainly Chinese, will also take pride in their nation China. The identity of Hong Kong people with cultural roots in China will provide a basis for developing their future political structure. (Tung, 2000).

This new identity that Hong Kong people had assumed is one that is mainly economic in nature, dependent on China's economic status in the international field. Apart from the economic base as a glue for unification, there are also the cultural, historical and social strands that will consolidate the political structure in the future merge that will be an ongoing process to becoming one country for Hong Kong and China.

Tung Chee Hwa (2002) revealed that Hong Kong needed to focus on among other things, the necessity to reinforce Hong Kong's identity and image locally and abroad. There was no elaboration on how Hong Kong's identity could be reinforced. The researcher however surmises that under the section "One Country, Two Systems", Tung Chee Hwa asserted that Hong Kong's stability and continual development as an international city since reunification in July 1997 has depended upon the successful implementation of the principle of "One Country, Two Systems". This political framework ensures that Hong Kong retains its distinct identity and strengths as an international business, financial, shipping and aviation center. (Tung C H , July 2002).

This report underlines the close association of building Hong Kong's distinct identity with the political framework of "One Country, Two Systems" and the economic symbiotic relationship with China. It appears that this political framework supports Smith's (1995) territorial political community characteristic of nation-building in the civic model where territorial community of the two systems of China and Hong Kong is bound by one political framework that is mainly economic in nature.

**Table 5.2**  
**Text Extracts of Policy Address Speeches Related to “Nation-Building” and “National Identity” by Mr Tung Chee Hwa (Chief Executive from 1997 to 2005) on Chinese Heritage**

|   |   | Date |
|---|---|------|
| 1 | Our vision of Hong Kong is: <b><i>a society proud of its national identity and cultural heritage</i></b>  | 1997 |
| 2 | To foster a <b><i>sense of belonging and identity</i></b> , we need to <b><i>promote our heritage</i></b> , which is a valuable cultural legacy. This involves the protection of historic buildings and archaeological sites,...<br>Since reunification there has been a noticeable trend among our people to know more about <b><i>our country's proud culture, history and heritage</i></b> . | 1998 |
| 3 | Our reunification with the motherland has enabled us to develop our own distinctive and colourful culture. We will continue to promote public understanding of <b><i>Chinese culture, history and heritage</i></b> ...  | 1999 |
| 4 | I see an increasingly <b><i>affluent and well-educated population, proud of our new identity and our Chinese heritage</i></b> ...   | 2000 |
| 5 | ... Hong Kong must take into account <b><i>our cultural heritage</i></b> . <b><i>Culture and art are the soul of a community</i></b> . We have  | 2001 |



established the Culture and Heritage Commission to vigorously support and promote our efforts to develop Hong Kong as a center for the arts in all its forms.

6 We share a common goal of developing into **Asia's World City**, 2004 a city that will be the **envy of the world**. We will be an enlightened and people-based government, a cohesive and vibrant society emphasizing care and justice, a creative, knowledge-based economy, a general population **proud of our Chinese heritage** and willing to **assume our national responsibilities**.

7 We can make good use of our advantage as a **confluence of Eastern and Western cultures** and leverage on our **connections with the Mainland** to create an environment conducive to the **vibrant development of culture and arts**. 2005

Tung Chee Hwa is proposing a theory of building national identity through Chinese heritage. The factors presented include appreciating China's history and proud cultural heritage; culture and the arts are the soul of the community; the new identity is linked with Chinese heritage.

It is interesting to note that Tung Chee Hwa's use of the "vision of Hong Kong as **a society proud of its national identity and cultural heritage**"... in the handover speech in 1997 contrast in his theory and meaning of national identity in the Policy Address of 2005 when he made it clear that Hong Kong's government will diligently "**enhance Hong Kong people's understanding of our country** and strengthen their **sense of national identity**." and with "**a growing sense of national identity**, Hong Kong people will be able to play a positive role in, and make new contributions to the peaceful **rise of our great nation**."

During the handover in 1997, Tung Chee Hwa's notion of national identity of Hong Kong is one that has earlier been classified as an interesting confusion in chapter 6.3. The essence of what he was actually referring to as Hong Kong having a regional identity within the national identity of China was hidden under the veneer and use of rhetoric of Hong Kong's society being proud of "***its national identity and cultural heritage***".

The researcher surmises that perhaps at the time of handover, there was a political need and agenda to assure the Hong Kong people that the 50 years of autonomy accorded to them by China is authentic and so the rhetoric was used that they can be proud of Hong Kong society's own "national identity" and culture. It is not logical or probable that Hong Kong could ever have its own independent national identity.

However 7 years after the handover, in the year 2005, Tung Chee Hwa spelt out clearly in his Policy Address that the Hong Kong's people's "sense of national identity" is directly related to "our country", and "our great nation" which is China itself. No longer is national identity referred to the society of Hong Kong. This shift of focus in national identity is significant in that it reveals the political intent of the speech in directly asserting that the Hong Kong society has already identified itself with China. It refers to distinct character characteristic of the transfer of values and cultural aspects of settings to create a distinct national identity (Liah, 1994).

Hong Kong residents were informed that “to foster a sense of belonging and identity, we need to promote our heritage, which is a valuable cultural legacy” (Tung, 1998, 124). It involved the protection of historic buildings and archaeological sites which had its origins in more than 6000 years ago. One year after the reunification with China, it had been observed that “there has been a noticeable trend among our people to know more about our country’s proud culture, history and heritage”. (Tung , 1998, 125).

This speech was made one year after the reunification and the urge to foster a sense of belonging and identity for Hong Kong seemed authentic in that historic buildings in Hong Kong are thus seen as symbolic icons in the preservation of their regional identity

But in the same breath that the call was made to preserve physical regional icons in Hong Kong, Tung Chee Hwa stressed the importance of a greater growing need to identify with the country China’s history and heritage. The latter would play a more prominent role in nurturing a sense of belonging with China. This call by Tung (1998, 125) will produce a distinct character of national cultural identity (Liah, 1994).

In calling for the creation of a society that is proud of its national identity and cultural heritage, Tung Chee Hwa is asserting his theory of nationalism through

allying its regional identity with China and gradually assimilating the culture of China so that Hong Kong can become one country with China.

**Table 5.3**  
**Text Extracts of Policy Address Speeches Related to “Nation-Building” and “National Identity” by Mr Tung Chee Hwa (Chief Executive from 1997 to 2005) on Cosmopolitan City**

|   |  | Date |
|---|--|------|
| 1 | Hong Kong has <i>long embraced both eastern and western cultures...</i>  | 1997 |
| 2 | Ours is a <i>cosmopolitan city</i> . Our ability to embrace the cultures of east and west is one of the secrets of our success, shaping a <i>unique social culture</i> of our own.   | 1997 |
| 3 | ... Hong Kong too has the potential to become, not only a major city within one country, but also <i>the most cosmopolitan city in Asia</i> , enjoying a status similar to that of New York in America and London in Europe. We must seek, as our ultimate goal, to realize this potential.  | 1998 |
| 4 | We will also look to strengthen Hong Kong’s own unique culture which embodies a successful blend of <i>the best of the East and West</i>   | 1998 |
| 5 | ... Hong Kong should not only be a major Chinese city, but could become the <i>most cosmopolitan city in Asia</i> , enjoying a <i>status comparable to</i> that of <i>New York</i> in North America and <i>London</i> in Europe.   | 1999 |
| 6 | Hong Kong possesses a unique cultural history that goes back several thousand years. This not only helps us to <i>establish our identity</i> but also serves to attract tourists. I have proposed to develop Hong Kong into an <i>international center for cultural exchanges</i> . This will help to <i>strengthen our identity as a world-class city</i> . | 1999 |
| 7 | Hong Kong has made rapid economic and social progress in   | 2000 |

many areas over the past three years, which are propelling us towards our long-term vision of Hong Kong becoming a major city of China and the **most cosmopolitan city in Asia**.

- 8 Hong Kong is **a cosmopolitan city**. ... Hong Kong people must continue to embrace a high degree of social tolerance... to examine how we can reinforce the **ideals of harmony and equality** through publicity and education 2001
- 9 Hong Kong is **Asia's World City**. This identity embodies the **spirit and characteristics** of Hong Kong and reflects our competitive edge. 2003
- 10 As the place where **East meets West**, we believe that the interplay of different cultures will stimulate diversity and inspire creativity.... 2003

Tung Chee Hwa is proposing a theory of building national identity through the concept of a cosmopolitan city. The factors argued for include the blending of the cultures of the East and West; Hong Kong becoming Asia's World City; a unique social culture of international repute.

Reference to Hong Kong developing "our identity" refers to building on Chinese culture and at the same time drawing on Western culture to make it a distinctive colourful culture. Hong Kong is affiliated to a unique cultural history from China that has its roots several thousand years earlier, a common cultural origin factor found in Hroch's (1998) common origin and destiny characteristic for nation-building.

It not only helps them to establish "our identity" but also serves as an attraction to boost tourism. In developing Hong Kong as an international center for cultural

exchanges, it will strengthen “our identity” as a world-class city. (Tung C H, 1999). The creation of a world-class distinction through the transformation of cultural aspects is reflected in Liah’s (1994) distinct character characteristic in nation-building.

Hong Kong’s identity, termed as “our identity” is one that is subsumed under China’s Chinese culture. It is an identity that Hong Kong people can be proud of as it makes it unique as a world-class city. This world class-city is also referred to as “Asia’s World City” (Tung, 2003), and the “most cosmopolitan city in Asia” (Tung 1998, 2000) where it showcases the best of “East and West” (Tung 1997, 1998, 2003). There is use of rhetoric in proclaiming that Hong Kong is a place where the best of East and West meets. In doing so, Hong Kong is presented as a symbol of social policy and cultural myth of international repute Smith (1991) an ethnic characteristic of nation-building.

Table 5.4

Text Extracts of Policy Address Speeches Related to “Nation-Building” and “National Identity” by Mr Tung Chee Hwa (Chief Executive from 1997 to 2005) on Symbiosis with China

|   | Date  |
|---|---|
| 1 | <i>Reunification with China opens up new opportunities</i> for Hong Kong. 1997<br>...We must strengthen the understanding and relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland, through <i>mutual trust, mutual economic benefits, cultural interaction</i> , and <i>mutual respect</i> for each other’s way of life. We know <i>Hong Kong and</i> |

***the Mainland will move forward together, hand in hand.***

- 2 Political stability and ***rapid development in China give Hong Kong a strong hand*** in furthering our development. 1998
- 3 ***China*** has historically ***provided the impetus for Hong Kong's economic growth***, and we have always played an important role in promoting the Mainland's relationship with other countries. 1998
- 4 According to the World Bank, ***China's gross national product currently ranks 7<sup>th</sup> in the world***, and will rise to 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> place by 2020, with an enormous cumulative growth in the interim. Nothing can stop China's advance. If ***Hong Kong can play an active part*** in the process, not only will we ***make a contribution to our country, but we will also benefit***. 1999
- 5 Our ***economic link with the Mainland is our greatest advantage*** in developing Hong Kong into a ***world-class city***. . . The ***symbiotic relationship*** between Hong Kong and Mainland is expected to gain momentum with the admission of China to the WTO 1999
- 6 Hong Kong and the Mainland have forged even ***closer economic ties*** and have strengthened mutual co-operation. Hong Kong has long benefited from the country's strong support. I still firmly believe that ***when China succeeds, Hong Kong will prosper***. 2000
- 7 Over the past four years, the ***Government and the community have worked together*** to effectively uphold the rule of law and maintain Hong Kong's liberal and open systems. In this, we have the ***full trust of the Central Government***. The people of Hong Kong now have a ***better understanding of the Motherland*** and have ***affirmed their new identity with the reunification***. We have successfully implemented "***One Country, Two Systems***". 2001
- 8 Hong Kong's future development ***hinges on the economic growth omentum in the Mainland***. According to the World Bank, the economy of China will become the world's second largest by 2020. It is envisaged that ***Hong Kong will benefit from such strong growth*** over the next 20 years. 2001
- 9 The World Tourism Organisation has forecast that China will ***lead the world in tourism*** by 2020, and ***Hong Kong will take*** 2003

***fifth place, partly because of our Mainland connections.***

- 10 Provided that we work hard at it, our ***economic development*** 2004  
will undoubtedly ***benefit from closer ties with the Mainland.***
- 11 Our country's prosperity has energized our future, reinforced 2005  
our position as ***Asia's World City*** and provided us with the  
opportunity to rebuild a sense of pride. With a ***growing sense  
of national identity***, Hong Kong people will be able to play a  
positive role in, and make new contributions to the peaceful ***rise  
of our great nation***
- 12 Fourth, we will work hard to ***enhance Hong Kong people's*** 2005  
***understanding of our country*** and strengthen their ***sense of  
national identity.*** ... We must endeavour to ***avoid giving our  
country worries and trouble.***

Tung Chee Hwa is proposing a theory of building national identity through symbiosis with China. The factors identified are China's support giving Hong Kong the impetus for economic development; mutual benefits through closer ties and economic links; riding on China's success in the world; mutual trust and respect.

The concept of Hong Kong developing a "new identity" has been developed in Tung (2001, 4 ) to include "the full trust of the China government". Tung (2005) reveals that national identity building in Hong Kong is directly linked with Kellas' (1991) official nationalism characteristic of unquestioning loyalty and patriotism to their mother country China. Hong Kong people are publicly exhorted not to oppose the policies of China; and those who are still harbouring negative



thoughts are encouraged "to change their minds" Tung (2005, 24) and pledge their absolute loyalty to China.

Tung (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005) emphasized that Hong Kong's sense of national identity has been directly linked with China's economic prosperity, leading to Hong Kong's prime position as Asia's world city. Hong Kong's symbiotic relationship with their motherland China will contribute towards the political stability and economic revival of their great nation China. It is obvious that the terms "nation" and "national identity" are understood from the perspective of the region Hong Kong been inextricably linked to its mother country China. This special symbiotic relationship between Hong Kong and China demonstrates the need for Tinker's (1981) survival characteristic where Hong Kong needs to survive economically as a new regional state; but it is not alone because of the bureaucratic support of China (Tinker, 1981) that will allow Hong Kong to ride on China's own economic success.

Tung (1999, 2001, 2003) asserts that Hong Kong will benefit from its alliance with China not just at the national level, but also at the world and international levels, e.g. the economy of China will become "the world's second largest by 2020" and Hong Kong will "benefit from such strong growth over the next 20 years" (Tung, 2001, 26). Here closer economic integration of Hong Kong and China will bring about a global or supranational identity (Cameron, 1999) of economic success at the international level.

Table 5.5

**Text Extracts of Policy Address Speeches Related to “Nation-Building” and “National Identity” by Mr Tung Chee Hwa (Chief Executive from 1997 to 2005) on Public Education**

|   |   | Date |
|---|---|------|
| 1 | In the school curriculum, we need to develop teaching about <b>Chinese history and culture</b> . These are part of the <b>heritage</b> of our predominantly <b>Chinese community</b> .  | 1997 |
| 2 | To help nurture the growth of a stronger understanding of our own community and culture, the Home Affairs Bureau will be launching a programme to <b>strengthen civic education</b> over the coming year, under the theme “Hong Kong, Our Home”.  | 1997 |
| 3 | The starting point for the development of an <b>enlightened, knowledge-based society</b> is good education. To take Hong Kong forward in an increasingly competitive world, we must <b>give education top priority</b> .  | 1998 |
| 4 | ... many educators maintain that education should ...aim at an <b>all-round development</b> of our children, including development not only in knowledge but also in <b>personal character, skills, attitude</b> and physique. In addition to normal academic studies, our students need to learn how to become <b>responsible and caring individuals</b> . | 1999 |
| 5 | It is the SAR Government’s goal to train our people to be truly <b>biliterate</b> and <b>trilingual</b> . To ensure that all teachers achieve a necessary standard of language ability, we have established language benchmarks for those teaching <b>English</b> in junior secondary schools and <b>Putonghua</b> in primary schools.                      | 1999 |
| 6 | <b>Chinese</b> is one of the most widely used languages in the world. It is also an important tool for exploring our own cultural heritage. ... <b>Mother-tongue</b> teaching was introduced to help students learn more effectively  | 1999 |
| 7 | Schools should have <b>more scope for moral and civic education</b> courses enabling the students to develop <b>sound beliefs</b> , determination and integrity, leadership skills, <b>a sense of social responsibility and positive attitudes</b> towards life.  | 2000 |

- 8 ... to enable every student to **enjoy learning, be good communicators**, be courageous in accepting responsibilities, and to be creative and innovative. 2001
  
- 9 It is our policy to promote **bi-literacy** and **tri-lingualism**. Hong Kong is a cosmopolitan city, and it needs to promote the **wider use of basic English**. As **part of China**, Hong Kong people should also **learn to speak fluent Putonghua**. This will facilitate effective communication and business exchanges with the Mainland. 2001
  
- 10 We will continue to invest heavily in hard and soft infrastructure. By **soft infrastructure**, I mean education. We will **invest a lot in education** to make sure that for generations to come, we will be able **to compete successfully in world terms** as a value-added city. 2002
  
- 11 One crucial means of promoting **economic restructuring** is **by investing in education**. Only by developing our own local human resources and providing opportunities for continuing education for people of all walks of life can we prepare ourselves for the changes in the marketplace. 2003
  
- 12 The main tool for promoting **economic restructuring** and establishing **a knowledge-based economy** is to **invest substantially in education** and to strategically raise the competitiveness of our labour force. 2004  
 ... Currently education accounts for about 25% of government expenditure.

Tung Chee Hwa has proposed using public education to build national identity. The factors related to education are that heavy investments in education brings about economic benefits; the issue of the choice of languages; the importance of civic and moral education to build character; the teaching of Chinese history and culture.

In his new 1997 administration's policy agenda, former Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa had singled out education, as one of the main concerns. Above all other concerns for education, Tung called for the creation of a society that is proud of its national identity and cultural heritage. Tung in his statement emphasized patriotism and political education. He called for the need to intensify civic education to give the young people a deeper knowledge of China, Chinese culture and history, the "one country, two systems" concept, and the Basic Law. It is hoped that they can achieve an ever greater understanding about fostering in the youth a sense of attachment for the nation (Pepper, 1997).

This call to use moral and civic education to enable the students to develop sound beliefs, leadership skills, "a sense of social responsibility and positive attitudes" for nation-building with China is reiterated in Tung (2000, 62).

The use of public education to produce a homogeneous nation with emotional attachment is a characteristic proposed by Smith (1991) for national identity.

The language issue of bi-literacy and tri-lingualism to promote the "wider use of basic English" and the need to "learn to speak fluent Putonghua" (Tung, 2001, 46) to communicate well in China (Tung, 2001) is a testimony to Hroch's (1998) proposal of a "higher culture" in a national language where Putonghua is the "higher" culture language that has to be mastered to enable the Hong Kong

people to socialize with mainland Chinese. This “higher” culture language is than accepted as the nation’s traditional cultural heritage. (Cameron, 1999).

Tung (1998, 89) mentions the need for Hong Kong to “give education top priority” in an age of “enlightened, knowledge-based society” which parallels Gellner’s (1997) industrial society stage of cognitive growth with a standardized educational system to meet changing needs.

Tung (2002, 2003, 2004) rationalizes that economic restructuring in a knowledge-based economy is by investing “substantially in education”. Gellner (1997) also affirms the theory that economic and cognitive growth in the industrial society is carried out through a costly educational infrastructure that will lead to political centralization.

In summary, the characteristics used by Tung (1997-2005) to create a theory of regionalism/nationalism and a concept of national identity include : economic success; Chinese heritage; the concept of a cosmopolitan city; symbiosis with China; and using public education to build national identity.

The factors argued for economic success include economic growth through the creation of wealth; international financial center; economic cutting edge in Asia and world; economic restructuring to meet challenges of globalisation. Chinese heritage factors presented include appreciating China’s history, Chinese cultural

heritage, culture and the arts. The factors for the concept of cosmopolitan city is built through the blending of the cultures of the East and West; Hong Kong becoming Asia's World City; a unique social culture of international repute. Symbiosis with China is constructed with China's support giving Hong Kong the impetus for economic development; mutual benefits through closer ties and economic links; riding on China's success in the world; mutual trust and respect. Factors for investing in education include bringing about economic benefits; the issue of the choice of languages; the importance of civic and moral education to build character; the teaching of Chinese history and culture.

These characteristics and factors analyzed in the text extracts of Tung's (1997-2005) Policy Addresses reveal some parallels with Tinker's (1981) elite economic characteristic for nation-building; Gellner's (1997) characteristic of an economic growth as witnessed when the economy has to adjust to change in the global economy; Liah's (1994) distinct character characteristic of the transfer of values and cultural aspects of settings; Smith's (1991) cultural policy in the form of symbols; Kellas' (1991) official nationalism characteristic; Tinker's (1981) survival and bureaucratic support of nation-state characteristics; Cameron's (1999) global or supranational identity; Smith's (1991) reference to public education to produce a homogeneous nation with emotional attachment; Hroch's (1998) "higher culture" in a national language; and Cameron's (1999) reference to language as testimony of cultural heritage; and Gellner's (1997) economic and cognitive growth in the industrial society.

The researcher reasserts again that Hong Kong falls into the classification of characteristics of Subjective/Objective National Identity as expounded in chapter 3.4.2

In essence the true meaning of building “national identity” in Hong Kong refers to the building of a regional identity in Hong Kong within the political expectation of building a national identity within their motherland country of China. The statehood factors are still dominant. China played a very prominent role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. China is instrumental in building the economic symbiotic relationship between Hong Kong and China that will contribute to the economic prosperity of both Hong Kong and China. Nation-building through economic means will help to contribute towards a distinct identity within Asia as the unique Asia’s World City that is perceived to accord it international status and become the envy of the world.

The secondary characteristics of Subjective National Identity include the imbibing of cultural values, history and heritage of China for Hong Kong. Like Singapore, the latter process of culture building will take time to evolve. However unlike Singapore, the history and culture of China and Hong Kong has been around for a much longer period and the population in Hong Kong is quite homogenous in its racial composition, with the majority being Chinese. China’s history and culture has long been established and with the change in the curriculum in

citizenship education for Hong Kong, it is believed that the student population and generations to come will gradually learn to identify with China culturally and appreciate its heritage.

### 5.6 Singapore and Hong Kong : Comparisons and Contrasts

This section will compare the result of the analysis of Singapore’s three Prime Ministers and Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Tung. It will summarise the weaknesses in those theories; categorise what kind of theories they are academically and make the process of national identity building more transparent.

**Table 5.6 : Comparisons of Analysis of Singapore and Hong Kong Politicians’ Theories of National Identity and Academic References**

| Singapore   | Hong Kong  |
|---|--|
| 1) Singapore to work hard for economic survival (Lee KY, 2000). Kellas’ (1991) economic and Tinker’s (1981) survival features.  | 1i) Economic growth and wealth for nation-building (Tung, 1997). Tinker’s (1991) survival feature.<br>ii) Symbiosis with China and strong economic support by China (Tung, 2005). Tinker’s (1981) bureaucracy as structural support.<br>iii) Challenges of globalisation are economic (Tung, 2004, 2005). Gellner’s (1997) global economic growth. |
| 2 i) Elite leadership to direct post-colonial Singapore (Lee KY, 1967). Tinker’s (1981) survival and Kellas’ (1991) political elite features<br>ii) Elite leadership to combat creation of a virtual war (Lee HL, 2004). Tinker’s (1981) survival and Kellas’ (1991) political elite features | 2) Economic success at the international level led by China’s potential reput e in the world (Tung, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) used as rhetoric to project Hong Kong as elite economic feature by Tinker (1981).  |



|   |  |
|---|--|
| 3) Focus on the political agenda (Lee KY, 1984). Kellas' (1991) state and political power features. Cobban's (1994) political government criterion.   | 3) Principle of "One Country, Two Systems" political framework (Tung, 2002). Smith's (1995) territorial political community in civic model.  |
| 4i) The Singapore Story – creation of the myth of shared history (Goh, 1998). Kellas' (1991) & Hroch's (1998) culture and common origin features.<br>ii) Myth of the Singapore Dream (Goh, 2003). Hobsbawm's (1994) nation as invented tradition.<br>iii) One people, one nation, one Singapore (Goh, 1991, 1993, 1996). Gellner's (1983) sense of belonging of the people in a country | 4i) Hong Kong as society proud of its national identity and cultural heritage (Tung, 1997). Smith's collective cultural phenomenon.<br><br>ii) Directly related to "our country" and "our great nation" (Tung, 2005). Liah's (1994) distinct character<br>iii) A cosmopolitan city (Tung, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003). Cameron's (1999) supranational identity in culture  |
| 5i) Intranational identity to defend Singapore at all times (Teo, 2005). Tinker's (1981) strong bureaucratic planning and Smith's (1991) civic model.<br>ii) Nationalism as anti-communism (Lee KY, 1980, Goh, 1996). Hayes' (1926) nationalism as a force of evil to be weeded out from within the society.  | 5i) Supranational identity (Cameron, 1999) through closer economic integration with China (Tung, 2001)<br><br>ii) Unquestioning loyalty and patriotism to China (Tung, 2005). Kellas' (1991) official nationalism.   |
| 6i) Education for citizenship through National Education (Goh, 1996). Smith's (1991) ethnic character to produce emotional attachment through public education.   | 6i) Heavy investment in education for economic restructuring (Tung, 2002, 2003, 2004). Gellner's (1997) economic and cognitive growth through costly educational infrastructure.<br>ii) Bi-literacy and tri-lingualism to communicate well (Tung, 2001). Hroch's (1998) "higher culture" in national language; Cameron's (1999) language as cultural heritage.<br>iii) Strengthen civic education (Tung, 1997).<br>Smith's (1991) public education to build homogeneous nation |

That Singapore has to work hard for its economic survival (Lee KY, 2000) has been a primary deep seated ideology created by the People's Action Party and transmitted to all citizens at all times. Economic success and prosperity is the tangible yardstick of measure of the country's progress in nation-building. This economic characteristic corresponds to Tinker's (1981) survival and Kellas' (1991) economic factors. Economic success supersedes and obscures other necessary characteristics for nation-building e.g. Kellas' (1991) culture or cultural elite; Smith's (1991) cultural and social policy; Liah's (1994) community's cultural/ethnic uniqueness and distinct character; Hroch's (1998) common origin and destiny.

The fact that Singapore had progressed from an economic slum of Third World country to the affluent First World by the year 2000 (Lee KY, 2000) serves as justification for the continual political agenda (Lee KY, 1984) and elite leadership (Lee KY, 1967, 2004). This political agenda is strictly the development of the apparatus of the administrative state to maintain the nation-state (Tinker, 1981) where the state functions as the PAP one-party state in Singapore and has full control of how the nation is run.

To compensate for the lack of a shared history to unite the people, the myth of the Singapore Dream (Goh, 2003), the Singapore Story (Goh, 1998) and the call to "one people, one nation, one Singapore" (Goh, 1991, 1993, 1996) rhetoric which transcends all four races are created as an alternative to building a cultural

heritage (Kellas, 1991; Liah 1994; Smith 1991; Hroch 1998).

The *Singapore Story* seeks to present Kellas' (1991) community ties of history, culture and ancestry; and Hroch's (1998) culture and common origin features. It is in essence a political agenda of the struggles of the PAP story; told at the National Education Exhibition in 1996, "but the story is not completed" (Goh, *Conclusion: Unity in Adversity*, 1998). This is due to the continuous economic trials that the nation faces; and can be classified as a created myth to build the nation as invented tradition of historical political and economic struggles. (Hobsbawm, 1994).

Apart from economic success, the actual implementation of nation-building characteristics for Singapore are in the areas of psychological intranational identity (Teo, 2005); education for citizenship (Goh, 1996) and anti-communism factor (Lee KY, 1980, Goh, 1996). While these features correspond to Tinker's (1981) strong bureaucratic planning; Smith's (1991) ethnic character; Smith's (1991) civic model; and Hayes' (1926) nationalism as a force of evil respectively; Singapore's approach to these areas has taken a very introspective stance. E.g. the call to defend Singapore in a time of peace and prosperity through National Education is pursued to the hilt and citizenship education is taught through National Education that involves "learning about Singapore – our history, our geography, the constraints we face, how we have overcome them, survived and

prospered, what we must do to continue to thrive" (Goh, 1996, 44). It does not examine any area outside Singapore.

Communism is presented as an evil threat to the survival and political security of Singapore and has to be weeded out so that Singapore can function as a new nation. It is implicit that PAP is the good and legitimate party in governance and has to be protected from all evil forces (Hayes, 1926).

Like Singapore, Hong Kong also presents regional economic growth and creation of wealth for nation-building (Tung, 1997) which corresponds to Tinker's (1991) survival feature. Unlike Singapore that has to resolve its economic issues alone, Hong Kong has strong economic support from China and a symbiotic relationship with China (Tung, 2005), a feature of Tinker's (1981) bureaucracy as structural support. The symbiotic relationship is not an equal one because China is the controlling national political party and administrative state (Tinker, 1981). The challenges of globalisation are presented as economic in nature (Tung, 2004, 2005). It leads to a perceived need for heavy investment in education to accommodate economic restructuring; corresponding to Gellner's (1997) global economic, cognitive growth and costly educational infrastructure.

Meeting economic demands of globalisation in Hong Kong is contrasted with Singapore's paradoxical approach in not just accepting the economic priority in

copied with globalisation; but also looking into the affective aspect of emotional bonding in nation-building (Lee HL, 2004). Bhagwati (2004, H8), an economics professor, affirms that globalisation does have a "human face" through "appropriate governance, extending to both domestic and international policies and institution formation".

Economic success at the international level led by China's immediate and potential reputation in the world (Tung, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) is used as rhetoric to project Hong Kong as a future elite economic characteristic of nation-building by Tinker (1981). Implicit in this argument is that China as the political elite (Kellas, 1991) within the "One Country, Two Systems" political framework, has control of the political resources to assume the economic elite (Kellas, 1991) status in the world; and Hong Kong as a region will vicariously identify with the national China's reputation. The underlying assumption is also that on its own, Hong Kong is not likely to achieve international success.

Related to the identity of international reputation for Hong Kong is the creation of a potential Supranational identity (Cameron, 1999) through closer economic integration with China (Tung, 2001). Similar to the merging of member states of the European Union, is the likelihood of the consolidation of China as a motherland to not only Hong Kong, but also Taiwan and China will be using force if necessary "to stop Taiwan from leaving the Chinese fold..." (The Straits Times,

3 July, 2004, A8). Thus Hong Kong will have a threefold identity, regional, national and potentially supranational.

There was use of rhetoric in initially stating that Hong Kong as a society is proud of its national identity and cultural heritage (Tung, 1997) during the political transition in 1997, corresponding to Smith's (1991) collective cultural phenomenon. In 2005, Tung (2005) asserts that Hong Kong's "sense of national identity" is directly related to "our country", and "our great nation" which is China itself, relating to Liah's (1994) distinct character of the transfer of values and cultural aspects to create a national identity. This character is not just Chinese in cultural heritage, but also cosmopolitan in nature (Tung 1998, 2000, 2001) that embraces the cultures of both East and West (Tung, 1998, 2003). It is a supranational identity in culture (Cameron, 1999) that is universal because it covers the asserted best cultures of both worlds. This statement is a myth that is created to build a distinct universal culture.

Tung (2005) assumes in his statement that Hong Kong has already assumed the national identity of China. There are no academic studies to verify his claim. On the contrary, Hui et al, (2004) cited the following : Kuan and Lau's (1997) study revealed that people in Hong Kong preferred to identify themselves as "Hongkongese" rather than Chinese; Lee's (1999, 336) study showed that Hong Kong students "were found to be weak in national identity despite the emphasis of the official curriculum"; Leung and Print's (2002) study found that though

schools taught civic education, the number of teachers who supported it was not high. These evidences explained "why Hong Kong students have been trained to be politically indifferent" (Hui et al, 2004).

While Hong Kong's identity as proposed by Tung (2005) and the Central Mainland government will be enlarged into a threefold regional, national and supranational identity (Cameron, 1999); it contrasts with Singapore's Intranational identity (Teo, 2005) where the population is known as its only resources and "the will" of the people will have to be closely guided by the ruling elite political leadership (Kellas, 1991).

(Tung, 2005) calls for unquestioning patriotism to China, supporting Kellas' (1991) official nationalism which demands of the citizens to be totally loyal to the state. It is difficult to measure if this factor can be observed in the Hong Kong people as it was earlier discussed that Hong Kong students are politically indifferent.

Bi-literacy and tri-lingualism are promoted so that Hong Kong people can communicate well both in Hong Kong and China. (Tung, 2001) That Hong Kong people should learn to speak fluent Chinese Putonghua further supports Hock's (1998) "higher culture" in national language and Cameron's (1999) language as cultural heritage. While both Hong Kong and Singapore promote the use of

English for utilitarian purposes, Hong Kong promotes Putonghua as a national language and Cantonese is still predominantly used in the society. Singapore's truly "national" language is historically Malay; but in practice is actually English because of its wide usage in the country, at work, in the media and in print. (Anderson, 1983). All races are united and communicate freely through the use of English Language or "Singlish", a pidgin form of English. Singapore also promotes bilingualism in the schools so that its Asian roots can be maintained.

Just as Singapore uses National Education to promote citizenship education (Goh, 1996), Hong Kong seeks also to strengthen civic education to bind the people to the country (Tung, 1997), further supporting Smith's (1991) theory that public education is necessary to build a homogeneous nation.

The researcher postulates that in the classifications of Objective/Globalised National Identity for Singapore and Objective/Subjective/Globalised National Identity for Hong Kong, the Objective National Identity element in both societies are strong. Having traced the economic, political and social factors that influenced Singapore and Hong Kong, it is evident that political and economic factors are essential in building national identity for Singapore and regional identity for Hong Kong after the transitions although their circumstances and approaches may differ. However Hong Kong has the added cultural heritage factor that helps it to bond with their motherland China.



Both Tung (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) and Goh (1996) have argued for a special place for education in building national identity for their region and country respectively. The researcher will next analyse public education in citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong in chapter 6, before examining the use of public education and the curricula of citizenship education in building national identity in chapter 7.

## **Chapter 6 Citizenship Education**

After reviewing the political, economic and social factors that influence nation-building in Singapore and Hong Kong in chapters 4 and 5 respectively, chapter 6 will discuss the relationship of citizenship education to the creation of national identity and the support for the nation-state. The theory of and application of citizenship education; and the historical background of citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong will be discussed. It will serve as a preparation for the analysis of public education in citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong in chapter 7.

### **6.1 Defining Citizenship Education**

In many parts of the world, educationists have difficulty defining and redefining the concept of education for citizenship due to the different shades of meanings acquired in different contexts of the different countries (Lawton, 1998). Davies (2000) has counted over 300 known definitions of concepts associated with citizenship education.

Key concepts that underpin citizenship education include not only democracy, rights, responsibilities, tolerance, respect, equality, community, diversity but also the dimensions of knowledge and understanding, skills, attitudes and values often set in a historical framework encompassing a broad range of perspectives to shape the attitudes and behaviour of the young (Kerr, 2003).

While the classical definition of citizenship education stems from the assertion that citizenship involves a balance or union between rights and obligations; recent definitions according to Heater (1990) emphasise the affinity and identity dimensions of citizenship. Marshall (1977, 1981) differentiates three dimensions of citizenship: civil, political and social, emphasizing the social aspect. Turner (1990, 1997) highlights the economic dimension, positing that citizenship controls access to the scarce resources of society.

Taking into consideration all the potential social, political and economic forces at play in transforming the social bond of society and its citizens, Ichilov (1998) defines citizenship as a complex and multidimensional concept consisting of legal, cultural, social, and political elements, and providing citizens with defined rights and obligations, a sense of identity, and social bonds. Ichilov (1998) further argues that citizenship education evolves with the political, social, and value changes within any given society. For example in Israel, the shift had been from a highly emotional and expressive "Zionist citizenship" education to apolitical "civic education" from the mid 1950s. Until 1967, civic education was confined to the study of structural and legal aspects of citizenship, excluding controversial issues. From 1967 students were gradually introduced back to the politics and the social and political reality in Israel. In 1985, a new policy introduced "education for democracy" and swung the pendulum to the direction of universal humanistic values, marginalizing the previous national values.

Ichilov's (1998) argument holds true for Hong Kong. Before the signing of the Sino-British Joint declaration in 1984 between Britain and China, civics education was not important in Hong Kong. Many Hong Kong people were apolitical. However in the wake of the resumption of sovereignty of China over Hong Kong in 1997, the British colonial rule saw a need to introduce the concept of democracy and citizenship education to Hong Kong education system. A formal set of Guidelines for Civic Education was drawn up in 1985. It was revised in 1996 to include the building of national identity with China to assimilate Hong Kong into China.

In the West, one attempt at the creation of a supra-national citizenship is the establishment of European citizenship in 1993. Although the duties of the European citizen are not yet defined, the social rights and individual rights are only implicit, there is economic integration of the European community and a common hope in a common future (Ravazzolo, 1995). With the recent socio-economic and political changes in Europe, European education systems cannot afford to remain monocultural. Osler (1994) argued that education in the twenty first century is one that is inclusive rather than exclusive in its understanding of national identity and citizenship.

Lynch (1992) suggests that education for democratic citizenship needs to embrace three interdependent levels of citizenship, local, national, and international, operating in four domains of social, cultural, environmental and

economic. In the past, he declared that what was classified as citizenship education was actually teaching for national citizenship. The challenge now is to develop approaches to citizenship education to meet the needs of a multicultural Europe where minorities also assert their rights.

The possibility of a European identity transcending the identity of nation states is discussed in the European Union. It faces the problem of resistance from the complex nationalisms of member states. The Union is felt to consist of White Christian nations. Non-white and non-Christian minorities have a separate identity called the Migrant Forum. These problems have yet to be resolved (Rex, 1996).

Despite the rising tension and global complexity between citizenship and national identity, Habermas (1994) remains optimistic in his conviction that different cultures will form a common political culture in the future as we work towards world citizenship.

While Habermas' (1994) conviction may be applicable for bigger political unions like e.g. European Union, a small Asian country like Singapore is working hard towards the building of national identity in the 21<sup>st</sup> century's challenging phase of globalisation. One way of nation-building in Singapore is the revision of citizenship education in the schools and the introduction of National Education, which is given emphasis and prominence in the school curriculum.

## **6.2 Citizenship Education in Other Countries**

Citizenship education in Malaysia is infused into the study of history, starting with the lower secondary levels. The focus is on the acquisition of historical knowledge of Malaysia and the inculcation of the spirit of citizenship. Students are exposed to both the national, local and history of other countries outside Malaysia. The five citizenship values instilled include pride in being Malaysian, patriotism, esprit de corps, discipline, industry and productivity. As the Malaysian education system is content and examination oriented, it is difficult to see effective implementation of values and values-related subjects in the curriculum (Jadi, 1997).

Smith (2003) contends that as the concept of nation-state has changed; populations have become more diverse and tensions between different values and traditions more rife, modern concepts of citizenship education have also evolved. Conceptually it is a shifting of the old paradigm of “patriotic” notions of citizenship, defined mainly in terms of national identity, towards a more encompassing definition of citizenship defined in terms of fundamental freedoms and obligations that apply to all, irrespective of birth or ethnic origin. Recent concepts of citizenship education in the United Kingdom contain distinctive features such as commitment to enquiry-based learning and the development of skills for participation in civic society.

In the United Kingdom, the National Curriculum Council in 1990 has declared education for citizenship essential for every student with the document *Education for Citizenship* which stresses the responsibilities of citizens and the pluralist nature of society's ethnicity, culture and faith. Three elements of citizenship education identified include political education in an attempt to promote political literacy; global education to emphasize the holistic nature of the world; and citizenship education promoting students to become active in social, environmental and political issues. The recent enthusiasm for citizenship education has resulted in the production of a vast range of teaching resources. The government has embraced the concept of citizenship education but promoted it with a slant on social cohesion and active participation, a citizenship education that is considered to be appropriate for a democratic and pluralistic society (Lister, 1998). The fact that Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) will assess schools on the quality of citizenship education from 2002 should result in the incorporation of citizenship education into the school curriculum. (Hussain, 2001).

It was reported in the Singapore Straits Times that OFSTED had singled out citizenship education as the worst taught subject in British secondary schools in January 2005. Mr David Bell, the Chief Inspector of Schools and head of OFSTED revealed that scepticism, cynicism and even fear about dealing with complex, sensitive issues such as race and ethnicity have hindered the teaching of these classes. Although the classes were made compulsory for students since

September 2002, a poll of 14-16 year old students indicated that they did not know what such classes were; and did not care or understand about political parties in the country. (The Straits Times, 19<sup>th</sup> January 2005).

Unlike many advanced nations, there are no national citizenship goals, curriculum, standards, examinations or means to evaluate citizenship education in the United States. A decentralized public education system determines its own policies and practices in conducting citizenship education at all levels. Wide variations exist in the implementation. The primary and secondary school system tends to emphasize either the structure of government in the United States and major historic events, or the problems and issues associated with democracy and the American culture. Elementary school children are exposed to American symbols and the rudiments of American history and government. More intensive formal instruction in citizenship education takes place at the junior high school where all students are required to take a designated citizenship education course variously entitled as Civics, Principles of Democracy, Government, Problems of Democracy etc. Research has suggested that extracurricular activities are more effective ways of learning citizenship education. Most of the courses have been criticized as tedious and boring. Teachers may not be well equipped to handle stimulating but controversial issues. Redesigning and implementing citizenship education in America is difficult to achieve because of inherent controversies in defining democracy. Multiple definitions of democracy abound and it results in arguments over how the students ought to be taught. While some schools and



parents believe that the main goal of citizenship education is to produce well-informed and conforming citizens, others may demand a critical, issue-oriented, problem-solving approach to develop active citizenship. (Ichilov, 1998).

### **6.3 Education for National Identity**

From the outset, young children have a simple notion of unconscious egocentricity about their assumption that the immediate attitudes arising from their own surroundings are the only ones possible (Piaget, 1951). This view is extended from the territorial attitude to the political life of children by Coles (1986) who observed that a nation's politics become a child's daily psychology. Parmenter (1997) noted that this observation is applicable not only to the nation, but also to the international and global spheres. This does not mean that international politics will naturally become a child's daily psychology.

The child's psyche is influenced by identities that can be multiple, depending on whether an issue is national, international, global or cultural. A good test of this psyche is the spontaneous response of young children in Singapore to the September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 terrorism attack in the United States. The Sunday Times, (September 2001) reported that from child-care centers to primary schools, students from four to twelve have been discussing the incidents daily with classmates and teachers, expressing their shock and concern. Without being taught in schools, they were using the international identity to empathize with the Americans.

In September 1996, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong delivered the rationale for National Education for nation-building and the building of national identity for Singapore in his Teachers' Day Rally speech. He explained that National Education in schools is not just mere book knowledge. Like Coles (1998) and Parmenter (1997), Goh Chok Tong spoke of the need to develop instincts that will become part of the psyche of every child that will lead to a shared sense of nationhood.

In Hong Kong, before the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, the de-politicised strategy of the British colonial government to maintain social cohesion and social control affected the education system. The British Hong Kong government was very sensitive to political issues in education and tried to keep them under control (Tse, 1999). Civic education was never a core learning subject and nationalistic education was neglected. The only information and experience students had with respect to China was limited to Chinese history, the cultural aspect of heritage, customs and traditions and their concept of Chinese identity was more cultural rather than a political sense of belonging (Wong K Y, 1996).

Instead the students fostered an identity that is uniquely "Hongkongese" which was linked with individualism, human rights and democracy (Mathews, 1997). It greatly hindered the development of the national Chinese identity or identification with China, which had different emphasis on collective wills and patriotism. Given

the political background, students had been inadvertently educated with the resulting belief that they did not belong to the nation of China but to a city state Hong Kong. However with the changes in political circumstances that surrounded the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the urgent need to develop students' sense of national identity for being Chinese and take pride in being part of China was first officially announced in the 1985 Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools. In 1996, a revision of the guidelines put further emphasis on the development of the students' national identity within the area of Civic education. (Hui et al, 2004).

The 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools stated that politically speaking, the students' civic identity is defined by his national identity within his national community. China constitutes the domestic context for Hong Kong students' civic learning. The cultivation of nationalism and patriotism is essential not only for the Hong Kong students' national identity and sense of belonging, but also to build cohesion in building the nation of China.

The study of the building of national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong from a historical-comparative perspective of nation-building through citizenship education is complex. The theories of nationalism, nation-state, national identity and citizenship education are manifold and multidimensional. Paradigms of these theories also shift with the times, especially with globalization. While Singapore has adopted a very local nationalistic outlook of building national identity with the

latest revision of citizenship education in the form of National Education; the need for a local nation-building with China for Hong Kong appears to have taken a less significant role with the most recent emphasis on a global multidimensional approach to citizenship education to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

#### **6.4 Citizenship Education in Singapore**

The historical evolution of citizenship education in Singapore is covered in chapter 5 and is related to the political, social and economic circumstances surrounding the building of the nation.

It has evolved from the Civics syllabus to address social cohesion in the 1950s to the revisions in the 1960s to the Civics and History syllabuses to further promote social cohesion. The birth of Religious Knowledge grew out of a need to arrest the fears of a moral crisis in the 1980s for the secondary schools; while the primary schools had a locally designed programme "Good Citizen". In the early 1990s, Religious Knowledge was replaced with a compulsory Civics and Moral Education to help develop a commitment to nation-building.

The present focus of citizenship education for Singapore was an initiative that arose out of a desire to impart a sense of national identity in nation building for Singapore. A changed social context where the younger generation do not have knowledge and appreciation of their local history, especially in Singapore's

struggle for nationhood; and the impact of globalization; warranted a surge of a new programme National Education in all schools.

Goh Chok Tong (1996) explained the rationale for National Education. The contents of Social Studies, Civic and Moral Education and History had to be revised to emphasise nation-building. National Education is an exercise that will develop instincts in every child to engender a shared sense of nationhood, an understanding of how the past is relevant to Singapore's present and future. It should appeal to both the heart and mind of all the students. It is critical that Singapore succeeds in National Education as the peace and prosperity of Singapore cannot be taken for granted. (Goh C T, *The Rationale for National Education*, 1996).

Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the launch of National Education in May 1997 reiterated that the younger generation did not know how Singapore became an independent nation. Unless Singapore systematically transmits the right cultural DNA instincts and attitudes to future generations, Singapore cannot thrive beyond the founder generation. The *Singapore Story* on how Singapore succeeded against all odds to become a nation is what makes Singapore special and provides a backdrop which helps Singaporeans make sense of their present. At the secondary level, the Ministry of Education will develop a new Social Studies subject to cover issues central to Singapore's survival and success. Schools will also commemorate a few key events that define milestone markers

of Singapore's history. They include Total Defence Day on 15<sup>th</sup> February, Racial Harmony Day on 21<sup>st</sup> July, International Friendship Day and National Day on 9<sup>th</sup> August. Schools will also participate in learning journeys to national institutions and economic facilities to build pride and confidence in the students; as well as be involved in community service to strengthen social cohesion and civic responsibility. The National Education content is introduced across the formal curriculum from primary One level right up to junior colleges. (Lee H L, The Launch of National Education, 1997).

### **6.5 Citizenship Education in Hong Kong**

The historical evolution of citizenship education in Hong Kong is covered in chapter 5 and is related to the political, social and economic circumstances that surround the British colonial rule's return of Hong Kong to China and the building of the region Hong Kong, while been assimilated into China. Scholars have marked the development of Civic education into three phases. Morris et al (1997) looked at an earlier period from 1945-1965 to examine the political circumstances under which the British resorted to depoliticising the school texts. Ng SW et al (2000), Grossman et al (1999) and Morris et al (1997) all agree that the period prior to 1984 was one that saw changes in the political and economic conditions in Hong Kong which resulted in the content of Civics been redefined to include an academic link in the new subject Economics and Public Affairs in 1965. Civics was replaced by Social Studies in primary schools in 1967.

However, much criticisms were leveled against how Economics and Public Affairs and Social Studies were taught. Emphasis was placed on how the British government had contributed towards the welfare of the Hong Kong people and any sensitive political matters regarding China was avoided.

With the impending return of Hong Kong to China, the British government realized at a late stage that they had to prepare Hong Kong residents for their citizenship in China in 1997. Guidelines for both Civic education and Moral education were introduced in 1985. A new subject, Government and Public Affairs was introduced in Upper Secondary schools in 1988. The content of History, Geography and Social Studies were revised in the late 1980s to include political awareness (Grossman et al, 1999).

The 1985 Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools recognized that there was a special need at that time in Hong Kong's political development to ensure that students will understand the significance of the changes taking place. Though civic education must essentially be political in nature, political education is differentiated from political indoctrination. Civic education is used synonymously with education for citizenship. Citizenship is simply defined as the relationship between an individual and his government which can be extended to society. Civic education is then construed to be a process whereby desirable qualities in the citizens are developed to promote better relationships between governing authorities and the society. Education for democracy means different things to different people and there are many brands of democracy. As it is difficult to

interpret the concept of democracy, civic education will be used instead. A sense of belonging to Hong Kong and a sense of national identity and belonging to China was included in the attitudes section for both upper primary and junior secondary levels. Students are to be taught the history, geography of China and its latest political and economic developments. At the same time, the focus was on the British government, its function, the work of the government and the need for the Hong Kong students to appreciate and co-operate with the British government. (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1985).

There were criticisms that the 1985 Guidelines was a depoliticised form of political education. Bray and Lee (1993) suggested that apart from the concepts of responsible, rational and sensitive citizenship, some teaching about China and national identity, the underlying principles of the 1985 Guidelines were not that different from those of the previous Civic education and Economic and Public Affairs syllabus, which at the most raised the students' awareness and concern about the social services rather than politics.

With regard to the implementation of the political content, the implementation was worse. Most schools avoided the teaching of political elements in their Civic education programmes, and have only endorsed and implemented the non-political elements in the Guidelines. More emphasis was placed on the personal development, interpersonal relationships, and moral education in their school Civic education programmes. (Ng et al, 2000).



The third phase of Civic education started from 1997, when Hong Kong was returned to China by the British rule. In response to the political transition and the need for Civic education to be more China centered than Hong Kong centered, a revised version of the Guidelines was produced in 1996. There are three aims. The main aim is that it sets out to help students understand how the individual, as a citizen, relates to the family, regional community of Hong Kong, national community of China and the world; and to develop in them positive attitudes and values conducive to the development of a sense of belonging to Hong Kong and China. Politically, the students' civic identity is defined by their national identity with the national community in China. Students should be imbued with the national spirit of nationalism and patriotism. (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1996).

Even with the official 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, the focus of Civic education has been challenged. Tse (1997) stressed that the 1996 Civic Education Guidelines are still lacking in democratic education and nationalistic education. A recent study carried out by Leung and Print found that while civic educators in secondary schools were willing to implement nationalistic education, the percentage supporting the teaching of Civic education is not high. There is a need to reconceptualise the curriculum. (Hui et al, 2004).

In the latest reconceptualization of citizenship education for Hong Kong, Grossman (2000) presented a paper on the *Multidimensional Shifts in Education*

*and Issues of Teacher Education* at the 2000 International Symposium in Japan. The 21<sup>st</sup> century presents challenges and the primary global task of each nation is to cope with the centrifugal forces of the global economy which undermines ties that bind citizens at the local level. To identify what kinds of citizens were needed for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the multinational Citizenship Education Policy Study (CEPS) was initiated. A key recommendation was that educational policy should be based upon a vision of multidimensional citizenship. There are four dimensions of the personal, social, spatial and temporal aspects that comprise multidimensional citizenship. The personal, social and spatial dimensions of citizenship are mainly historically conditioned. Cultural heritage influence citizens in understanding what citizenship entails and provides them with a sense of rootedness. The temporal dimension helps to formulate citizenship education in as broad a time frame as possible, enhancing students' knowledge and understanding of the present with that of the past and the future.

In working towards a more comprehensive approach to citizenship education, the Centre for Citizenship Education (CCE) drew on three internationally established academic and educational traditions within the field of citizenship education: Values education, Civic education and Environmental education. Values education refers to the acquisition of dispositions and predilections that provide the foundation of civic attitudes and beliefs; Civic education is linked with the building of a knowledge base for civic beliefs and skills for civic participation; and Environmental education ties in with the process of developing understanding,

skills and values consistent with the concept of sustainable development. (Multidimensional Citizenship Education, Centre for Citizenship Education, Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2003).

This swing of pendulum in the citizenship education focus seems to further support Ichilov's (1998) argument that citizenship education evolves with the political, social, and value changes within any given society. It is understandable that the forces of globalization has contributed to the shift in a multidimensional approach to Civic education so that Hong Kong people can live in an interdependent world where nations work together. But it appears that the need to focus on the regional identity of Hong Kong students to be assimilated into the national identity of China is lost in this latest revision.

Why is this so? The researcher postulates that with the smooth political sovereign transition of power that was effected in 1997 for China, there are no major threats or significant political tensions to look into for China in the 21<sup>st</sup> century where Hong Kong is concerned, unlike the tensions that existed with the British colonial rule before the handover in 1997. Hence the need to stress on national identity for Hong Kong is no longer an urgent need. It does not necessarily mean that the Hong Kong people have already assimilated well and identified themselves with China.

What China could be more concerned with currently is to extend the “One Country, Two Systems” to reign over Taiwan. China has agreed to a new formula “two sides of the Taiwan Strait, one China” for its relations with Taiwan, hoping to kickstart talks and bring about economic incentives for Taiwan. The consensus in defining their meaning of “one China” for both Taiwan and China is controversial because it has no official record. (The Straits Times, 13<sup>th</sup> May 2005).

In fact, the absence of priority in stressing patriotism and national identity for Hong Kong’s latest Multidimensional Civics education is so apparent that it was stated in the Spatial Dimension conceptual framework that what is important to note is not that the claims on patriotism and national identity in Hong Kong’s relationship to China have been dismissed. It serves rather to underline the realization that they live in an interdependent world where they need to respect differences in the pluralistic and diverse societies in today’s world. (The Spatial Dimension, Centre for Citizenship Education, Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2003).

Chapter 7 analyses the purposes and scope of citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong with reference to the literature on nationalism.

## **Chapter 7**

### **How Citizenship Education Contributes to Nation Building in Singapore and Hong Kong**

This chapter will demonstrate how citizenship education as defined in chapter 6 contributes to building national identity in Singapore and Hong Kong. Chapter 7 will analyze the purposes and scope of citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong with reference to the theories of nationalism, nation-state and national identity as expounded in Chapter 3. It is a follow-up of Chapters 4 and 5 which examined the theories of nation-building and national identity propounded by the politicians of Singapore and Hong Kong; to demonstrate how these ideologies have been influential in the curriculum. It will then be argued that there is deliberate use of curriculum to promote the kind of national identity that politicians wish to see in public education. The influence of nation-building and how it affects citizenship education will be examined. The chapter will begin with a discussion of curriculum analysis on which the later development of the analysis of citizenship education will be founded.

#### **7.1 Curriculum Analysis**

An earlier view of curriculum was propounded by Ralph Tyler (1949), whose book *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* was a landmark in curriculum theory. Tyler suggested four fundamental questions that must be answered in any curriculum: what educational purposes should the school seek to attain; what educational experiences can be provided to help attain these purposes;

how can these educational experiences be effectively organized; and how can we determine whether these purposes are being attained. Essentially a simple model of this exposition is translated into the quest for the i) aims and objectives ii) content iii) organization iv) evaluation.

Tyler was motivated by the fact that many educational programmes did not have clearly defined purposes but his approach has been criticized for being a very simple linear approach. (Lawton, 1973).

Tyler (1949) asserts that a comprehensive philosophy is necessary to guide the judgment of objectives. The question is raised about what sources of information would be useful in deciding on the objectives. "A good deal of controversy goes on between the essentialists and progressives,..The progressive emphasises the importance of studying the child to find out what kinds of interests he has, what problems he encounters,... The essentialist, on the other hand, is impressed by the large body of knowledge collected over the years, the so-called cultural heritage, and emphasizes this main source for deriving objectives" (Tyler, 1949, 4-5).

The essentialists and the progressives divide can be illustrated from Singapore and Hong Kong respectively.

Singapore's National Education focus, approaches Citizenship education from the short history of Singapore's struggle for independence and survival or what is commonly called the *Singapore Story* in Singapore schools. Singapore's national identity and cultural heritage is still evolving and in a sense, it can be classified as the essentialist's approach as described by Tyler (1949).

An example of the progressive approach is Hong Kong's 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education that looks at Civic education from the perspectives of the students and includes a Conceptual Framework based on their needs. This approach distinguishes the Guidelines from other materials in Hong Kong on Civic education . It includes also a section on "Reflection" and "Action" for the students to internalize and put into practise what they learn to make it meaningful for themselves. (Curriculum Development Council, 1996).

Since the 1970s, there has been a subtle shift in the change in curriculum studies. While in the past definitions of curriculum focused on the content of a teaching programme, current writers on curriculum are more likely to define it in terms of whole learning experiences. Curriculum is defined to refer not simply to a syllabus, or subjects, but rather everything that takes place in educational institutions, in the formal or hidden curriculum, all that the student learns, including a set of proposals about aims, content, pedagogy, evaluation, assessment etc. (Lawton, 1973).

An alternative model is one proposed by Eliot Eisner (1969) who made an important distinction between what he terms as instructional objectives and expressive objectives. An instructional objective is one where the teacher predicts exactly what behavioural changes will take place if teaching is successful. An expressive objective describes an educational encounter where the teacher and students are invited to explore, defer or focus on issues of interest to the inquirer. It is evocative and not prescriptive. Lawton (1973) challenges the concept of expressive objective as there is no specific way of measuring the behavioural changes in the students.

Broudy et al (1964) designed a more complicated model. Under the umbrella of general education, one objective "demands of the culture" is further sub-divided into vocation, citizenship and self-cultivation. The other two factors are the use of knowledge, and psychological questions of teaching and learning. Lawton (1973) criticized the model for assuming that the three fundamental determinants are assumed to be equally important. It is not necessarily so as the weightage of influence may not be equal.

At the political level, the national curriculum in a country can be reconstructed based on the perceived economic needs of the nation, as in the case of the United Kingdom.



In the United Kingdom, the *National Curriculum* debate has been brought about by the perception of the nation threatened by economic decline; and rhetorically presented as part of meeting the solution of economic regeneration. Behind this broad objective is also “a reassertion of the ideology and control of the nation-state” (Goodson, 1998, 150).

Goodson (1998) argues that central to the construction of a national polity in the historical development of the origins of state schooling is the socialization into national identity. History has been chosen to revive and refocus on ideology and national identity. Likewise although the United States’ *Nation at Risk* report on education is presented as economic, e.g. the challenges of globalisation of economic life; the real issue is “the sense of a loss of control, a loss of national destiny and identity. The school curriculum provides one arena for reasserting control and for reestablishing national identity”. (Goodson, 1998, 151).

The political project supporting the *National Curriculum* assumes another dimension “for the hidden curriculum of the National Curriculum is a reassertion of the power of the state in nation-building.” (Goodson, 1998). In the United States, Giroux (1988) also draws attention to “the hidden curriculum that imposes the values, attitudes, and norms of the dominant class on all students”.

Apple (1993) relates national education to the building of hegemonic power in society. Not only does the hidden curriculum in education bring about control of the masses, it can consolidate hegemonic power at the political and social level.

The example of the English National Curriculum reveals through Goodson's (1998) analysis the ways in which any national curriculum can be used by the nation state and hegemonic forces.

Apple (1993) perceives education as deeply implicated in the politics of culture. The curriculum itself is never neutral, it is always a part of someone/some group's vision of legitimate knowledge produced out of the political, cultural, economic conflicts and tensions of the society. Apple (1993) asserts that a national curriculum is part of an attempt to recreate hegemonic power that has been fractured by social movements. Hence a national curriculum is a mechanism for the political control of knowledge. Once it is established, there is little room for change.

The researcher agrees with Apple (1993) that analyzing Citizenship education as part of a national curriculum is very much linked to the economic, political and social/cultural contexts for both Singapore and Hong Kong. However, due to its highly political agenda, Citizenship education is not static, is evolving and has undergone phases of change in both Singapore and Hong Kong.

As it is such a highly political act, and it is more meaningful to examine how the purposes of Citizenship education are driven by political views, related to the building of national identity for Singapore and Hong Kong. However, economic and other factors still do play a part, albeit a less important role.

The researcher will now analyse the curriculum and trace the relationship of the curriculum to the historical developments in society, which is the focus of this chapter.

The analysis does not take into account the actual implementation of Citizenship education and thus cannot evaluate the effectiveness of the actual experienced curriculum.

## **7.2 Citizenship Education : The Role of Politicians**

Despite the recent surge of Civic education in the formal education systems in schools, we know much more about the aspirations and intentions of policy makers than we understand about how they are translated into practice and understood by the students (Cogan et al, 2002). The highest level of policy makers in a country is usually the politicians who hold the authority to make decisions on behalf of the government.

In order to understand the situation in Hong Kong we need to first look at developments in the United Kingdom. Historically, political education for democratic citizenship had been neglected in the British curriculum.

For the past 150 years, Great Britain has had a predominantly two-party system. Since 1945, it was either the Conservative Party, whose origins went back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, or the Labour Party, which emerged in the last decade of 19<sup>th</sup> century. (UK Guide to Government, 2005). In the 1980s, the 2 major political parties in Britain became increasingly divided in their attitudes towards political education. While the Labour Party was supportive of political education in schools, the governing Conservative Party was adverse. In 1988 the Conservative government introduced a national curriculum for all schools and excluded any form of political education for democratic citizenship. However, the return of the Labour government in 1997 saw a major change in policy. One important aspect of the Labour Party programme was a greater democratization of British political institutions, with education playing a role. It gave rise to the introduction of Citizenship education as part of the national curriculum. (Schweisfurth, 2002).

Ministers decided what should be done in England for citizenship education and in May 1999, the draft proposals for revising the National Curriculum were published. The curriculum that was constructed was a proposal for a single national framework for citizenship and personal, social and health education

(PSHE). Citizenship education was composed of 3 strands – social and moral responsibility, community involvement and political literacy and was made compulsory in 2002.

Like Britain, citizenship education in Hong Kong was never given its due importance during the bulk of the 155 years of British rule until the 1980s. Whether it was the neglect or the emphasis of citizenship education for Hong Kong during the British colonial rule, the British government was directly involved in its crafting. Before the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, China had a more prominent role to play with regards to the monitoring of the political content of citizenship education to assimilate Hong Kong into its nation.

Likewise in Singapore, with a much shorter history of independence, the promotion and focus of citizenship education to build national identity has been mainly mooted, conceived and launched by political figures, e.g. Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong and Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.

Details of how the political, economic and social factors have influenced nation-building have been discussed in the earlier Chapters 4 and 5. The researcher will summarize how the Singapore government and British/Beijing governments have been directly involved with the focus of citizenship education in their societies and how their theory of national identity and nationalism/regionalism is evident in the content of citizenship education.

Details of the involvement of Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is covered in chapter 4.2 where he addressed principals of schools in 1966. In chapter 6.4 details on Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong were discussed on the rationale and launch of National Education.

In Singapore, milestone markers of the evolvement of citizenship education where political figures are involved and impacted the curriculum are as follows:

- i) Lee Kuan Yew's address of concern to principals in 1966 was soon inundated with many policies in the school system. "After 1966, with the objective of inculcating patriotism and national identity, all pupils were required to recite a daily pledge to Singapore and to participate in a flag-raising ceremony during which the national anthem was sung". (Gopinathan, 1990, 17). Work on a new series of history books in four languages for primary schools followed suit to inform students on how their forefathers contributed to the society as successful businessmen. (Gopinathan, 1990).
- ii) Goh Chok Tong's introduction to the urgent need for National Education in 1996 saw revisions made to Social Studies, Civic and Moral Education and History to emphasize nation-building. (Goh C T, 1996).
- iii) Lee Hsien Loong's (1997) official launch of National Education in 1997 stressed the importance of transmitting key national instincts to students. National Education aims at developing national cohesion in

students through “fostering Singaporean identity, pride and self-respect; teaching about Singapore’s nation-building successes against the odds; understanding Singapore’s unique developmental challenges, constraints and vulnerabilities; and instilling core values, such as meritocracy and multiracialism, as well as the will to prevail, in order to ensure Singapore’s continued success” (cited in Tan, 2003, 99)

The three generations of Prime Ministers (Lee Hsien Loong assumed the office of Prime Minister in 2004) saw a need for Singapore to preserve itself by imbuing in the younger generations of students a strong sense of national identity so that they can have a shared sense of nation-hood. The analysis later in this chapter will trace not only how the politicians provided the impetus for curriculum development but also how closely tied their ideas were with the content of citizenship education.

While there is early and direct involvement of the Prime Ministers in Singapore for citizenship education in building national identity, Hong Kong as a British colony had a different political climate where the British government was not interested in promoting political and citizenship education until it realized much later that there was an urgent need to do so before the handover to China. Unlike the citizens of Singapore, the Hong Kong people were so used to an education system that was apolitical that there had to be significant changes introduced in

citizenship education to start building national identity with China as seen in the 1985 and 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education

Details of the different phases of citizenship education in Hong Kong is covered in chapter 6.5 where the British and Chinese governments were directly involved in its changing form and content.

Cogan et al (2002) note that in Hong Kong, milestone markers of the evolvement of citizenship education where the different political authorities (i.e. British or Chinese governments) were involved or chose to avoid involvement are as follows:

- i) Prior to the return of sovereignty to China, Civic education was depoliticized. The Civic education subject was developed solely to counter communist propaganda in 1950. The depoliticization of and neglect of Civic education was achieved by direct British government intervention.
- ii) The signing of the Joint Declaration by Britain and China in 1984 saw a variety of curriculum reforms to provide a contextualized and politicized approach to Civic education. The 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools placed greater emphasis on patriotism, national pride and identity with China, cultural identity, values associated with critical thinking and active citizenship.



- iii) Tung Chee Hwa's speeches stressed on the need to intensify Civic education to give the younger generation in Hong Kong a deeper knowledge of China, Chinese culture and history, the "one country, two systems" concept and the Basic Law. In doing so, they can foster a closer bond and pride with their nation China. (Pepper, 1997).

Although Hong Kong was under British colonial rule, the British government had avoided involvement in the political affairs or political education of the Hong Kong residents till it was faced with the transfer of power to China. China, on the other hand, had greater stakes in looking into the political content of the Civic education so that it can help to ease the assimilation of the Hong Kong society into a one country system with China. Even then, unlike Singapore where the Prime Ministers intervened closely and directly, the Chinese government did not intervene in citizenship education directly. It appointed a Chief Executive to oversee the inclusion of political education to inculcate patriotism and loyalty to China.

### **7.3 Citizenship Education : What is the Purpose?**

Unlike other subjects in the curriculum, Citizenship education is widely accepted as a highly political agenda in all countries.

In the early stages of curriculum studies described above, Tyler (1949) provided basic principles for the analysis of curriculum. He acknowledged that "there are

basic values in life, largely transmitted from one generation to another by means of education" (Tyler, 1949, 5), and elaborated that "educational philosophies in a democratic society are likely to emphasise strongly on democratic values" (Tyler, 1949, 34). However, Tyler does not examine a subject like citizenship education which teaches values that are politically motivated from the macro government level.

That is why the researcher has adopted the studies of Giroux (1988), Goodson (1998), and Apple (1993) who argued that the school curriculum has a hidden curriculum for reasserting control, reestablishing national identity and acting as a mechanism for the political control of knowledge, hegemonic power, especially in reassertion of political ideology.

The researcher agrees with Giroux (1988) that essentially citizenship education has a hidden curriculum that imposes values and attitudes on the students. These values and attitudes in citizenship education are actually filtered through "a reassertion of the ideology and control of the nation-state" (Goodson, 1998, 150) and provides one arena for the state to reestablish national identity (Goodson, 1998). Then at the macro political and social level, Apple (1993) stretches the argument that the public curriculum can result in hegemonic power being created and consolidated. Thus in adopting the three levels for understanding the political agenda in the making of the citizenship education

curriculum, the researcher has incorporated the principles proposed by the above three scholars.

To establish the hidden purpose and hidden curriculum in citizenship education for Singapore and Hong Kong, the researcher will examine how the political ideologies of the politicians as discussed in chapters 4 and 5 are infused in the curriculum content.

The evolvement of Citizenship education is examined in its political, economic and social contexts. The main factors of economic reasons; political circumstances; and social and global contexts give rise to the evolving forms of citizenship education. The researcher has classified the factors under the broad categories of economic reasons; political circumstances; social contexts and globalisation. These categories serve the main political agenda of both Singapore and Hong Kong.

One factor that is important but found missing in Goodson's (1998), Giroux's (1988) and Apple's (1993) purposes is to meet the challenges on globalization. It helps to account for the latest multidimensional concept of Citizenship education in Hong Kong. In Singapore, measures are undertaken to stay rooted in their national identity through National Education while facing changes in the global scene.

A summary of the main political ideologies of nation-building for the three Prime Ministers of Singapore and Chief Executive of Hong Kong gleaned from chapters 4 and 5 are as follows:

### **7.3.1 Category of Purposes for Citizenship Education for Singapore and Hong Kong**

The researcher has tabled a new category of four broad purposes for citizenship education and this section is a re-working of the findings of factors that influence nation-building in Singapore in chapter 4.3 "Nationalism as Anti-Communism", 4.4 "The Singapore Story", 4.5 Nation-Building Through Economic Means", 4.6 "Nationalism as a Rationale for Elite Government", 4.7 "Social Factors that Influence Nation-Building and Education", 4.8 "Discourse of Nationalism".

For Hong Kong, the findings of factors re-examined include chapter 5.3 "Analysis of Concepts of Identity in Hong Kong at Handover", 5.4 "Nation-Building Through Economic Means", 5.5 Analysis of Language of Nation-Building and National Identity Text Extracts of Tung Chee Hwa (1997-2005), with regards to matters on Economic Success (Table 5.1), Chinese heritage (Table 5.2), Symbiosis with China (Table 5.4), Public Education (Table 5.5). The only section that is not directly included is on "Cosmopolitan City" (Table 5.3) because the researcher felt that the category is rhetorical in purpose and can be subsumed under Table 7.1.3iii Social/Historical Contexts of "appreciating Chinese culture and Chinese history".

**Table 7.1** Factors gleaned from both chapters 4 and 5 for Singapore and Hong Kong are sifted mainly from historical accounts and significant factors highlighted by the respective politicians in their annual public speeches.

| Category of Purposes for Citizenship Education for Singapore and Hong Kong (Table 7.1 ) |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1)Political Circumstances   | 2)Economic Reasons  | 3)Social/Historical Contexts  | 4)Challenges of 21 <sup>st</sup> Century                |
| i) control and education (Singapore and Hong Kong)                                      | i) pragmatism (Singapore and Hong Kong)                                     | i) social factors and public education social cohesion (Singapore and Hong Kong)<br>"one people, one nation, one Singapore" | i) meet challenges of new era (Singapore and Hong Kong) |
| ii)transformation of citizens (Singapore and Hong Kong)                                 | ii) survival (Singapore) Singapore Story Intranational Identity (Teo, 2005) | ii) counter threats (e.g. communists or "foes")/promote Communist Party (Hong Kong and Singapore)                           | ii) stay rooted in Asian culture (Singapore)            |
| iii)personal development (Singapore and Hong Kong)                                      | iii) prosperity (Singapore and Hong Kong) Hong Kong - symbiosis with China  | iii) appreciate Chinese culture and Chinese history (Hong Kong)   | iii) forge ahead with demands (Hong Kong)               |
| iv) rationale for elite leadership (Singapore)  |   |   |   |
| v)"patriotism" (Singapore and Hong Kong) National Education - Singapore                 |   |   |   |

The researcher will first examine the purposes for citizenship education in Singapore and then Hong Kong.

The following political, economic and social circumstances and ideologies have impacted the purposes and directions of Citizenship education for Singapore:

control;

survival;

to counter external threats or “foes”;

social cohesion;

pragmatism;

prosperity;

elite leadership,

personal development;

transformation of citizens;

patriotism/national identity

staying rooted in Asian culture;

challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century;

and they are elaborated in the following :

### **7.3.2 Purposes for Citizenship Education in Singapore**

Like Hong Kong, the British colonial authorities' involvement in educational provision in the nineteenth century in Singapore was also minimal.

The task of establishing and funding schools was left mainly to the Christian missionaries and wealthy merchants from the various communities in Singapore. It was only in 1946 that the British government tabled a 10 year programme

founded on several principles. Apart from the provision of universal free primary education in any of the four main languages- Chinese, Malay, Tamil and English; education was aimed to foster civic loyalty and responsibility with a view to extend the capacity for self-government which marked the gestation of a form of civic education. In 1955, an All Party Report was produced to improve Chinese-medium education. It recommended that "civics should be made a compulsory subject in all schools and appropriate textbooks should be prepared. ...the Ministry of Education formed a Syllabuses and Textbooks Committee to draw up common syllabuses and textbooks. Civics was formally introduced into all schools". (Tan J, 1997, 159). Changes in educational policies occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s in response to the political developments. It was the first step towards administering **control** (refer to Table 7.1) in the schools through the centralised content of a national curriculum after Singapore was "granted self-government and local control over all domestic affairs" (Tan J, 1997, 159).

#### **7.3.2.1 Survival**

As explained in chapter 4 section 4.4 Singapore was expelled from Malaysia in 1965, and as also pointed out, this was formulated as a historical need to survive through the creation of the myth of nationhood.

This deep-seated sense of rejection by Malaysia and abandonment by the British colonial power as felt by the early political leaders had been quite entrenched in their political ideology that no one owes Singapore a living. Singaporeans have to

continually strive hard, be resilient and resourceful as a nation. (Lee KY 0206 1969). Thus the **survival instinct** is quite embedded in the political philosophy in Singapore. Since 1964, Lee Kuan Yew in his National Day address to the public has declared that the **problem of national survival** for Singapore has always been there (*Lee KY0603, 1964*)

The theme of instilling in the young a **national instinct for survival**, a sense of belonging and forging a national identity with the nation which has been described at the political level in chapter 5; runs across the citizenship education curriculum from the primary school level to the junior colleges and centralized institutes.

In the Primary school Civics and Moral Education syllabus, this concept of survival instinct is translated into the topic on “knowing Singapore’s constraints and vulnerabilities” (p 19 and 20) and introduces the “total defence” concept (i.e. psychological, social, economic, civil and military defence) of defending Singapore (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Primary, 2000, website : moe.edu.sg).

The secondary school syllabus follows up with “the uniqueness of Singapore, the struggles, constraints and vulnerabilities and total defence...” (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Secondary, 2000, 2). It further teaches the upper secondary students certain



values i.e. “resilience, survival, belief in oneself, hope, adaptability” in character building that will help build their national survival instinct. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Secondary*, 2000, 14).

This need for “total defence” is taught at the military defence level for the secondary students in the values of “love for the nation, confidence in our defensibility, preparedness for any eventuality, commitment to our defence” . (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Secondary*, 2000, 11). The approach adopted is one in which Singapore is seen to be vulnerable to perceived enemies and thus has to be prepared at all times to **counter external threats or “foes”**.

In the Junior College level, students are taught concepts of military self-reliance, deterrence, and the value of self-reliance (p 16) and one example of the defence strategy is “equipping our army with technologically advanced systems” (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes*, 2000: 13). The purpose of deterrence and self-reliance are to instil the importance of self-defence in anticipation of any external threats.

In the Junior colleges, college students are taught nation building milestone events that contributed to the nation’s history of survival. They learn concepts of

“instinct for survival” (p 9) through values and virtues validated by the People’s Action Party (e.g. self-reliance, national consciousness, courage, indomitable will). In the current world situation, students also concentrate on “the implications of increasing global competitiveness on Singapore” and “the active posture that Singapore takes in the region and the world” in the midst of global competitiveness (p 13) and even in future challenges, the instinct for survival runs deep. Students are warned through the teachers teaching the curriculum that there are dangers of complacency and the need for interdependence with the world. They are to anticipate, harness and execute change for personal and national survival. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes, 2000).

Apart from the emphasis on the instinct for survival, the woven myth of the *Singapore Story* is promoted and taught through the Ministry of Education National Education website where “episodes from the *Singapore Story* at a glance...” include “Founding of the Housing and Development Board (1 Feb 1960); Collapse of Hotel New World (15 Mar 1986); Hijack of SQ 117 (25 Mar 1991); Beginning of the Longest Water Rationing (23 Apr 1963); The Beginning of SIA (1 May 1947); The Hock Lee Bus Riots (12 May 1955); The Bukit Ho Swee Fire (25 May 1961); First Intake of National Serviceman (17 Jul 1967); The Opening of the First Factory in Jurong (2 Aug 1963); The First “Keep Singapore Clean” Campaign (1 Oct 1963); Withdrawal of the British Military Base in

Singapore (11 Nov 1971); Maria Hertogh Riots (11 Dec 1950)." (National Education Website: Episodes of the *Singapore Story*, 2004, 1-5).

These episodes present some of the significant early economic, social, racial, political struggles and achievements of Singapore alone. They are so highly introspective, that the researcher has termed the survival approach as Intranational identity (Teo, 2005).

This deep need for survival instinct in the Singapore political scene and Civics education is not relevant to Hong Kong. While Singapore has no natural resources or hinterland, Hong Kong is part of and has China to fall back for support in the economic and political/defence arenas. Besides, it is commonly accepted that China is one of the future economic giants in Asia and Hong Kong stands to benefit from its alliance.

#### **7.3.2.2 Social Cohesion**

When the British Parliament passed a State of Singapore Act in 1958, Singapore was granted self-government and control over all domestic affairs. The newly elected People's Action Party (PAP) government led by Lee Kuan Yew, stated that it would look into equal treatment for the four streams of education and address the problem of social cohesion amongst the ethnic communities. One of the measures taken was the revision of all primary and secondary school subject

syllabuses undertaken by the Ministry of Education in 1962. A common ethics syllabus was published for primary and secondary schools. (Tan J, 1997).

The racial tensions in the 1960s that caused social unrest, violence and deaths between the Chinese and Malay races saw the need to promote and preserve racial harmony among the communities. (Lee K Y 0721 1964).

In chapter 4.9, Lee Kuan Yew's (1974) speech included the biological reference to DNA as the crucial drive of the people and related it to building national identity when "it can only be used if there is organization, there is **cohesion**, there is unity of purpose and objective between government, people, between union and employers." (Lee KY, 1974, 14).

Goh Chok Tong (1996) also created the myth of the Singapore Dream and stated that the way to fulfil their aspirations of this dream is "only if you keep Singapore strong and **socially cohesive**" (Goh CT, 1996, 23).

This ideology of social cohesion as a binding factor for nation-building is transferred to the curriculum in public education.

Revisions were made to the civics and history syllabuses to promote **social cohesion**. The Ministry of Education formed another committee to develop another civics syllabus in all schools in 1968. Values advocated include

patriotism, loyalty and civic consciousness. (Ong and Moral Education Committee, 1979). A new set of history text books were published in four languages for use in primary schools. These texts related to the *Singapore Story* of the early immigrants who contributed to the economic growth of Singapore.

During the early 1980s, two locally designed programmes, "Good Citizen" for primary schools and "Being and Becoming" for secondary schools were implemented. Fears of a moral crisis among young people saw the birth of Religious Knowledge in 1984. The options offered were Bible Knowledge, Buddhist Studies, Confucian Ethics, Hindu Studies, Islamic Religious Knowledge and Sikh Studies. Religious revivalism and evangelistic activities among Buddhists and Christians caused Religious Knowledge to be made an optional subject in 1990. In its place, a new compulsory Civics and Moral Education programme was designed for all secondary school students. Its objectives were to foster cultural and religious appreciation; promote community spirit; affirm family life; nurture interpersonal relationships; and to develop a commitment to nation-building. Meanwhile all primary school students continued with the Good Citizen programme. (Tan J, 2003).

Till today, social cohesion is continued in the Civics and Moral Education syllabus in the primary, secondary and junior college levels. The theme of "Being Part of Society" teaches students gracious behaviour, "respecting customs, traditions and beliefs of different races" and "caring for the community" is taught

in the upper primary level.(Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Primary, 2000, 5).

In chapter 4.9, Goh Chok Tong (1991, 1993, 1996) called for unity amongst all races and he stressed that with "each year of nation-building, we approach closer to the ideal of **one people, one nation, one Singapore**" (Goh CT, 1993, 52). This ideology to demonstrate "a single Singaporean identity" (Goh CT, 1997, 48a) that transcends all races is translated into the curriculum in the upper primary Civics and Moral Education syllabus under the theme of national pride and loyalty where pupils are taught the concept of "responsible citizenship" and the scope includes "being concerned for national affairs as **one people, one nation**" (p 19). In the secondary syllabus, under the theme of community spirit, students learn under the topic of "unity in diversity" to "demonstrate **one people, one nation, one Singapore**" in their lives. (p 17) ..(Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Primary, Secondary, 2000).

In the secondary schools, students learn the importance of "racial and religious harmony" (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Secondary, 2000, 3). In junior colleges, "**social cohesiveness**" as a concept is viewed with importance as related concepts of "national ideology, national consciousness" (Curriculum Planning and

Development Division, *Civics Syllabus*, Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes, 2000, 11).

Secondary students learn under the theme of Community Spirit topics on “multi-racialism, **social cohesion**, dangers of communalism, sense of identity with the nation, social responsibility”. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Secondary, 2000, 17).

Junior College students learn how problems of early nation-building were addressed through the efforts of the People’s Action Party leadership. National ideology and national consciousness are covered under the theme of “Social cohesiveness” and one of the four general objectives of the syllabus is to “contribute to **social cohesion**”. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Primary, 2000, 2).

### 7.3.2.3 Pragmatism

Singapore has adapted the Westminster system of Parliamentary democracy of the 1950s to suit its needs to include Group Representation Constituencies, Nominated Member of Parliaments, and the Elected President. Singapore’s evolving democracy will be shaped according to domestic conditions and international environment changes. As such, Singaporeans have become practical and “a **pragmatic** people. .. It protects and advances the national interest.” (Goh C T, 1995, 39).

The ideological characterization of the People's Action Party is political pragmatism. Pragmatism is loosely defined, meaning that it is practical or useful and concerned with the application instead of theory or speculation. It has become synonymous with rationality. Lee Kuan Yew has simply described his approach as one in which "Our people had the guts and gumptions; the **government provided practical policies**. The combination worked. New problems are on the way; they can be solved; they will be solved." (Lee KY, 1979, 17). It highlights the successful application of the ideology proposed by Lee Kuan Yew (1967); discussed in chapter 4.8, to argue for the support of the public for a minority elite leadership in nation-building. The practical needs of politics has always been a top priority in PAP's administration.

Pragmatism is one of the key values taught in both the secondary and junior colleges Civic and Moral Education syllabus. In secondary schools, students learn that Singapore's economic achievements was attributed in part to the values of "pragmatism" adopted by the leaders which "have contributed to the economic development of our nation" (p 12).

Junior college students again are reminded of the pragmatic value of nation building (p 8) and appreciate "pragmatism" as one of the key values in government policy-making (p 12). (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Secondary, Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes, 2000).



#### 7.3.2.4 Prosperity

The unprecedented **prosperity** that Singapore has experienced is one of the themes which is a constant part of Lee's and others' definition of national identity and this can be found in the pledge and curriculum.

Lee KY (1984) in comparing the difference between Hong Kong and Singapore, claimed that unlike Singapore, Hong Kong was not allowed to develop a separate national identity. Singaporeans have a sense of national belonging partly because "We have given every Singaporean a stake in our progress and **prosperity**". (Lee KY, 1984, 1-2).

In fact, the daily national pledge of the students in Singapore demonstrates the importance of achieving prosperity for Singapore.

##### *The Pledge*

"We, the citizens of Singapore,  
pledge ourselves as one united people,  
regardless of race, language or religion,  
to build a democratic society  
based on justice and equality  
so as to achieve happiness, **prosperity**  
and progress for our nation".

(Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, 2004).

To ensure that economic prosperity is valued and sustained in the Civic and Moral Education syllabus, students in the secondary and junior college levels are taught the prescribed attitudes towards economic development.

In the secondary schools, one of the ideals of Singapore is “continued growth” or “continued success” which is essentially prosperity, an achievement that is attributed in part to the visionary political leadership of Singapore (p 12). Students are encouraged to be entrepreneurial in spirit and venture overseas to establish economic links in the future (p 21) (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Secondary, 2000).

In the junior colleges, much of the focus of the goal of leadership, whether past or present, is to address “economic development” (p 13) and “propose what Singapore can do to sustain her economic success and survival in a fast-changing world” (p 16), stay competitive regionally and establish international economic networks globally. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes, 2000).

#### **7.3.2.5 Elite Leadership**

This perceived need to harness and nurture a pool of **elite leadership** by Lee Kuan Yew has been discussed in Chapter 4.6 As this ideology is an important component of nation-building, it has been given significant coverage, especially for the Junior College students. In the upper primary level, students learn to

“show appreciation for good leadership” with traits and values like “incorruptibility and meritocracy”. (p 20). Secondary students are encouraged to look up to “visionary leaders like Lee Kuan Yew, Dr Goh Keng Swee, Dr Toh Chin Chye...” (p 12), the early founders of PAP who have contributed to the economic development of Singapore. For the Junior college students, the entire theme of the syllabus “Challenge of Leadership” seeks to “develop in our students the willingness to take on the responsibility to contribute to shaping the future of our nation” (p 2). (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Primary, Secondary, Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes, 2000).

#### **7.3.2.6 Personal Development and Transformation of Citizens**

At the 1996 Teachers' Day Rally, the Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong lamented that the younger generation of Singaporeans lacked knowledge of Singapore's past and might take Singapore's peace and prosperity for granted. Urging all school principals and teachers to lend their support behind this important initiative, called National Education (NE), Goh Chok Tong stressed that National Education has to become “a vital component” of the education curriculum in all schools, “it goes beyond book knowledge” and “must appeal to both heart and mind”. The prescribed perceived **personal development** in the exercise of National Education will “develop instincts that become part of the psyche of every child.” Then only can there be **transformation of citizens** to “engender a shared sense of nationhood, an understanding of how our past is relevant to our

past and future" in nation-building. (Goh C T, The Rationale for National Education, 1996).

The Ministry of Education has adopted "a two-pronged approach in the cultivation of national instincts" among the students:

- First, to develop an awareness of facts, circumstances and opportunities facing Singapore, so that they will be able to make decisions for their future with conviction and realism;
- Second, to develop a sense of emotional belonging and commitment to the community and nation so that they will stay and fight when the odds are against us."

(National Education Website, 2004, Approach, 2).

The two-pronged approach is designed to transform students "who have no idea how we became independent, ... did not know the dramatic events which led to our independence" (Goh CT, 1996, 45) into students who will have knowledge of the past and can then feel passionately about defending their nation. Whether this imbuing of the sense of history can stir their emotional desire to die for their nation remains to be seen, especially when they are eventually tested in times of war, regional or world wide.

### 7.3.2.7 Patriotism

A significant call to build **patriotism** through raising the national consciousness of the students came from the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in his address to school principals in 1966, one year after Singapore's independence. He decried Singaporeans' lack of inbuilt reflexes of loyalty and patriotism. From 1966 onwards, all students sing the national anthem, raise the national flag and recite the national pledge. (Lee KY, 1966). This call repeats what was earlier mentioned in chapter 4 on the political factors that influenced nation-building in Singapore.

The introduction of National Education in the education process was intended to result in a revision in the "contents of Social Studies, Civic and Moral Education and History to emphasise nation-building". (Goh C T, The Rationale for National Education, 1996).

National Education was to "address both knowledge and feelings about Singapore at every level of the education system. A spiral approach, that proceeds from the concrete and elementary to the abstract and more complex, and which consolidates what is learnt at the lower levels to the upper levels, would be adopted. Distinct strategies are required at each stage, reflecting the intellectual and emotional maturity of the student. These distinct strategies can be encapsulated as: **Love Singapore** (Primary level); **Know Singapore**

(Secondary level); **Lead Singapore** (Pre-University level).” (Ministry of Education, Press Release No: 017/97).

It was seen as inadequate to just rely on the existing subjects like Social Studies, Civics and Moral Education and History to build national identity in nation building. In May 1997, the National Education initiative was officially launched by the Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. This National Education initiative is not new in its desire to impart a sense of national identity in nation building for Singapore. It has been the Singapore government's perennial concern to foster social cohesion and national identity for the past four decades. What is new is the changed social context with greater income disparities from the economic effects of globalization and also the heightened fear of terrorist attacks following the September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 attack; National Education will face challenges (Tan J, 2003).

#### **7.3.2.8 Challenges in 21<sup>st</sup> Century : Staying Rooted in Asian Culture**

Challenges that National Education will face include the social effects of globalization, especially when Singaporeans are called to cast their nets overseas in search of job opportunities. It would be difficult to retain their undivided loyalty in nation building in Singapore if dual citizenship is not an alternative option.

In the mobile world of globalization, many Singaporeans who venture abroad to spread the external economic wing have taken up permanent residency in other countries.

Some of Singapore's best scholars in the United States are recruited before graduation and they break their bonds. It is an area of concern for Singapore as they have no surplus talent. To tackle this new facet of globalisation and regionalisation, Singaporeans are exhorted to stay rooted to keep Singapore together. **One way of staying rooted is to maintain the Asian heritage or culture.** Singaporeans are called to be anchored in the values of their three main communities – Chinese, Malay and Indian. Although English is the common working and administrative language, it will be tragic if e.g. Chinese language, culture and values are no longer a major element of the cosmopolitan society. This Chinese heritage is “an important strand in the strength and stability of our multi-racial society. The sense of rootedness and identity; the social instinct to work together.” (Goh C T, 1997, 39) will help Singapore hold together socially and politically.

This exercise in appreciating the cultural and historical heritage can be traced to the introduction of the Education for Living syllabus in the 1970s when it was rationalized that Asian moral and social values like filial duties and loyalty can be better understood in Mother Tongue languages and the pupils are expected to

become more aware of their cultural roots and to foster a stronger sense of nationhood if they knew their own language (Ministry of Education, 1974).

Till today, the Civics and Moral Education syllabus for the Primary schools are still conducted in the Mother Tongue languages. Students in the secondary and junior colleges are exhorted to be tolerant of “the beliefs and practices of the main ethnic and religious groups” (p 17) and “racial and religious sensitivity” (p 9) respectively and to appreciate “our rich cultural heritage” (p 21) (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus*, Secondary, Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes, 2000).

However this call to be anchored in cultural roots seems to have taken a more superficial form in the emphasis on just promoting racial and religious harmony to ensure that there is social cohesion. Although there is mention of the scope of “our rich cultural heritage” to help preserve Singapore's national identity in the context of globalisation in the secondary syllabus, the researcher surmises that “rich” is more appropriately termed to refer to the breadth or variety of the different races rather than the depth or quality of richness of cultural heritage. The deduction is made from the short history of Singapore and also the focus of nation-building had been predominantly that of survival and economic development. There is no long history and the “cultural heritage” had been borrowed from the lands of the forefathers. Besides, the emphasis on social



cohesion is to work towards political stability and the end goal of economic prosperity; and not towards cultural refinement or richness in cultural heritage.

In contrast, the essence and depth of cultural heritage that is infused in the Hong Kong's syllabus for Civic education is much more rich and evident as discussed in Chapter 8.

To meet the challenges of the new era of globalisation, junior college students are taught to handle "national security", stay competitive economically, "adapt and network in a fast-changing world for national survival and success in their leadership roles". (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes*, 2000, 16). There is no mention of the cultural element. Obviously the cultural roots are not as important as the need to forge ahead economically for continual survival.

### **7.3.3 Purposes for Citizenship Education in Hong Kong**

The following political, economic and social circumstances have impacted the purposes and directions of Citizenship education, for Hong Kong :

control;

to counter communist threats;

transformation of citizens;

patriotism;

global challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century;

prosperity;  
personal development;  
social cohesion;  
to appreciate Chinese culture and Chinese history;  
forging ahead with demands;  
pragmatism

The researcher has taken a slightly different approach for Hong Kong by presenting the historical and political circumstances which influenced the focus of citizenship education because of the unique political circumstances that surrounded the independence of Hong Kong from the British rule.

While the Singapore PAP government actively seeks to recruit elite leaders to continue with nation-building efforts, Hong Kong's political leaders are selected and appointed by the Chinese government (e.g. Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa) who may not necessarily be the Hong Kong people's choice of leadership. Hong Kong Herald (3<sup>rd</sup> March 2005) reported that the unpopular chief Tung Chee Hwa had been a "despised figure whose reputation as an incompetent administrator and puppet of communist masters in Beijing has brought hundreds of thousands of protestors on to the streets".

Unlike Singapore's account that had consistent political leadership direction for citizenship education with the three generations of Prime Ministers; Hong Kong

had no deliberate direct political influence from the British on citizenship education until the 1980s or the long-awaited urgent influence of building national identity with China in the 1985 and 1996 Guidelines for Civics and Moral Education. Thus historical circumstances had a more direct bearing on citizenship education post-independence from British rule.

Like Singapore, evidence in the form of close analysis of the documents and language of the documents of Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa will be provided to demonstrate that it is possible to witness ideologies of the politician in the curriculum documents.

Morris et al (1997) highlighted that the development of the school curriculum and citizenship education in Hong Kong is shaped according to its specific political, economic, social and historical contexts. Three distinct periods were evident in the relationship between the state and school curriculum. They were 1945-1965, 1965-1984 and 1984 onwards.

Ng SW et al (2000) marked the development of civic education into three phases: before 1985, after 1985 and post 1997. Grossman et al (1999) also analysed the development of civic education in three periods: prior to 1984, the 1985 Guidelines on Civic education in schools, and the 1996 Guidelines on Civic education in schools.

These scholars who set the milestone markers for school curriculum and citizenship education were taking into account the various political, economic and social events that contributed to the evolving form of citizenship education.

The impact of the political transition on the school curriculum brought about “three curricular innovations which are the products of, or have been directly affected by, the political transition. These are civic education, which was promoted as a cross-curricular theme subsequent to the signing of the Joint Declaration, social studies, a subject which was introduced in 1975 and redefined in 1989, and liberal studies, which was introduced as a subject in 1991” (Morris et al, 1997, 102).

As with the section on Singapore’s purposes for citizenship education in Hong Kong, the researcher will make references to Table 7.1 in section 7.3.1 for the categories of purposes.

#### **7.3.3.1 Control**

As was discussed in chapter 6.5, Morris et al (1997) looked at the antecedent period 1945-1965 to cast light on why and how the British government resorted to “a centralized and bureaucratic **system of control of the curriculum**” (Morris et al, 1997, 103). The sociopolitical environment then was not stable. Tensions that arose from the civil war in China were re-enacted within the curricula of schools in Hong Kong. The British government was quick to intervene by

expanding public provision of schools and housing to strengthen their **control** of the curriculum.

Post 1997 **control** of the curriculum can be witnessed in the 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education where “the student is expected to develop the skills of critical and reflective thinking, to experience a positive change in civic attitudes, to participate actively in civic affairs...” (p 1) so that at the time of political transition, “we need our students to actively adopt a new national identity” (p 23) and nationhood to students entails reflecting on “What is the role of Hong Kong in the development of/promotion of common good to China?” (p 38) (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1996). Obviously students are taught to pledge their loyalty to their nation China.

#### **7.3.3.2 Counter Communist Threats/Promote Communist Party**

To counter the anti-government propaganda which was associated with the Kuomintang (KMT) and Chinese Community Party (CCP) schools, the British government gave “the Director of the Education Department (ED) control over syllabus, textbooks and other teaching materials... These regulations were used to deregister teachers and **to close a communist school in 1949**” and “to ensure that the content of syllabi and textbooks was depoliticised and decontextualised”. (Morris et al, 1997, 103).

The fact that the British colonial rule resorted to depoliticising the school texts was earlier discussed in chapter 6.5.

Civics, first introduced in 1925 into Hong Kong's vernacular schools "to vanguard against different sorts of political riots. ... In 1950, a revised version of Civics was offered to all schools and became an examined subject. The content of Civics put focus on the knowledge of politics, the working of the local government, ... but with little emphasis on the people's rights to proactively participate in political affairs ... These highly centralized policies on education aimed at **countering communist propaganda**". (Ng et al, 2000, 394).

Civic education then was also "characterized by its depoliticisation" due to "Hong Kong's historical and geographical context.... Civic education in schools had never been able to receive the amount of attention it deserves. The signing of the Joint Declaration by China and Britain in 1984 gave sudden prominence to the long silent educational issue... Civic education would be a hot issue in Hong Kong after the Joint Declaration" (Grossman et al, 1999, para : *Civic Education in the School Curriculum Prior to 1984*)

The depoliticisation of civic education was reversed with the political transition in the post-1997 era. Earlier in chapter 5.2, it was mentioned that with the political transition, politics was taken more seriously in Hong Kong. The 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education stresses the "Hong Kong-China relationships" under the area of "Regional Community" (p 35) which is elaborated in the next area of "National Community" where students learn the political system and ideology of China. It includes "The Government institutions in China: the bureaucracy and the Cadre

System, **State and the Chinese Communist Party**: functions and role of the Party, structure of the Party” (p 37) Here students in Hong Kong are taught to identify with and support the Chinese Communist Party as part of their national identity. It appears to contradict the rhetorical promotion of “a basic understanding of democracy, liberty, equality, human rights and the rule of the law...” (p 6-8) from the kindergarten to the secondary levels. Democracy has been loosely defined as acknowledgement of “the significance of plurality, render tolerance to diverse views, and promote democracy, which in itself values freedom and liberty” (p 14) (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1996).

#### **7.3.3.3 Transformation of Citizens**

In chapter 6.5, it was discussed that with the impending return of sovereignty to China, civic education became a crucial issue after the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. The British government “were faced with the problem of preparing future citizens of China”. It was a unique case where the transition was not for independence for Hong Kong but the resumption of sovereignty by China. The perceived solution then was to provide for some form of political education through Citizenship education as an exercise for the **transformation of citizens** to inculcate Chinese patriotism.

To prepare students for their impending role as citizens of the region Hong Kong, and their country China, “ new Guidelines for both civic education and moral education were introduced” in 1985. Changes were made to the curriculum. “A

new subject, Government and Public Affairs was introduced in Upper Secondary schools (Secondary 4 and 5) in 1988. The content of other subjects which include Economics and Public Affairs (EPA), Chinese History, History and Geography were significantly revised after 1984". It was also true of the junior secondary subject, Social Studies. So until the late 1980s, the school curriculum in Hong Kong had virtually ignored raising political awareness. (Grossman et al, 1999, para: *Civic Education in the School Curriculum Prior to 1984*).

In contrast, Singapore's students were first initiated into the rituals of nation-building through the daily pledge and anthems early in nation-building in 1966 through Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Citizenship education gradually evolved to the form of the infusion of National Education in Civics and Moral Education in 1997 that heightened the need for Singapore students to identify with the struggles and success of the PAP government.

#### **7.3.3.4 Patriotism**

The researcher had discussed in chapter 6.5 that at the time of handover in 1997, there was a political need to assure the Hong Kong people that they can be proud of Hong Kong society's own "national identity" or **patriotism** and culture (Tung CH, 1997). But in the year 2005, Tung Chee Hwa spelt out clearly in his Policy Address that the Hong Kong's people's "sense of national identity" is directly related to "our country", and "our great nation" which is China itself. (Tung CH, 2005). As brought up in chapter 5.2, with the political integration, the central



tenet of change in political culture in Hong Kong is not just respect for the culture but **patriotism**.

This political ideology for Hong Kong to identify with China as the nation is transferred to public education in the first official Guidelines on Civic education.

The 1985 Guidelines on Civic education suggested an “inter-disciplinary” and “whole-school approach”, using “all the learning opportunities in the formal curriculum”, informal curriculum and “supplemented by extra-curricular activities”. It outlined in detail the knowledge, attitudes and skills to be covered for the various levels. It defines citizenship (p 7) as “the relationship between an individual and his government and that relationship can be extended to other members in society”. Civic education is used synonymously with education for citizenship and is “interpreted as the process whereby desirable qualities in people are developed to promote healthier relationships between the government and members of the society.” (p 7) Civic education is essentially political in nature. (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1985).

In the upper primary and junior secondary levels, while the individual relates to the society which is Hong Kong and is encouraged to have a sense of belonging for Hong Kong; “building a sense of national identity and belonging” is related directly to the nation China.(pages 19 and 30 respectively for primary and secondary levels). There is also a section related to understanding of the

workings of the British government and students are required to appreciate "the work of the government" and co-operate with the government. (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1985).

This emphasis on building national identity with China continues and is made more explicit with the 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education where "at the time of political transition, we need our citizens to actively adopt a **new national identity**" (p 23). This "new identity" can be found within the confines of the "national community" of China and it is argued that "politically speaking, one's civic identity is defined by one's national identity. The national community therefore constitutes the ultimate domestic context for one's civic learning. Such national spirit as **nationalism and patriotism** is essential not only for one's national identity and sense of belonging, but also for the cohesion and strength of one's own nation". (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1996, 23 ).

This theory of definition of "national identity" for Hong Kong students in the 1996 Guidelines presumes that Hong Kong's new national identity is submerged and naturalized within the domestic context of the larger civic identity of China. Implicitly, it is annulling the rhetoric "One country, two systems" policy to teach and propagate "One country, one national civic system policy" to build national identity.

### **7.3.3.5 Global Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

In chapter 5.5, it was discussed that Tung (2003, 2004) theorises the challenges of globalisation to be economic in nature and unemployment is seen as a result of mismatch of human resources. The solution proposed is heavy investments in education to reap economic benefits in the marketplace (Tung, 2003, 2004).

As Hong Kong moves into the new global challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, citizenship education necessarily has taken on a different form to address the mismatch of human resources. This is done in part to cope with the centrifugal forces of the “Global Economy”, which is part of the umbrella context of “Global Trends” that include other interrelated trend lines like “Technology and Communication, Population and Environment, Global Movement: Migration”. (Grossman, 2000). Professor Grossman was tasked by the Hong Kong government to reconceptualize citizenship education for the new millennium.

In providing a more comprehensive approach to Citizenship education, a new Multidimensional citizenship examines citizenship from the perspective of four interconnected dimensions : the personal, the social, the spatial and the temporal. To lend depth to the conceptualization of Multidimensional citizenship, the Centre for Citizenship Education drew on three established traditions within the field of citizenship education: values education, Civic education and environmental education. (Multidimensional Citizenship Education, Centre for Citizenship Education, Hong Kong Institute of Education, 2003).

The focus from the earlier emphasis of Hong Kong building national identity with China for Civics education in 1996 has significantly swung to that of an international/global perspective where Civic education is only one of the three approaches to Citizenship education and national identity with China does not appear to be paramount. The researcher surmises that with the smooth transfer of sovereignty of the rule of Hong Kong from Britain to China, the issue of building national identity/patriotism with China will develop with time and is no longer critical for China. Hence, the global perspective is allowed to develop to meet the international economic challenges of this new millennium.

#### **7.3.3.6 Prosperity**

Like Singapore, Hong Kong's nation-building identity is created largely and legitimized through economic means as discussed earlier in chapter 5.5 and are in line with some of the theorists on nationalism like Tinker (1981), Kellas (1991) and Gellner (1997).

Tung (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) equates the identity of Hong Kong with **economic success, prosperity** at the Asian and international level. This theory of national identity through economic prosperity is directly linked to Hong Kong's **symbiotic relationship** with China (Tung, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2005).

From the definition of citizenship education in the 1985 Guidelines, students are expected to relate well first to the then existing British government and then to

the society of Hong Kong. In encouraging students to have a “sense of belonging to Hong Kong”, students are taught to “appreciate the factors which are responsible for Hong Kong’s success and future stability and prosperity” (p 28) There was mention of China as the nation that the students were supposed to identify in nation-building (e.g. p 30 where students are supposed to develop “a sense of national identity and belonging” for China through respect for Chinese culture and tradition; and “have a willingness to contribute towards **economic development of China**”). (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1985)

The researcher postulates that the Curriculum Development Committee which looked into the preparation of the Guidelines must have realized the need to include China into the scene. It will help to secure and link with future economic and political developments with China. However tenuous the link may be, it was a good beginning. Students are expected to pledge their citizenship loyalty threefold : the British government, Hong Kong society and then China as a nation. In practical terms, it may not be quite workable then simply because all along the Hong Kong people had been apolitical, anational and rather individualistic in their **prosperity** and material achievements.

In contrast with Singapore, the researcher deduces that it easier for Singapore students to identify and pledge their loyalty to the Singapore government, as the PAP government since independence had contributed significantly to their political and economic welfare. Besides, with the absence of competent

opposition parties, the monopoly of PAP as the only government to date makes it less complicated in helping them make their political allegiance. With the short history of independence, the PAP government would be the only government that the students have known to relate to.

The need for the students to have knowledge of the prosperity of Hong Kong and China is spelt out in the 1996 Guidelines in Civic education when the students are required to have accuracy in the "economic development" of Hong Kong and in particular the "latest political and economic developments" of China (p28 and 30). This "new national identity" that Hong Kong has adopted contributes "to sustain prosperity and stability" to improve the Hong Kong society. (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1996).

Compared to Singapore, the emphasis on economic development for Hong Kong appears less important. For Singapore, economic development is tied to continual survival in nation-building whereas for Hong Kong, economic development is linked to its symbiotic relationship with China.

Reevaluation of the 1985 Guidelines was brought about by political events. One key turning point was the Tiananmen Incident or Massacre of 4<sup>th</sup> June 1989. One million people in Hong Kong took to the streets to protest against the violence and criticize the Chinese leadership in China. In the educational arena, there was a sharpened debate over the nature of Civic education. As a result,

during the period between 1989 to 1997, the relevant course syllabi such as Economic and Public Affairs, Government and Public Affairs, History, Chinese History and Social Studies were revised with an increase in political content. A new sixth form subject, Liberal Studies was introduced in 1991 to provide a more contextualised and politicized curriculum. (Grossman et al, 1999).

Critics have argued that democratic education was emphasized at the expense of nationalistic and patriotic education. (Leung, 1996). The Preliminary Working Committee, a group of Hong Kong residents hand-picked by China to act as shadow government prior to the handover, provided instructions that textbooks should be in line with the Basic Law, support the one China policy and eliminate colonial terms. The committee complained that the then existing textbooks were too Hong Kong centered, with China being described as an outside country rather than a motherland. The committee formed a subgroup on cultural affairs that called for strengthening of Civic education with regard to perceived weaknesses in nationalism, patriotism, Chinese history and geography (Lee, 1996).

With some impetus from the Preliminary Working Committee critique, the Hong Kong government formed another working group to review the 1985 Civics education Guidelines in March 1995. After wide consultations with various groups and the general public, a revised version of the Guidelines was produced in 1996. (Grossman et al, 1999).

### 7.3.3.7 Personal Development

In chapter 5.5, Table 5.5, it was tabled that Tung Chee Hwa in his Policy Address in 2000 called for the schools to provide more scope for moral and civic education to help students develop sound beliefs, attitudes, values and attitudes in life. (Tung Chee Hwa, 2000)

The 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools was written from the perspective of Hong Kong students with sections on “Reflection” and “Action” to make it more meaningful and provide for **personal development** of the students. It interlinks the learning of values, attitudes, beliefs and competence with the acquisition of knowledge that spans from the dimensions of the family to the world.

In terms of personal development, Hong Kong’s sections on “Reflection” and “Action” would serve a more authentic role in developing the perspective of the students where they can reflect critically of what is being taught (p 1, 1996 Guidelines). An example of reflection and action for the junior secondary students in the topic of regional community is :

Reflection:

In what ways am I proud of being a Hong Kong student?

Does our government structure provide a fair and efficient mechanism of promoting common good in Hong Kong?

Action:



What can I do to enhance the sense of pride of being a Hong Kong citizen?

What can I do to enhance the promotion of common good in Hong Kong society?

(p 36, Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1996)

This element of reflective thinking is not found in the Singapore's Civic and Moral Education syllabus from Primary to Junior College levels. Singapore students follow a prescribed syllabus that does not leave any room for questioning the political content.

#### **7.3.3.8 Social Cohesion**

In chapter 5.5, table 5.4, it was recorded that Tung Chee Hwa mentioned the need for Hong Kong to work closely and prosper with China during the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, he stated that there must be mutual trust, mutual economic benefits, cultural interaction and mutual respect for each other's way of life. (Tung Chee Hwa, 1997).

Tung Chee Hwa was in essence stating the importance of **social cohesion** between the people of China and Hong Kong if Hong Kong is going to build itself as a prosperous society. Tung is theorizing that social cohesion of a region within a country will give rise to economic benefits for the region itself. Tung's theory can be compared to Gellner's (1997) theory of nationalism where certain social bonds or conditions are necessary for economic growth.

The 1996 Guidelines in Hong Kong does not attempt to define Civic education but gives some aims of what the school Civic education should do. The first aim (2.2a in p 5) draws close to being an alternative definition of Civic education. It focuses on how the individual as a citizen can relate to the family, neighbouring community, the regional community, the national community and the world so that so that he can have “a sense of belonging to Hong Kong and China”. The Hong Kong individual’s “civic identity is defined by his national identity” (p 23). The national community of China constitutes the ultimate domestic context for civic learning. The “national spirit such as nationalism and patriotism is essential not only for the one’s national identity and sense of belonging, but also for the “**cohesion** and strength of one’s own nation” (p 23). (Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1996).

#### **7.3.3.9 Chinese Culture and History**

In chapter 5.5 Table 5.3, Tung (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004) has theorised the importance of promoting China’s proud culture, history and heritage to strengthen their national identity as a world-class city.

In the 1996 Guidelines to Civic education, the specific domestic context for the Hong Kong civic learner is China and there is a need to know the ideologies of the Chinese government which includes “socialism and communism; the economic system” and **appreciate Chinese culture and Chinese history**

“which is essential for **developing national identity** and patriotic spirit”. (p 24)  
(Guidelines on Civic Education in Schools, 1996).

The importance attached to cultural bonding with China for the Hong Kong students is further elaborated in chapter 8.

While it can be accepted that a Chinese culture from China exists, the same cannot be said to be true for that of Singapore. Although there is a call by the Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (1997) to stay rooted to Singapore’s Asian cultural heritage, the Singapore culture has yet to evolve. What has been acknowledged is that there is a *Singapore Story* which is essentially a history of the political struggles of the PAP government in nation-building.

It is obvious that the building of national identity for the Hong Kong students from 1996 onwards would regard China as the nation and all due patriotism and sense of belonging should start from the mainland China

#### **7.3.3.10 Forging Ahead with Demands**

As Hong Kong moves into the new threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Tung (1999) stressed that they should be “able to **meet the challenges** that come our way, however daunting they may seem”. He reminded them that they must “cultivate a sense of pride for our new identity and a spirit of continuous self-improvement”.

(Tung, 1999). These global challenges have been categorized under the economic realm as discussed in chapter 5.5.

The recent reconceptualization of the multidimensional Citizenship education for Hong Kong for the 21<sup>st</sup> century is in response to **meeting the challenges of the new era** which include economic and information technology gaps, environmental deterioration, deforestation, poverty and water constraints. To get a feel of what types of citizens would be needed for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the multinational Citizenship Education Policy Study (CEPS) was initiated to study global trends, the impact of these trends and the implications for educational policy. A key recommendation was the proposal of a multidimensional view of citizenship to **forge ahead with the demands**. (Grossman, 2000).

In order to forge ahead, the concept of Multidimensional Citizenship is given much breadth and depth. The breadth concept analyses citizenship from “the perspective of four interconnected dimensions: the personal, the social, the spatial and the temporal. To lend depth, Multidimensional Citizenship draws upon three internationally established academic and educational traditions in citizenship education: values education, civic education, and environmental education.(Centre for Citizenship Education: Multidimensional Citizenship Education, 2003).

#### 7.3.3.11 Pragmatism

Like Singapore, the approach to overcoming challenges, especially economic challenges in Hong Kong, appears to be carried out in a “pragmatic” manner. Tung (1999) commended the Hong Kong people for showing perseverance, initiative and **pragmatism** in overcoming unemployment problems. In his 2004 Policy Address, Tung again highlighted that in the process of economic recovery, what is most important is the need to push with work already planned in a pragmatic way to sustain recovery. (Tung, 2004).

While Tung Chee Hwa uses the term pragmatism in a limited way to define his approach to tackling economic issues; in Singapore, pragmatism is viewed as pointed out earlier, as a form of political ideology in the form of “pragmatic democracy”.

Goh C T (1995) stressed that the form of democracy that Singapore practises is pragmatic democracy that is a political system that adopts and adapts good systems that have worked well in other countries like Switzerland, Israel, Japan, the United States, especially in areas of economic productivity. In terms of value systems, Singapore seeks to model after the Asian exemplars, e.g. Japan system where the opposition parties are not destructive and the Japanese press is free but responsible in protecting and advancing the national interest of the ruling government.

This form of pragmatic utilitarian democracy is unique to Singapore for economic purposes and unlike the ideals of democracy practised in the West.

This pragmatic manner of political approach to challenges in Hong Kong is also applied to the education system, in particular to the changes initiated for Citizenship education. It is in a way practical and convenient to move with the times in a new era where global demands would be an issue, even though the issue of building a national identity with China has not yet been established.

Thus while Singapore actually implement the value of pragmatism in its citizenship education, Hong Kong does not explicitly teach this value. Instead, Hong Kong moves ahead with the times in a pragmatic way in its 21<sup>st</sup> century refocus on citizenship education.

#### **7.3.4 Summary of Analysis of Purposes of Citizenship Education Documents of Singapore and Hong Kong**

In summary, both Singapore and Hong Kong have similar features for political factors (i.e. the respective need for control; transformation of citizens through Citizenship education; and perceived personal development through citizenship education). For the economic factors, though Singapore and Hong Kong share similar features on pragmatism and economic prosperity, the pragmatic streak in Singapore political leadership is much more evident than Hong Kong. The survival instinct for Singapore is also pronounced and central in its theme for citizenship education.

There was political control of the administration of a national curriculum in citizenship education for both Singapore and Hong Kong before and after the period of transition, where civics was introduced and gradually evolved according to the respective political circumstances of both societies. This focus on the political agenda supports Kellas' (1991) state and political power features on nationalism.

Though Singapore and Hong Kong share the features of pragmatism and prosperity, the evident pragmatic streak in Singapore is reflected in one of the key values of government policy making in the secondary and junior college curriculum. However this value of pragmatism is not one of the values promoted in the 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education. Instead, the researcher has discovered an anomaly and applied the pragmatic approach to citizenship education in the refocus of the multidimensional approach for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, without even validating the earlier issue of building national identity with China.

Nation-building through economic prosperity is evident in both Singapore and Hong Kong curriculum. For Singapore, the daily pledge undertaken by the students includes the need to achieve prosperity for the nation; and economic development is viewed as a key ideal towards continued success and survival in Civics education. Hong Kong also legitimizes its nation-building identity through its economic success, especially through its symbiotic relationship with China in the 1996 Civic Education Guideline. This economic feature supports theories on

nationalism like Tinker's (1981) economic survival, Kellas' (1991) and Gellner's (1997) emphasis on economic growth.

In the social contexts, the need to arrest Communists threats in Singapore and Hong Kong was necessary in the early years to bring about political stability. Hong Kong had to introduce Civics education to counter communist threats. However, after the political transition in 1997, the 1996 Civics Education Guideline introduces the State and the Chinese Communist Party as part of its curriculum. While the building of social cohesion and appreciation of Chinese culture and history for Hong Kong are pursued with reference to building national identity with China, social cohesion in a multiracial Singapore is critical for peace, racial harmony and economic progress. . The issue of moral crisis for Singapore is not found in Hong Kong. Neither is the critical issue of nurturing elite leadership for Singapore relevant to Hong Kong.

The building of national identity through citizenship education for both Singapore and Hong Kong is crucial for nation building. Especially for Singapore, National Education has been introduced to ensure that all the students can foster a sense of national identity with the nation. For Hong Kong, the political need to identify with China through citizenship education in the form of national identity was critical prior to and during the handover period in 1997. Here there is evidence to further support Goodson's (1998) claim that the curriculum provides an arena for reasserting control and reestablishing national identity, especially for Singapore



as the approach is insular and thus creates an intranational identity (Teo, 2005). It is also a testimony to Apple's (1993) assertion that a national curriculum can recreate hegemonic power and act as a mechanism for the political control of knowledge.

Singapore sees the need to stay rooted in the Asian culture in Civics education so that it can have values to anchor itself in the midst of global influence, especially from the West. This supports Hroch's (1998) identification of a common origin and destiny feature as characteristic of national identity and Smith's (1991) myth of a cultural and social policy for social cohesion.

Compared to Hong Kong, Singapore's current focus of National Education in Citizenship education is quite inward looking. Hong Kong has moved ahead with reconceptualization of a multidimensional Citizenship education based on the need to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century so that it can forge ahead with the demands. Whether the implementation of a multidimensional citizenship is mere rhetoric or can actually prepare the younger generations to forge ahead remains to be seen.

In all, it can be deduced that the purposes of citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong are hidden in its values and attitudes (Giroux, 1988); a reassertion of the ideology and reestablishing of national identity (Goodson,

1998); as well as the legitimation of the knowledge produced from the political, cultural, economic circumstances of society (Apple, 1993).

Chapter 8 will examine how the curriculum in citizenship education is used to build national identity in both Singapore and Hong Kong.

## **Chapter 8**

### **Citizenship Education Curriculum**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

Chapter 7 shows how the education system has been used in nation-building in society in general, which includes the creation of a sense of patriotism/national identity. Chapter 8 will focus more exclusively on the creation of a sense of national identity in the individual and on the theories of nationalism and national identity which the politicians have been shown to hold in chapters 4 and 5. It will necessitate a closer analysis of the values implicit in the curriculum seen as a whole and also refer to the post-1970s view of the curriculum mentioned in chapter 7.

As discussed in chapter 7.1, Goodson (1998, 151) argued that “the school curriculum provides one arena for reasserting control and for reestablishing national identity”. The researcher has decided to utilize Le Matais’ (1997) review of values and aims in citizenship education for Singapore and Hong Kong to examine the scope of citizenship education covered. It was chosen because it covers all countries into three categories and takes into account how the different types of countries devolve authority at the national level. Thus it is more useful than other citizenship education values (that include political, cultural, and moral values) categorized as civic values (Thomas, 2002) which are more micro in perspective.

The national identity values that are analysed are categorized as Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity values for Hong Kong, and Objective/Globalised National identity values for Singapore as propounded in the theories of nationalism and national identity Chapter 3.

For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher will concentrate on the latest moral and civic education approach and Multidimensional Citizenship framework for Hong Kong; and the recent National Education and Civics and Moral Education guidelines for Singapore. National Identity is promoted in the General Studies of the Primary schools and Liberal Studies in the secondary schools under the umbrella of Civic and Moral and Civic Education in Hong Kong; and for Singapore, National Identity is promoted mainly through the infusion of National Education in the Civic and Moral Education and Social Studies in the Primary and Normal (Technical) stream, reference to these documents will be made and compared. These documents are the most recent milestone markers for the respective societies.

Some important international studies in citizenship education conducted in recent years have analyzed the nature and impact of civic education programmes and policies. Findings from a recent study of multidimensional citizenship across nine countries revealed that the values promoted through civic education were perceived by policymakers as very significant in accounting for changes with respect to citizen characteristics and future policy directions. (Cogan and Derriot,

2000; Hahn, 1998). The first phase of the Second IEA (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement) Civics Study identified the significance of civic education in various countries underscoring the values learned by students. But none of these studies paid much attention to the Asia-Pacific region. (Cogan et al, 2002).

Lee Wing On et al (1997, p6) discussed that at the school level, the cultural analysis of change during the political transition refers to changes in attitudes or values and these "are often the slowest things to change and often lag behind the technological changes".

Values are a foundation of the educative process in schools just as they are the cornerstones of our everyday living. Values play an important role in the development of social capital, one of the driving force of civil societies (Montgomery, 1998). Values can be defined narrowly as a mode of conduct, or state of existence that is personally or socially preferable (Rokeach, 1973) or broadly as trans-situational goals varying from the abstract to the substantive values serving as guiding principles in life (Schwartz, 1994). Such beliefs are abstract, general and would include substantive values like the common good, power, affection (Cummings, 1997). Education plays a key role in transmitting values (Cheng, 1997). Hence citizenship education/civic education can play an important role in enhancing students' acquisition of a range of civic-related values. Values that we believe in take years of cumulative experience and

knowledge to imbibe. This role is even more important when we recognize that values affect our future behaviour. (Cogan et al, 2002).

In nation-building for Singapore and Hong Kong, the values transmitted through citizenship education in building national identity help to shape future behaviour of the citizens. That is why politicians have a great stake in deciding on national values prescribed for their societies and public education, as analysed in chapters 4 and 5. These values at times correspond to theories proposed by academics on nationalism and national identity discussed in chapter 3.

## **8.2 “Values-Explicit” and “Values-Neutral” Citizenship Education**

Le Matais' (1997) review of the values and aims that underpin national education system indicated that how such values and aims are expressed has significant influence on the approach to citizenship education. He divided countries into the three categories:

- i) *Minimal reference to values in education legislation:* Countries in this group have a commitment to pluralism and devolved authority. The values that are expressed in the Constitution provide a framework for the values devolved through educational structures. Countries included in this group are England, the Netherlands and the United States of America.
- ii) *National values expressed in general terms.* Here general statements on values are determined at national level, but details are worked out

by authorities with devolved responsibilities. Examples of countries include Australia, New Zealand and Spain.

- iii) *National values expressed in detail.* These countries have a highly centralized system and are inclined to express very detailed aims and clear educational and social values. Singapore, Japan and Sweden belong to this group

One of the major tensions that countries face in approaching citizenship education is the extent to identify and articulate the values and dispositions that underpin citizenship. The response to this philosophical and practical tension hinges on the answer to the question whether citizenship education should be “values-explicit”, promoting distinct values that are normally part of the public values and beliefs; or “values-neutral” which takes a neutral stance to values and controversial issues. The answer depends very much on the country’s approach to citizenship education. (Kerr, 2003).

Richardson (1996) views this tension as part of a broader debate about finding a balance between the “public” and “private” dimensions of citizenship, leading educational philosophers to term these as “thick” and “thin” citizenship respectively. Those who uphold citizenship as a “public” concern view an important or “thick” role for education through the formal citizenship education curriculum in school. Those who view citizenship as largely “private” concern sees a less important or conversely “thin” role for education (mainly through the

hidden curriculum). They then advocate a more significant role for the family and community than for teachers. Criticisms have been leveled against the “values-explicit” approach for bias and indoctrination of students, while “values-neutral” approach have been attacked for failing to help students deal with the realities of controversial issues. In examining the above three categories, countries in the first category adopt a “values-neutral” approach to citizenship education (e.g. in England); those in the second category are situated between “values-neutral” and values-explicit”, depending on decisions of the authorities; and the third category is very much “values-explicit” in its approach. Countries with “values-explicit” approach are much more specific and prescriptive about what citizenship education is about in terms of its aims and objectives. (Kerr, 2003).

While Hong Kong belongs to the second category where national values are expressed in general terms, Singapore belongs to the third category where national values are explicitly expressed in details.

The fact that Singapore’s national values, especially taught through National Education, are explicitly expressed, can be traced to Singapore being classified as Objective/Globalised National Identity and Teo’s (2005) Intranational Identity where there is a high level of bureaucratic national planning and political elite factor in chapter 3.4.1.



Hong Kong, classified as Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity in chapter 3.4.2, has values expressed in general terms. It can be traced to the relatively less direct bureaucratic planning of China; initial emphasis on building national identity with China and the latter reconceptualised multidimensional approach to citizenship education to cope with globalisation which were discussed in chapters 3 and 5.

In Singapore, "there has always been great emphasis on values transmission. For this reason, effort has been made to inculcate such "Asian" values as thrift, industry, loyalty, placing the group above the individual, etc. Hence, it can be said that the goals of the education system are to build a Singapore national identity, to preserve core "Asian" values, and to increase Singapore's capacity for greater economic resilience in the international and global marketplace". (Han et al, 2001, 268).

Han et al's (2001, 276) study showed a "nationalistic" position in values education which endorsed "two sets of values that are strongly encouraged by the political leaders, and in schools". They are "the teaching of national identity and the teaching of work values".

In Singapore where the official policy is enshrined as mandatory, it is unlikely that the current situation where there is little emphasis on individuals' autonomy

and reflection will be reversed. It is inevitable that the national political values taught are explicit and value-laden.

Schools are often used by the government as vessels of transmission of values that at different times and by different leaders are held to be important for the development of Singapore's national identity. In chapter 7, milestone markers of the evolvement of citizenship education where three generations of Prime Ministers were directly involved were analysed.

Various areas "have ranged from the mundane (for example, road safety) to the more comprehensive (such as life skills and career choices)". An experiential dimension "took the form of an extracurricular programme that encouraged students to take up sports, ... the cultural groups,... Student Councils" to build teamwork and develop leadership skills. (Charles, 1999, 118).

### **8. 3 Building National Identity through Citizenship Education in Singapore**

Civic education or citizenship education took its place in the formal curriculum as a mandatory subject as Civics and Moral Education (CME), with two lesson periods (35 minutes per period) in the school week in the lower primary (Primary 1 to Primary 3) and secondary schools. The upper primary (Primary 4 to Primary 6) are given 3 periods. The junior colleges are taught a 30 hour module. CME aims to engender in the students a shared sense of nationhood, build national identity, nurture in them values of responsible citizenship and develop in students

the responsibility to contribute as leaders in shaping the future of their nation Singapore.

Primary school students also do the Social Studies which has “National Education infused” wherever possible “to help instill in our young a national instinct for survival”. Sound knowledge of Singapore’s “history, geography, sociology and economic activities” will help them “develop a strong sense of national identity and pride.” (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Social Studies Syllabus, Primary*, 2000, 6).

Lower Secondary Normal (Technical) stream students are taught a revised curriculum of Social Studies from the year 2005 onwards to help with “fostering social cohesion and national identity through National Education”. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Social Studies Syllabus, Lower Secondary Normal (Technical)*, 2005, 11).

As Singapore moves to a knowledge-based economy in recent years, it is said to be paramount that teachers imbue in students the psyche of commitment to society and the nation. The “Thinking Schools, Learning Nation” vision was implemented in 1997, where every school is a “thinking school”, nurturing creative thinkers who question assumptions, learn from past mistakes, and all students are encouraged to be life-long learners to thrive in a knowledge-based society and economy. To equip students for the uncertain times ahead, the

education system was re-oriented to an ability driven paradigm. At the same time, National Education, or citizenship teaching was introduced as a component of the curriculum in 1997. The goal was to equip students with the basic attitudes, values and instincts that make them Singaporeans, and to develop in them a shared sense of nationhood and confidence in a common destiny. (Ministry of Education, 2001-2002, *The Heart of the Teacher*).

The concept of "Thinking Schools" sounds ideal, but is not put into practise in Singapore, where citizenship education is concerned, just as the reconceptualised multidimensional framework in Hong Kong is also ideal and not implemented in practise (see 8.3 for details).

The researcher will elaborate that the values taught in citizenship education in Singapore are highly prescriptive. Students learn but do not question assumptions of values inherited from the political heritage of PAP that are now enshrined in the Civics and Moral Education syllabus. As concluded in chapter 7, the purpose of citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong is a reassertion of the ideology and reestablishing of national identity (Goodson, 1998); and legitimation of knowledge produced from political, cultural and economic circumstances of society (Apple, 1993).

Unlike Hong Kong's 1996 Guidelines on Civic education, Singapore has no element for self reflection or analysis of the political content.

The problems encountered in the formal part of Civics and Moral Education were worrying. Teachers were not teaching the subject "with the commitment that such a programme needed" (Charles, 1999, 119). It was not just a question of increasing the content of resources in the text. The greater problem of the teachers not taking it seriously was the fact that it was not examinable and not, in the grades, an obvious structure of accountability or importance. The new approach of the multi-disciplinary learning seeks to emphasise "understanding and learning", requiring the students to "explore possibilities and alternatives, "worked both to develop the heart and mind" (p 121). For example, economics and history are interweaved to help students grow in their understanding of citizenship and civil liberties. With the emphasis now on the process more than the content, it is hoped that education can begin "with the engagement of the heart". (p 121) The greatest challenge facing the schools is to develop the sense of belonging. (Charles, 1999).

This issue about citizenship education being given less importance than the other examinable academic subjects is also a problem with Hong Kong, where priority is placed on academic subjects and it "underlined the non-academic status of the subject and its weak linkage to later studies (e.g. matriculation and university)". (Morris et al, 1997,104). The content had to be redefined to include economic analysis and packaged into a new subject called Economic and Public Affairs in the early 1970s.

The researcher questions whether the psychological engagement of the heart, mind, soul and emotions can be effectively cultivated solely through a subject that has been deemed to be less utilitarian in academic value for both Singapore and Hong Kong, where their success is often measured in economic terms. In Singapore, political and economic success is seen as having transformed the country from Third World to the First World by Lee Kuan Yew; and Hong Kong, with a growing sense of national identity with China, as described by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa (2005), is also aspiring to be "Asia's world city" so that Hong Kong people can be "more affluent".

In Singapore, the school environment plays a vital part in providing opportunities to relate what is taught in the classroom for Civics education. Students' project works and extracurricular activities, are channels in which they can develop leadership and communication skills meaningfully. (Chia and Ang, 1999, 170). The daily flag raising and lowering ceremonies, taking the pledge, and the commemoration of key events in Singapore's history, including the celebration of National Day, work "to instill in the students a shared sense of nationhood and sense of emotional belonging and commitment to the community and the nation" (ibid, 171). The Community Involvement Programme (CIP) also encourages all students from primary level to junior college to actively contribute to the community for at least 6 hours per school year. It helps to "nurture pupils to be socially responsible and help them to understand that every Singaporean has a

role in enhancing the well being of the community and the nation" (ibid, p 171). It strengthens their sense of identity as Singaporeans.

The above activities of pledge taking; commemoration of key events and CIP which are part of National Education, are a testimony of the influence of Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong. The importance of pledge taking by Lee Kuan Yew for nation-building was discussed in chapter 5.2. In chapters 5.4 and 6.4, the rationale and launch of National Education by Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong respectively were also discussed.

Education in Singapore seeks to imbue in the future generations the right values. Values education are designed to develop in future citizens upright character and a deep sense of bonding to the nation, so that they can be prepared to fight in times of adversity. It is perceived that Singapore students need to develop an awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding Singapore to equip them to make decisions for the future with conviction. They need to strengthen their emotional ties and commitment to the nation so that they will stay and fight for Singapore even when the odds are against them. National Education, infused into all aspects of the school life, systematically integrates Singapore's past, present concerns and future challenges into subjects in the curriculum. It is incorporated in the non formal curriculum, e.g. extra-curricular activities, assembly talks, camps. Schools commemorate some important events in Singapore's history, like Total Defence Day (15<sup>th</sup> February) is a reminder of the

day Singapore fell to the Japanese in 1942 (Ministry of Education, 1997-1998, Learning to Think, Thinking to Learn).

The core values, perceived to be good and upright for the development of individual character; and political historical circumstances and constraints that are crucial to ensure future continual sustenance of the nation, have been designed to help Singapore ride future challenges and continue in its survival indefinitely. The ideology is that whatever practical political and economic values that have worked in the past for the individual and nation will be continued so that there is renewal of the PAP leadership and continual prosperity. The core values are evidently "Values-explicit" as described by Le Matais (1997), corresponding also to Kellas' (1991) political elite and economic elite factors in nation-building in chapter 3.4.1.

These national values are also insular in perspective, derived from the political agenda of the three Prime Ministers and reflect an introspective stance or Intranational Identity (Teo, 2005).

This metaphor of Singapore going into warfare in "Total Defence" with an underlying perceived assumption that there are perpetually regional or global enemies in a time of peace and prosperity when the National Education programme was launched is interesting. What appears to be a dire need to foster such an aggressive call to defend the nation to the hilt seems to be a compulsive



obsession and deep seated concern that overrides all other principles in the foundational factors that influence citizenship education. This need to fight and survive is the underlying pillar that supports the rationale for the infusion of National Education in the schools and it is uniquely Singaporean. It is part of the rhetoric developed by the PAP as analysed in Chapter 4 to justify the urgent need to defend the nation at all times.

In contrast to Hong Kong, this need for self-defence and survival in the citizenship education syllabus is not relevant at all, simply because now that Hong Kong is part of the nation of China, all matters of issues with regards to its military affairs are handled by China.

Sadasivan (2003), Minister of State for Health and Transport, in his address to undergraduate students stressed that Singapore in the 21<sup>st</sup> century faced more uncertainties and insecurities in the form of borderless threats and boundless enemies with threats of terrorism : cyber terrorism and bio-terrorism (e.g. SARS); economic crisis through globalisation. He cited Lee Kuan Yew as saying that Singapore is vulnerable and stability does not come naturally. If the balance of security and stability is shattered, Lee doubts if Singaporeans on their own can ever put Singapore together again. As a young nation, stability cannot be taken for granted.

The researcher feels that the metaphor to warfare is more psychological than physical. In the past, the threats of communist subversion was physically and ideologically challenging for the earlier political figures, like Lee Kuan Yew. Today, the real psychological warfare is more inclined to one that seeks to win the hearts and minds of the citizens in getting them rooted and committed to the nation, as espoused by Goh Chok Tong's speech "Global City, Best Home" (1997) and implied by Sadasivan (2003). Otherwise it is perceived there is no future for Singapore. Politicians in Singapore view citizenship in Singapore as a "public" concern with "thick" role for education (Richardson, 1996) through the formal National Education curriculum infused in Civics and Moral Education syllabus.

To date, only one study has been carried out on evaluating the implementation of National Education. Tan-Wee (2000) carried out a survey to gather feedback on whether the National Education programmes (i.e. National Heritage Tour, Community Involvement Programme, Commemoration of Key Historical Events; and A Six-Week Enrichment Course on National Education) carried the National Education messages (i.e. Singapore is our home; we have confidence in our future; uphold meritocracy and prevent corruption; no one owes us a living; we must defend Singapore; racial and religious harmony) from the students' point of view. The aim of National Education is twofold, to strengthen the common culture; and next to develop the national psyche of "excellence through crisis". However Tan-Wee (2000) found that the six National Education messages given

by the Ministry of Education reflect the “common culture” only and left a large gap in meeting the aim of National Education in schools. After the data for this study was submitted in November 1997, the Ministry of Education introduced another set of programmes for National Education called “Learning Journeys” that saw the forging of the national psyche of excellence in crisis. Students are brought on field trips organized by key government departments that have made critical contribution to the success of Singapore. This is a shift in emphasis in the aims of the Learning Journeys, with a bias for the development of the national psyche of excellence in crisis.

The values learnt in the Learning Journeys are politically “Values-Explicit” as reviewed by Le Matais (1997) as they are designed to augment the students’ trust and faith in the leadership efforts and achievements of the PAP government. It serves to create an awareness of common origin and destiny and a myth of historical collectivity (Hroch, 1998).

Four Learning Journeys that are found to be very useful in inculcating the national psyche and also carry the National Education messages include :

- Visit to the Water Treatment Works (Confidence; Self reliance)
- Urban Redevelopment Authority (Home)
- Port of Singapore Authority Corporation (Confidence, Self reliance)
- Visit to the Singapore Discovery Centre (Defence, Confidence)

The above four learning journeys though “particularly helpful in inculcating the national psyche” (Tan-Wee, 2000), cannot be compared to the much more enriching cultural trips that Hong Kong students make to mainland China to appreciate the Chinese history and culture that date back thousands of years ago and build national identity with China. (See section on Hong Kong below for details).

In the Singapore Primary schools, the Social Studies syllabus was first implemented in 1984. Students from Primary 4 to Primary 6 were taught Social Studies. Due to rapid technological advancement and urbanization in Singapore, the syllabus was revised and implemented in 1995 to address concerns for the environment and preservation of Singapore’s heritage.

In 1999 further revisions were made to meet the new challenges of an increasingly unpredictable and fast-changing world of the globalised 21<sup>st</sup> century. National Education has been infused into the new syllabus from Primary 1 to Primary 6 to help pupils understand the constraints and opportunities facing Singapore and develop a sense of belonging to the community and nation. National Education message is infused to help instill in the young a national instinct for survival. Singapore is a young nation and pupils need to “develop a strong sense of national identity and pride” (p 6). In the values and attitudes objectives for the Primary school Social Studies syllabus, students are taught to “respect the customs and traditions of the various communities in Singapore;

acquire national instincts for survival and confidence in the future; develop a sense of awareness and concern for Singapore and its people; understand the need for co-operation and interdependence among people and among countries; develop an attitude that is objectivity; adaptability and open-mindedness". (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Social Studies Syllabus, Primary*, 2000, 3).

This instinct for survival can be traced to Lee Kuan Yew's 1967's National Day Speech analysed in chapter 4.8a where he exhorted the citizens to cooperate with the government to meet basic survival challenges, which corresponds to Tinker's (1981) survival characteristic for nation-building.

From unit 3 onwards (i.e. Primary 3 to Primary 6) all the focus is about Singapore as a society where people have to live in harmony with different races (primary 3) to Singapore's geography and history with emphasis on Singapore's struggle to self-government, nation-building and working towards a Singaporean or national identity. Only one unit in Primary 6 links Singapore with Southeast Asia and the world. This approach is factual and information biased on state information, without any higher order or critical thinking. It fits with the Objective National Identity values described in chapter 3.4.1. The cultural element is also missing in nation-building.

Globalisation and rapid changes in the society necessitated revision in the Civics and Moral Education (Primary) syllabus in 2000 to help students “in their development of their moral character and in fostering their love and commitment to the nation” (p 3). Due consideration was given to the alignment of the Civics and Moral Education (Primary) content with national and societal needs to help “children make connections between the school and the nation or society at large” (p 4). The shift is in tandem with the Desired Outcomes of Education at the end of primary school (See Appendix 8.1 for details). Singapore is viewed as a small fragile nation subject to vulnerabilities and constraints. Children have to learn from a young age to live harmoniously with people from different races. “The impact of globalisation poses a constant challenge to one’s loyalty and commitment to the nation as a citizen. A greater emphasis to develop the sense of belonging to and identity with the nation, and responsibility as citizens must be given to help our children cultivate that emotional bonding to Singapore from young.” Lessons are conducted in the official mother tongue languages (i.e. Chinese, Malay and Tamil). (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Primary*, 2000, 4).

This focus on the need to address the challenges of globalisation supports the classification of the Objective/Globalised National Identity for Singapore as discussed in chapter 3.4.1.

Goh Chok Tong (1993, 22-23) maintained that Singaporeans should retain their “unique distinct Singaporean identity as we go regional” in the global era in nation-building. Basically, this Singaporean national identity is one that “unite the different race and religions...” as recorded in chapter 4.9 table 4.4. This ideology is translated into the above curriculum focus on social policy of racial harmony, corresponding to Kellas' (1991) cultural factor.

Conducting the lessons in official mother tongue languages also correspond to Hroch's (1998) language factor of “higher culture” in assimilating national identity.

The lower primary syllabus for Civics and Moral Education concentrate on character building and bonding with family. Prescribed Singapore Family Values taught in lower and upper primary include “love, care and concern, filial responsibility, commitment, communication, mutual respect” (p 13). It is not stated how the Singapore Family Values were derived but the researcher believes that the Asian Confucian value of filial piety could have influenced the choice of “filial responsibility” where children are expected to be filial to their parents, love, be responsible and take care of them in their old age. Singapore's Shared Values taught in the upper primary include “consensus, not conflict” (p 15), “putting nation before community, society above self” (p 19) to help them accept differences of abilities and opinions amongst their school mates; as well as putting nation before community, society above self in being a responsible

citizen. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Primary*, 2000).

This creation of the Singapore Family Values and Singapore Shared Values is an attempt by the PAP to create the myth of a common origin and destiny of values (Hroch, 1998) that will naturalise into a culture that will be “uniquely” Singaporean. These values are decided at the political level, translated into the public sector and public education to recreate hegemonic power for political control. (Apple, 1993).

The Desired Outcome of Education that is directly involved in nation-building and national identity is to “love Singapore”. This is mainly scheduled in the upper primary theme on “National Pride and Loyalty” where students are taught values of “respect, pride in nation, loyalty, patriotism, responsibility, sacrifice, incorruptibility, unity, meritocracy, fairness, equality, sensitivity, adaptability, preparedness, confidence in nation, creativity, mutual understanding and respect, peace and stability, harmony” (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Primary*, 2000, 18-20).

These values reflect the official nationalism characteristic of Kellas’ (1991) where values of patriotism and loyalty to the state is paramount.



In Hong Kong, students are taught positive attitudes and values with regards to national symbols of China like participating in National Flag hoisting ceremony. The difference is that Hong Kong's flag and identity is now only regional, and its national identity is now submerged with China, corresponding to Cameron's (1999) political entity characteristic in the reunification of East and West Germany.

Revisions in the Civics and Moral Education (Secondary) syllabus in 2000 include the infusion of National Education messages; and developing instincts for national survival. The five broad themes include character building, family relationships, community spirit, our nation, our heritage and challenges ahead. The themes in the syllabus are underpinned by Singapore's ideology, Our Shared Values:

- Nation before community and society above self,
- Family as the basic unit of society,
- Community support and respect for the individual,
- Consensus, not conflict, and
- Racial and religious harmony

(Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Secondary*, 2000, 3).

What is prevalent in the values of the syllabus for both lower and upper secondary syllabus for Civics and Moral Education in Singapore appears to be a

build up of individual strength of character in terms of a strong survival, fighting and adaptability instincts for themselves, their families, community and nation. Important values for the family and nation are prescribed by the nation-state, namely Singapore Family Values that reflects a Confucian heritage (Thomas, 2002) and Our Shared Values. Though there are four main races, and the family is regarded as the building block in society, the different races share common values. The values of national ideology are familiar values that are taken in the daily pledge in school. Priority is also given to preparing the students to meet with challenges of globalisation through stressing the need to be adaptable, innovative, risk-taking and also to be emotionally rooted in their nation.

The researcher feels that the value of "belief in oneself" has been transmitted from the political preoccupation of the nation's perceived need to be self-sufficient in its state of continual survival so that it can maintain its economic prosperity and political stability. Just as no other country is responsible for Singapore's safety and survival, no one else is responsible for the individual's progress or future. It can be traced back to the analysis of Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 political ideologies on nation-building in chapter 4.8a where he emphasized that the new nation Singapore could only thrive with the citizens cooperating with the political minority elite, corresponding to Kellas' (1991) political elite factor. There was no alternative to the solution of basic survival. This notion of self sufficiency has since been propagated by the other two Prime Ministers. Goh Chok Tong (1996, 27) stressed that "Singapore is totally man-made, the result of human

organization and human ingenuity, ...". Lee Hsien Loong (2004, 36) reiterated Dr Habibie's comment that "... Singapore is a little red dot. If we don't defend our interests, who will?"

These curriculum values reflect the politicians' main emphasis on nation-building. Again no cultural values are emphasized.

To meet the challenges of the unpredictable and changing globalised world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Social Studies of the lower secondary Normal (Technical) stream was reviewed in 2002 and the new syllabus implemented from 2005. Like the syllabus of the primary Social Studies and secondary civics and moral education syllabus, it has become pertinent that the Technical students understand the constraints and opportunities that Singapore faces and develop a sense of belonging to the community and the nation. The values, knowledge and skills of the new syllabus "provide for better understanding of historical and current events, cultures and geography and enable our students to make decisions that will contribute to the improvement of local and global communities". (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Social Studies Syllabus, Lower Secondary Normal (Technical)*, 2005, 1).

What is essentially taught is the creation of a myth of nationhood, or the *Singapore Story*, discussed in chapter 4.4, corresponding also to Hroch's (1998) common origin and destiny factor in nation-building.

In the secondary one Normal (Technical) syllabus, features of the provision of education stressed include “catering to the economic needs of the nation” e.g. vocational-technical education and “fostering social cohesion and national identity through National Education”.(p 11)

Students in secondary two Normal (Technical) learn values which makes a good government or the “principles of good governance – meritocracy and incorruptibility, forward-looking, pragmatism, fairness” (p 12) through PAP and the ability to adapt while having “a sense of rootedness” (p 16) in “staying competitive in the 21<sup>st</sup> century” (p 16). The concerns of globalisation are economic in nature though the need to stay rooted is a social and psychological issue. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Social Studies Syllabus, Lower Secondary Normal (Technical)*, 2005).

These values reflect the values propounded by the three Prime Ministers in the National Day Rally speeches related to nation-building as discussed in chapter 4.9 where economic prosperity, state or PAP good governance, social cohesion, and the drive to maintain the economic edge in the age of globalisation are highlighted.

For the Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes, the theme of the Civics Syllabus has been revised and implemented in 2000 to be based on the “Challenge of Leadership” (p 2), which “aims to harness and develop the

leadership potential of the students” as part of the nation-building agenda in alignment with the mission of the Ministry of Education to “mould the future of the nation, by moulding the people who will determine the future of Singapore”. (p 2)

The rationale is that there is a need for Singapore in the globalisation era to nurture some of its best talents to serve in leadership positions in the governance and administration. The goals of the Civics syllabus include equipping students with requisite knowledge and skills to make sound decisions as future leaders; and developing in them the willingness to take on the responsibility in shaping the future of Singapore. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics Syllabus for Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes*, 2000).

The good concepts of leadership are generally that of the nation-building’s leadership values that has worked well for the People’s Action Party. Students learn that in the significant milestones of nation-building, certain values like “pragmatism, self-reliance, national consciousness, equality, loyalty, foresight, indomitable will, social cohesion, diplomacy, integrity, racial and religious harmony” (p 8) were critical in the past. Leadership development values include “renewal, service, excellence, accountability, collaboration, consultation, integrity, expertise, moral courage. Students are taught to exercise their leadership potential in school, at work and the national level. They are also taught the values of the current system of government that include “multi-racialism, meritocracy, incorruptibility, visionary leadership; the importance of Our Shared Values, stability as part of national ideology and pragmatism, security,

understanding government policies; survival, interdependence, goodwill in Singapore's place in the current world situation" (p10 – 13). For future challenges, to ensure Singapore's continued economic success and shape Singapore's destiny, students learn values of "proactiveness, astuteness, instinct for survival, realism, loyalty, self-reliance, independence, entrepreneurial spirit, internal stability, interdependence, love for the nation, confidence in the nation, commitment to survive the impact of globalisation and the borderless world, and make Singapore the best home by contributing towards Singapore's economic growth and political leadership." (p15 – 17) (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics Syllabus for Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes*, 2000).

This emphasis on political leadership for PAP that is now honed early in the public education system from the junior colleges, has its roots traced to Lee Kuan Yew's 1967 speech on nation-building in chapter 4.8a where he crafted his ideology in persuading the citizens to look up to PAP for directions in nation-building. Since then, the theme on political renewalship has been reiterated by the other two Prime Ministers as critical issues to nation-building in the National Day Rally speeches. Chapter 4 table 4.4 recorded that Goh Chok Tong (1996, 23) credited Lee Kuan Yew for building "today's Singapore" and that Goh's task is to lead the post-independence generation into 21<sup>st</sup> century. Table 4.5 also recorded that Lee Hsien Loong (2004, 98-99) reestablished that "it's important

that enough people come into politics so that we have self-renewal and we have a new leadership team. Political renewal is critical to Singapore.”

As in the secondary syllabus, the theme of focus is on the bare survival instinct, with a slant on the leadership dimension. Values taught reflect the historical struggles of the PAP government and the continual quest to look for renewal of PAP leadership in the student population, from which the talents can be nurtured and drawn while they are still young. The best students are often government scholarship overseas and are expected to come back and serve the nation. Implicit is the understanding that the very best elite talents are needed to serve the government, i.e. the one and only People’s Action Party. Values that are perpetuated serve to ensure that the nation can survive for generations to come in economic growth and political stability. There is no mention of cultural elements except for the need to maintain racial harmony and social cohesiveness. It again reflects the values of Objective/Globalised National Identity values as discussed in chapter 3.4.1

#### **8. 4 Building National Identity through Civic Education in Hong Kong**

Like other curriculum reforms, it was acknowledged that “a gap between intention and practice always exists.” For civic and moral education in Hong Kong, it was discovered that “there is an overall lack of effective moral and civic education to enhance the understanding of our nation and the development of national identity” (p 9). One of the goals of the curriculum reform in 2000, is that

students will be able to “understand their national identity and be committed to contributing to the nation and society” (p 18). Moral and Civic education as life experience is seen as “one of the five essential learning experiences” (p 28) and will help to develop “personal character and interpersonal skills; the creativity to innovate; and the spirit to live up to expectations and enjoy living” (p32). Values are defined as “qualities that students should develop for conduct and decision (e.g. rights and responsibility,... national identity), while attitudes are personal dispositions needed to perform a task well (e.g. open-mindedness) (p37) A distinction is made between values and attitude. (Curriculum Development Council, 2000, Learning to Learn).

As argued in chapter 5.4, it is citizenship education that would bring about a “national identity” for Hong Kong, in relating to China, although economic symbiosis with China will forge closer political integration with China (Gungwu et al, 1999). Gungwu et al’s (1999) statement corresponds to the birth of a nation through economic life, language and territory coming together (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994) in chapter 3.1

Chapter 5.5 Table 5.5 records that Tung Chee Hwa (1999, 55) Policy Address on public education for nation-building also focus on the need to develop knowledge in “personal character, skills, attitude and physique.” Which was then translated into the curriculum reform in 2000.



In Singapore, no distinction is made between values and attitudes. While Hong Kong's definition of "attitudes" refer to personal dispositions or natural qualities of the individual, implicitly acknowledging that there are individual innate virtues that can either enhance (e.g. open-mindedness) or slacken (e.g. close-mindedness) the learning of Civics and Moral education, it is not so for Singapore. In Singapore, the "attitude objectives" of the primary (p 6) and secondary (p 4) syllabus of Civics and Moral Education are specifically designed so that students as individuals will work towards the objectives of nation-building (e.g.s "show a sense of belonging to and love for Singapore as their homeland" p 6 of Primary syllabus; "have the willingness to contribute to the well-being, including the defence, of the nation, have confidence, loyalty and pride in our nation's success". P4 of Secondary syllabus). (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Primary, Secondary*, 2000)

The researcher feels that the reason why Singapore's values are void of personal dispositions, and focus only on objectives of nation-building is due to the very insular nature of political agenda in nation-building, classified as Intranational Identity (Teo, 2005) in chapter 3.4.1

Hong Kong belongs to the Le Matais' (1997) second category of countries where national values are expressed in general terms, especially with regards to political values in citizenship education. Morris et al (2002) did a comparative overview of civic education in the Asia-Pacific region. Findings revealed that like

Taiwan, Thailand and Japan, increasingly Hong Kong has put broadly conceived emphasis on the values of national identity, moral behaviour, personal attributes (e.g. honesty, civility), and international or global perspectives. A summary of values indicated that from 1985, Hong Kong sought to produce responsible, moral citizens; maintain social order and stability. From 1997, Hong Kong looked into inculcating Chinese values, family values, social harmony, moral responsibility, political machinery of the People's Republic of China, patriotism and love of the motherland China, controversial issues, reflection and action on the students' part. The formal civic education curriculum has often been dominated by concerns for "good" citizenship, the common good, moral education and a range of values associated with these aspects of civic education.

In chapter 5.3 it was discussed that the values advocated by Tung Chee Hwa (1997) are mainly of similar Eastern values, respecting the fine traditional values of filial piety, love for the family, integrity, mindful of the rule of the law and submission to the central authority of China. These Chinese values that are Confucian in origin, are then translated into the curriculum

Studies of values in citizenship education has a long tradition in Hong Kong. A common theme is that of traditional eastern Confucian values experienced in the modern society, related in terms of family, group, nation versus self and achievement orientations. These values are not dichotomized. Au (1994) and

Leung (1996) argued that the traditional Chinese emphasis on self is the starting point for social relationships. Au (1995) views self-cultivation as the foundation of a being a human, and is the basic requirement of attaining order and harmony in human relationships; thus attaining self-determination. Lee (2001) found that Hong Kong youth in the nineties continue to place high priorities towards family, work and education. There have been concerns about their commitments toward the society. In order to appreciate why Hong Kong youth behave in the mentioned manner with regards to values, it would be necessary to examine past values studies in citizenship education.

Lau (1985) administered the Rokeach Value survey to 1,463 university students and found that students in Hong Kong were inclined toward personal and competency-oriented values. In 1991 (Kwan and Tse) surveyed Hong Kong youth between 11 to 22, and found that "contribution to society" and "having a happy family" were the two most important criteria of success in judging a person. Wong and Cheng (1992) carried out a survey on "Value Systems of Youth" on secondary students and found that students ranked "family relationship", "freedom", "Family members", "Friends", "filial piety" and "knowledge" at the top amongst 46 value items.

In 1999, (Lee 1999a) compared teachers' perception of citizenship in three Chinese cities, namely Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Findings revealed that teachers from three cities gave high priorities to traditional values.

He found that Hong Kong was surprisingly Chinese, possessing common characteristics comparable to the other Chinese cities which had developed in political and social contexts that are different from Hong Kong in the past few decades. The study also showed that Hong Kong tends to place comparatively higher emphasis on fulfillment of family responsibilities and moral behaviour, focusing on the private sphere of citizenship, using Janoski's framework. (Janoski, 1998). Within 1999, Lee (1999b) also found that there were strong concerns for critical and analytical thinking, and an approach toward avoiding politics in the teaching of civics.

Lee (2001) conducted a study of some 12 elite students and citizen groups perceived to have significant impact on the future of values education in Hong Kong. The survey findings revealed that the most important choices are given to those relating to individuals. On the other hand, collective values, such as "to encourage civic consciousness", "to provide a guide for behaviour in daily life" and to develop appreciation for heritage and to strengthen national identity" are given secondary importance ( Lee, 2001, 210-211). Most of the respondents interviewed regarded spiritual development, rather than national identity as the most important reason for values education. Only one interviewer regarded national identity as the most important reason, and another felt that both spiritual development and national identity are equally important. In general, the reason why spiritual development is more important than national identity is attributed to the view that spiritual development refers to one's personal quality. Compared to

values related to the nation, it would be more important to focus on the individual first, as the nation is comprised of individuals who have to be nurtured to support the nation. Another way of viewing it is that the “spiritual development has fundamental influence upon one’s cultural appreciation and national identity” and that “Our Chinese culture represents our national identity”. (Lee, 2001, 211).

That Chinese culture should represent Hong Kong’s national identity is well propounded by Tung Chee Hwa in chapter 5.5 when he proposed a theory of building national identity through appreciating China’s history and proud cultural heritage. The call by Tung (1998) to identify with China’s history and heritage will produce a distinct character of national cultural identity (Liah, 1994).

This emphasis on Chinese cultural heritage is well translated into the curriculum as discussed in section 8.7, reflecting the Objective/Subjective/Globalised National Identity in chapter 3.4.2.

From the 1996 Guidelines on Civic Education syllabus, the section on Area IV: National Community serves in bridging national identity knowledge with China. The main theme is Chinese nationhood. From the kindergarten to senior primary level, the focus is on Chinese culture through festivities, customs, stories, historical figures, national festivals and ways of life in China. At the junior secondary level, major contemporary events of China, religion, social, political issues and the State government are introduced. It is at the senior secondary

level where the ideology, political and economic system, national pride, nationalism and patriotism are emphasized. (Curriculum Development Council, 1996, 37).

Issues that pupils are encouraged to ponder include cultural issues like "How can I uphold significant Chinese traditional values?"; economic and political issues like "How can I participate in the modernization of China?; What is the role of Hong Kong in the development of China?" (Curriculum Development Council, 1996, 38).

These themes and issues are linked to a translation of Tung Chee Hwa's stress on Chinese heritage, economic success, symbiosis with China, cosmopolitan city as important factors for nation-building discussed in chapter 5.5. They also correspond to Tinker's (1981) elite economic characteristic for nation-building; Liah's (1994) distinct character of values and cultural settings; Smith's (1991) cultural policy; Kellas' (1991) official nationalism characteristic.

In the relationship between nationalism/patriotism and global awareness, "global awareness" was accorded a higher ranking in Hong Kong compared to "national identity and patriotism". (p 212) It is largely due to the past background of Hong Kong as a British colony where citizenship education and national identity were undermined. It also suggests that while most of the Asian countries give priority on the national theme in values education, the global theme is given less

emphasis. In this aspect, the national and global themes in values education "appear to be competing concepts" (p 212). Respondents ranked global awareness higher than national identity and patriotism. The reasons given included "the importance of global citizenship; interrelationships between the individual and the world; betterment of human kind; importance of global view; and that patriotism is seen as a narrow perspective" (p 214). Thus the importance attached to national and civic values is quite low in Hong Kong. A clear trend that is revealed in this study is the focus on individual well-being. (Lee, 2001).

Lee (2001) had argued that the self as a center of relationship and self-cultivation can be regarded as a fundamental quality for effective citizenship, and that self-realization and collective realization are not dichotomized but mutually reinforcing.

"Some societies place strong emphasis on individualism, while others collectivism. However, the two are not necessarily dichotomized and mutually exclusive. On the contrary, there are subtle relationships between them. In societies where individualism is more obviously values, the significance of common interest, common will and common good is also valued. Likewise, in societies where collectivism seems to be dominant, there are various extent of respect for individuality,

and self-realization is seen as best achieved through collective realization. In the Chinese tradition, even though collectivism has been a dominant social value, self has been seen as the starting point of civic values ...”

(Curriculum Development Council, 1996, p 15, “Self Realization and Common Good” in Lee (2001)

With the shift to a multidimensional citizenship framework for Hong Kong in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the values have likewise indicated a paradigm shift from that of the individual to that of the public and world or international view. For example the four dimensions that comprise multidimensional citizenship education are the personal, social, spatial and temporal. (Grossman, 2000).

This shift to the global dimension supports the Subjective/Objective/Globalised National Identity classification for Hong Kong as discussed in chapter 3.4.2.

In the Consultation Document of *Learning to Learn* (2000, 37), “the enhancement of values is given high priority and moral and civic education is the top most to be developed”. (Education Reform, 2003) stated that the Curriculum Development of Council (CDC) has set out “seven learning goals that students should achieve in 10 years’ time” (p 10). One of the goals includes “national identity”. The central task is “moral and civic education” which helps to promote other key tasks of



reading to learn, project learning and information technology for interactive learning. In the *Learning to Learn* (2000, 18) document, it is expressed that students will be able to “understand their national identity and be committed to contributing to the nation and society”.

Here the interpretation of national identity in the curriculum is with reference to China as their nation or country and Hong Kong as their society. This concept of nation-building supports Cameron’s (1999) characterization of national identity in political entity with the example of German Democratic Republic being absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany.

Where values and attitudes are concerned, “national identity, a positive spirit, perseverance, respect for others and commitment to society and nation are the five values and attitudes considered paramount to students’ personal development for moral and civic education during the phase of 2001-2002 and 2005-2006” (*Learning to Learn*, Sep 2004, chap 4: Key Messages About Moral and Civic Education). Moral and civic education is one of the five essential learning experiences required for whole-person development and is important in helping them build positive values and attitudes. A holistic coverage of moral and civic education include other issues related to value development like “sex education, environmental protection, media education, religious education, ethics and healthy living”. (*Learning to Learn*, Sep 2004, chap 4) The approach is learner-focused. Students are given opportunities to reflect on their values and

attitudes in their daily life. A set of core and sustaining values and attitudes for the personal and social dimensions are proposed for incorporation in the school curriculum (See Appendix 8.2 for details).

These values are imbibed in a learner-centred approach that is adopted in the selected 6 life events categorized under 6 themes that are relevant to the students. (See Appendix 8.3 for details of the events grouped under Personal Development and Healthy Living, Family Life, School Life, Social Life, Life at Work, Life in the Community). The life events have to be modified with reference to time change and social development and the content of the theme tailored to suit the needs of the students.

As the themes are developed along events that are relevant to the students, it is noted that the reconceptualised dimensions discussed by Grossman (2000) for Hong Kong on the personal, social, spatial and temporal dimensions have not been adequately developed in the current 6 themes - which still focus on the individual's more immediate and private spheres of citizenship education. What is discussed in policy reconception and what is eventually endorsed in curriculum practise is found to be different. In fact, the current themes stop at "Life in the Community", i.e. Hong Kong students relating to mainland China. The international perspective is not included.

The researcher surmises that while it appears desirable, forward looking and theoretically ideal to be heading in the direction of meeting the demands of 21<sup>st</sup>

century through multidimensional framework, it is still not practical to put it in practice, simply because the national identity with China has not been cemented yet, given its short period of about 8 years of reunification with mainland China.

It is observed that the events or themes suggested for a learner-approach study of the values are centred largely on the students' personal development, healthy living, family relationships, school life, even their social life and later on practical skills on working life. Only one theme is placed on life in the community where only five out of the 17 suggested events are directly related to the building of national identity with China (i.e. participating in National Flag hoisting ceremony; understanding and showing concern on major events in the mainland; visit to the mainland; supporting improvement project on education and living in the mainland; discussing current issues of local/national/international community). Even these five events are expressed quite generally.

These five suggested events related to the building of national identity supports Smith's (1991) cultural and social policy of myths, memories and symbols for social cohesion; Hroch's (1998) common origin and destiny; Kellas' (1991) culture factor in nation-building in chapter 3.4.2.

Contrast the events from Hong Kong with Singapore's highly prescriptive national values and ideology that are transmitted through National Education in the Civics and Moral Education syllabus. E.g. in the syllabus for the lower secondary level

for the theme on *Challenges Ahead*, the topic is on *Our Achievement*. The scope/events covered include Singapore's economic history from 1950s to 1990s; labour unrest due to communist infiltration in the trade unions; and factors that have contributed to the economic development of Singapore as a nation include visionary leaders like Lee Kuan Yew, Dr Goh Keng Swee.... Some of the values include pragmatism, adaptability, resourcefulness, confidence in the nation, visionary leadership, indomitable will, incorruptibility. (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Secondary*, 2000, 12).

The researcher surmises that the reason why Singapore's national values are more prescriptive could be due to the different political circumstances that surrounded the politicians during nation-building. In the early years of political transition e.g. in the 1967 speech by Lee Kuan Yew, Lee asserted the need for close guidance of the PAP government to overcome the imponderables as discussed in chapter 4.8a. Tung Chee Hwa, however was selected by the mainland government to head Hong Kong after the political transition; and he merely carried out his administrative duties to represent the Chinese government. It is likely that the Singapore Prime Ministers, especially Lee Kuan Yew, had greater stake and originality in expressing his political agenda in a critical time of early nation-building.

### 8.5 Comparison of Key Messages, Aims and Goals of Moral and Civic Education in Hong Kong and Singapore (Table 8.1)

| Hong Kong   | Singapore  |
|---|--|
| 1) To develop the whole person and help students build up positive values and attitudes for personal character and interpersonal skills   | 1) Primary school – to nurture whole and balanced person with strong moral values.<br>Secondary school – to nurture person of integrity who has the welfare and interests of nation in mind.<br>Junior colleges – to equip and motivate students to be future leaders of nation.                             |
| 2) Holistic perception of moral and civic education, covering issues related to value development, e.g. sex education, environmental protection, media education, religious education, ethics and healthy living.                         | 2) National Education is infused in Civics and Moral Education syllabus of the primary, secondary and junior college levels; and the Social Studies of Primary schools and Normal (Technical) lower secondary levels.  |
| 3) 5 paramount values and attitudes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- national identity</li> <li>- a positive spirit</li> <li>- perseverance</li> <li>- respect for others</li> <li>- commitment to society and nation</li> </ul> | 3) 5 paramount values and attitudes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- national identity</li> <li>- appreciating and coping with vulnerabilities and constraints</li> <li>- Our Shared Values and Singapore Family Values</li> <li>- meeting challenges ahead</li> <li>- Leadership values</li> </ul> |
| 4) In schools – the principals and teachers to act as important facilitators in students' value formation.  | 4) For primary and secondary schools, the "adults" to set examples and also the operation of the school as a social system.  |
| 5) Learner-focus : students reflect on their values and attitudes using relevant daily life events  | 5) Content and teacher-focus : students learn values that are built from self to the nation.   |

Source : Hong Kong - (Learning to Learn, Sep 2004) Curriculum Development Council; Singapore - (Civics and Moral Education Syllabus Primary & Secondary, Civics syllabus Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes, 2000)

Both Hong Kong and Singapore seek to develop the whole person in personal character, interpersonal skills with positive and strong moral values from the family, to the school and the community in the primary and secondary schools. In Singapore, the call to heed the interests of the nation is much stronger in the secondary and junior college levels. Junior college students in Singapore are not taught moral values but only civic leadership values that will prepare them to serve as future leaders of the PAP government and nation. It is a form of hegemonic power to act as a mechanism for the political control of knowledge (Apple, 1993) for the purpose of political renewal, official nationalism and political elite factors in nation-building. (Kellas, 1991).

There is greater breadth of coverage in the holistic perception of Hong Kong's syllabus that has a range of different issues, including social, political, religious and even media issues. This variety is not found in Singapore, which has National Education through the *Singapore Story*, a myth of nationhood discussed in chapter 4.4 to help build national identity.

In the five paramount values selected for students' personal development by Hong Kong's Education and Manpower Bureau for 2001-2006, three of the values (i.e. a positive spirit, perseverance, respect for others) are values that the researcher classifies as specific for individual growth and development; and two (i.e. national identity, commitment to society and nation) are values designed for the nation (See chapter 8.6 for details)

For Singapore, the five important values have been culled by the researcher from the primary school to junior college syllabus. These values are largely values designed for the nation. Our Shared Values have been crafted by Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1988 to incorporate elements of Singapore's cultural heritage with attitudes and values that have helped Singapore survive as a nation. It is meant as a blueprint for national ideology.

Both Hong Kong and Singapore expect the teachers and principals to be exemplary models of moral behaviour for their students so that the school climate is conducive for imbuing the values learnt.

In comparing the Singapore themes with those of Hong Kong, the element that is missing in the Singapore syllabus is the provision by Hong Kong for "learning in real contexts, and experiential learning that cannot be provided by classroom learning, especially in moral and civic education curriculum" (Learning to Learn, Sep 2004, chap 4:11) through a life event approach. This life event approach helps to generate students' ownership and inspire them to understand events related to their daily life and reflect on values and attitudes learnt. It is a learner-centred approach that equips students in their personal and social development and thus is more meaningful in the experiential sense in contrast to Singapore's themes that are more prescribed, content-based, and more teacher-focused.

### 8.6 Comparison of Civics and Moral Education Themes in Singapore and Hong Kong

The five themes in the Singapore secondary syllabus (See table 8.2 below) correspond closely to the 5 themes of the Singapore primary school syllabus except that the "school" component in primary school is replaced with "challenges ahead" in the secondary syllabus. While school life is viewed as important in the primary school, the secondary syllabus moves on from family relationships to community spirit and prepares the students to handle challenges posed by globalisation.

(Table 8.2) Comparison of Civic and Moral Education Themes in Singapore and Hong Kong

| Themes in Primary school syllabus (Singapore)<br>5 E's –<br>Example, Explanation, Exhortation, Environment Experience | Themes in Secondary school syllabus (Singapore)<br><br>National Education Messages Infused | Themes in Primary and Secondary School Syllabus (Hong Kong)<br><br>Life Event Approach |
|---|--|--|
| Self  | Character Building   | Personal Development & Healthy Living  |
| Family  | Family Relationships   | Family Life  |
| School  | Community Spirit   | School Life  |
| Society   | Our Nation, Our Heritage   | Social Life  |
| Nation  | Challenges Ahead   | Life at Work   |
|   |  | Life in the Community  |

In Singapore's Primary schools, where the structures for implementation include the 5 E's (i.e. Example – where adults serve as exemplary roles; Explanation – Teachers give reasons for moral principles; Exhortation – Teachers remind students to practise the values; Environment – climate of the school reinforce CME lessons; Experience – opportunities created for students to undertake



responsibilities), (Curriculum Planning and Development Division, *Civics and Moral Education Syllabus, Primary*, 2000, 7).

It is still less learner-centred because the focus is still much reliant on the teacher to set example, remind students and create opportunities in school. It is too dependent on the teacher to drive the CME lessons and does not relate to the students' daily practical living outside of school.

Hong Kong's life events approach has personal themes like "permanent teething, entering puberty, self caring, developing good habits, using pocket money that are directly relevant to the primary school student's personal social and adolescent needs. Emotional needs like managing emotions, handling sexual harassment, facing serious illness/death" (Learning to Learn, Sep (2004); see Appendix 8.3 for details) also help students develop right attitudes towards coping with possible real life stressful conditions.

The social life aspect would be interesting to the students as they include and grapple with "handling undesirable peer pressures, going out with friends of opposite sex, being in love/lovelorn". Life at work includes the values upon "taking up a summer job, meeting requirements of work and facing work pressure". (Learning to Learn, Sep (2004); see Appendix 8.3 for details). These issues are relevant to the students in Hong Kong and it makes the lessons more interesting as they are directed to their immediate situational and affective needs.

In contrast, Singapore's themes are based more on the national political agenda for the students. Even the family values promoted are Singapore Family Values that are perceived to be good for all the races.

### **8.7 Comparison of Individual-Growth versus Nation-Building/National Identity Values in Singapore and Hong Kong**

The core, sustaining values and attitudes for the individual are much more general and centred on the development of the self (e.g. "sanctity of life, self-esteem, kindness, common good, appreciative, with some focus on the nation ("patriotism, culture and civilization, sense of belonging, fair play, rule of law") for Hong Kong. (Learning to Learn, Sep (2004); see Appendix 8.2 for details)

Thomas (2002, 243) presents the nature of "Individualism-Collectivism" perspectives of values to citizenship education. In a collective society, where there is "sharing of knowledge, skills and materials, and a strong measure of conformity", people tend to treat the society as collective, e.g. China, Singapore or Hong Kong. In contrast, the individualist pursues his or her own goals, makes decisions as far as possible, independent of a group and the wider society. E.g. in the United States. In countries like Singapore and Taiwan, "notions like national identity, social cohesion and societal cooperation" are commonly promoted in civics programmes (Thomas, 2002, 245). The recent emphasis on National Education places emphasis on nationhood rather than individualistic features like democratic freedom and rights of individuals. In Hong Kong, before

and after the handover to China, a strong collectivist theme runs through the civic curriculum where care and duty towards the family, neighbourhood and society is important. It has been a long held view that in Singapore and Hong Kong, individualism is subjected to the “collective will” (Thomas, 2002, 245), even with the growing influence of global culture.

The researcher would like to modify and extend the concept of Thomas’ concept of Individualism-Collectivism perspectives to values that are classified as “Individual Growth - Nation Building/National Identity” perspectives. Individual Growth refers to values that are taught to help the individuals grow in character development specific to the self. Nation-building/National Identity perspectives refer to the values that are cultivated to strengthen national identity with the state for Singapore and China for Hong Kong.

The researcher counted a total of 43 or 57% core and sustaining values and attitudes specific for the individual growth and development compared with 32 or 43% core and sustaining social values and attitudes designed for the nation (See Appendix 8.4 for details and Table 8.3 for summary of values). This result indicates that the Hong Kong syllabus on the teaching of values for moral and civic education does seek to develop the whole person, personal character and interpersonal skills.

However the focus of values on citizenship education in Singapore is still very much on the Singapore PAP ideology, values and internal scene or Intranational Identity (Teo, 2005). The researcher counted a total of 54 or 54% values that are specific to self and family growth compared with 47 or 46% values that are designed for national identity and nation-building in the primary school Civics and Moral education syllabus (See Appendix 8.5 for details). In the secondary school, a higher proportion of 106 or 80% values are designed for national identity and nation-building compared to only 27 or 20% values for personal character and family development (See Appendix 8.6 for details). The junior colleges and centralized institutes see the highest proportion of national identity values with 103 or 86% values for nation-building and only 17 or 14% values for personal character (See Appendix 8.7 for details). It is due to the fact that the junior colleges' focus is on leadership development for the nation. In the primary school, a foundation has to be laid for self growth, family and school before they could identify with the nation. Even then the percentage is still higher than that of Hong Kong by 14% for nation-building values. The secondary school in Singapore sees a significantly high proportion of more than three quarters of the values designed to for national identity and nation-building. The aggregate percentage of national identity or nation-building values for Singapore for primary to junior college levels is 72% and 28% for personal character development values.

This emphasis on national identity and nation-building came in the wake of the need to promote National Education in the moral and civics programmes in the schools with hidden values and attitudes (Giroux, 1988) to reassert ideology and national identity (Goodson, 1998); more so for Singapore than Hong Kong.

**(Table 8.3) Comparison of Individual-Growth and Nation-Building/National Identity Values in Civic and Moral Education Syllabus in Singapore and Hong Kong**

| Country   | Individual-Growth Values % | Nation-Building Values % | Total Percentage |
|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| Hong Kong<br>Life event approach for all levels | 57%                        | 43%                      | 100%             |
| Singapore<br>Primary Level                      | 54%                        | 46%                      | 100%             |
| Singapore<br>Secondary                          | 80%                        | 20%                      | 100%             |
| Singapore Junior colleges                       | 72%                        | 28%                      | 100%             |
| Aggregate for Hong Kong                         | 57%                        | 43%                      | 100%             |
| Aggregate for Singapore                         | 72%                        | 28%                      | 100%             |

**8.8 Comparison of Direct National Identity Components of Citizenship Education in Hong Kong and Singapore**

The components of the Hong Kong citizenship education that directly promotes national identity can be found in the teaching of Chinese history through General Studies for primary school Personal Social and Humanities Education (PSHE) with strand 5: National Identity and Chinese Culture, and Chinese History is taught at all the secondary levels (junior to senior). The appreciation of Chinese

culture for promoting national identity is studied in Key Learning Areas and also in moral and civic education.

This emphasis on Chinese cultural heritage had been stressed by Tung Chee Hwa in his Policy Address speeches on nation-building with China, discussed in chapter 5.5. It also corresponds to Smith's (1991) cultural policy, Hroch's (1998) common origin and destiny, Hasting's (1997) ethnicity, Kellas' (1991) cultural factor for nation-building.

In Singapore, national identity is taught through National Education infused in CME and Social Studies. The table below gives a comparison of the objectives and core elements

**Table 8.4 Comparison of National Identity Components of Citizenship Education in Hong Kong and Singapore**

| Hong Kong<br>National Identity and Chinese Culture   | Singapore<br>National Education   |
|--|---|
| <b>1) Learning Objectives</b><br>To have knowledge and understanding of national symbols, territory of China, customs, culture, ancient Chinese civilization; national cities and national capital of China, significant historical figures, events; influences of Chinese culture on life of people in Hong Kong; and sustaining cultural heritage. | <b>Learning Objectives</b><br>1) To develop national cohesion, the instinct for survival and confidence in the future |
| 2a) To have skills to observe and compare Chinese people and people of other countries; identify national symbols; investigate features in Chinese culture; identify significant events in Chinese history to match with historical figures; differentiate cause and results   | 2) to equip them with basic attitudes, values and instincts that make them Singaporeans                               |
| 2b) To have skills to identify characteristics of ancient Chinese culture; compare past and present life; develop study plans for customs and traditions of Chinese culture; distinguish fact from opinion in current affairs.   | 3) to give them a common culture and shared perception of life  |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| 3a) To develop appreciation of contributions of people in the past, unique contributions of Chinese culture; cultural heritage; Chinese values; concern for people and events in China and be proud of one's national identity.  | 4) to give them faith in the country's future  |
| 3b) To develop interest in Chinese history, Chinese nation; concern for China's past, present and future; evidence, reasoning and interpretation of history; a sense of belonging and responsibility towards the nation.   | 5) to pass the DNA from one generation to another  |
| <b>Core Elements</b><br><b>4a) Key Stage One</b><br>National symbols, national capital, Chinese nation and characteristics of Chinese people<br><br>4b) Characteristics of Chinese culture e.g. Chinese surnames, customs<br><br>4c) Historical figures and stories that impact Chinese history (e.g. Confucius, Taming of the floods by Da Yu)<br><br>4d) Ancient Chinese civilization demonstrated by cultural heritage e.g. Great Wall of Qin Dynasty<br><br>4e) Special natural landscapes (e.g. Guilin, the Silk Road) and characteristics of human life (e.g. music, food)<br><br>4f) some major historical events that impact them today e.g. the Opium War<br><br>4g) interesting current affairs in China | <b>Core Elements</b><br>6a) To foster a sense of identity, pride and self-respect as Singaporeans<br><br>6b) knowing the Singapore story – how Singapore succeeded against the odds to become a nation<br><br>6c) understanding Singapore's unique challenges, constraints and vulnerabilities, which makes it different from other countries<br><br>6d) instilling the core values of their way of life, and the will to prevail, that ensures their continued success and well-being |
| 5) Chinese history is incorporated to enhance national identity in General Studies in the Primary school as a strand of "national identity and Chinese culture".<br>At secondary level Chinese history is a subject at senior secondary (Secondary 4-5) and sixth form (Secondary 6-7).  | 7) National Education is infused in Civics and Moral Education syllabus for primary, secondary and junior college levels. National Education is also included in Social Studies at primary and lower secondary Normal (Technical) levels.  |
| 6) Chinese culture is infused into Key Learning Areas and promotes national identity with China  |  |

Source: Hong Kong : (Curriculum Development Council - *General Studies for Primary Schools*, 2001, 39-42)

Singapore : (Lee Hsien Loong - *The Launch of National Education*, 1997)

In comparing the learning objectives and the core elements of this affective domain in building national identity, it is noted that Singapore is more singular and specific in its objective of promoting the political ideology and agenda of nurturing the survival instinct, with singleness of purpose to ensure that there is continual survival in the future. The only history that Singapore endorses is the *Singapore Story* that is essentially the early political and economic struggles faced by the PAP government and there is no alternative version or interpretation of this history. Singaporeans are to learn it as enshrined in the syllabus so that the following generations in the globalisation era can be convinced of the perpetual need for survival. The objective of giving them “a common culture” is different from the Chinese culture. Here, Singapore does not have a Singaporean culture as such, but the researcher believes it refers to the culture of a shared vision of social cohesion that will “draw them closer together as one people when confronted with serious problems” (Lee H L, 1997). Thus there is no cultural element involved. It is mainly political in nature and the objectives and core elements serve as Objective/Globalised National Identity category discussed in Chapter 3.5.1

In contrast, there is greater breath and scope of coverage for Hong Kong. Hong Kong appears to have more to offer in terms of history (because the existence of China dates back thousands of years ago, and even some of the early Singapore



pioneers actually came from China), geography (where natural landscapes and territory are concerned because of the sheer size), and the richness of ancient Chinese civilization culture. There is comparison of the past and present, the current affairs and the areas covered are quite general. There is also room for the interpretation of history which is not found in Singapore's syllabus. With the political and cultural elements in the objectives and core elements for Hong Kong, it reflects the Objective/Subjective/Globalised National Identity category in Chapter 3.4.2

The syllabus in Singapore is found lacking in the cultural element as is evident in the Hong Kong syllabus. A comprehensive understanding and appreciation of Chinese culture is also important for the promotion of national identity and cultivation of commitment to enhance the well-being of China. A historical and geographical background for the development of Chinese culture such as art, music, science and technological developments will be studied in the Key Learning Areas, and also in moral and civic education as important experiences in school life. Schools organize such visits as co-curricular activities or cross-curricular projects. These visits provide a rich learning environment where positive attitudes and values conducive to a strong sense of national identity can be nurtured.

An example of such a visit is the 2003 China Fortnight held between September 23<sup>rd</sup> and October 3<sup>rd</sup> , with a variety of activities including experiential learning through Golden Bauhinia Civic Education Trail, exhibitions, seminars, sharing

sessions and performances. Wong Yuk-san (2003), chairman of the Curriculum Development Council highlighted that among the key values and attitudes, the promotion of national identity had been accorded high priority. The welcomed Moral and Civic Education Grant of \$10,000 yearly to incorporate national education into the moral and civic education by the Education Bureau will help to fund and strengthen national education in schools.

The following examples of Chinese culture are infused into the Key Learning Areas:

| <i>Key Learning Areas</i>   | <i>Examples of Chinese Culture</i>                     |
|---|--|
| Chinese   | Language, literature                                   |
| English   | Chinese culture in the eyes of the western media       |
| Mathematics   | Stories of Chinese mathematicians                      |
| Science   | Scientific and technological invention and development |
| Technology  |  |
| PSHE  | History, geography, economics, political systems       |
| Arts  | Art, music, etiquette                                  |
| Physical education  | Sports and achievements                                |
| (Curriculum Development Council, 2000, <i>Learning to Learn</i> , 43) |  |

The infusion of Chinese culture is comprehensive and pervasive in all the key subjects. The Council Development Council (2000) consultation document reported that this experiential method of appreciation of Chinese culture is a good way of building national identity. China has a rich history and culture that spans thousands of years and though Singapore has a short history that is built into the National Education programme, Singapore as a young nation, does not have such a rich culture to bestow on the current generation in nation-building. In fact, Thomas (2002, ) astutely observed that the Chinese culture has been

subtly used as “a gloss” to promote “Chinese national identity, which is a strong cultural notion, is the ultimate goal for the future of Hong Kong's young citizens”. (Thomas, 2002, 247).

Thus the researcher reaffirms that citizenship education in Hong Kong belongs to the Objective/Subjective/Globalised National identity category as discussed in chapter 3.4.2.

## **Chapter 9 Conclusion**

### **9.1 Conclusion - Overview**

Using the historical-comparative framework developed from theories of past historians and comparative educationists, this dissertation has compared the theories of nationalism, nation-state, national identity to provide a basis for the understanding of political, economic and social factors that impact nation-building and the evolvement of citizenship education in Singapore and Hong Kong after the British colonial rule. These factors are also encapsulated by politicians and their political ideologies expressed through public speeches. When examined, these speeches provide cues on how the ideologies are formed and also translated into national values for citizenship education.

The historical-comparative approach allows for a qualitative analysis of comparison of both Singapore and Hong Kong in the past; links it with the present demands, and future expectations of the challenges of globalisation faced by them.

### **9.2 Recapitulating Theories of Nationalism and its Impact on Political Circumstances**

The theories of nationalism examined reveal the types of nation-states are predominantly either Objective, Subjective; a combination of Objective/Subjective nations or the Globalised nations. Singapore has been found to exist as an

Objective/Globalised nation with parallel Objective/Globalised National Identity as discussed in Chapter 3.5.1

Hong Kong, on the other hand, is found to have a combination of Objective/Subjective/Globalised National Identity, because of its cultural heritage inherited from China, the desire to be the best Asian City and also to keep up with the global demands.

The changes made in citizenship education hinge on or dovetail with the political agenda that suits the contexts of the political circumstances. Eventually the course of development of citizenship education is a reflection of the macro agenda of the political ideologies that are propounded by the ruling government, especially for Singapore, a nation-state that sought to eke out its own existence from the very moment of its reluctant birth at independence in 1965.

Hong Kong thrives on a different set of political circumstances although both societies were once British colonies. It is due to the fact that Hong Kong's "independent birth", unlike that of Singapore, has an "umbilical cord" that is still and will be perpetually tied to its motherland China since the British colonial rule handed Hong Kong over to China in 1997. Thus it was never given its own autonomy or allowed to develop its own national identity. National identity for Hong Kong is tied up with its alliance, allegiance and symbiotic economic relationship with China. There is also the cultural heritage that binds Hong Kong

to China. What Hong Kong has for itself is a regional identity that is subsumed under the national identity of China.

### **9.3 Recapitulating Analysis of Citizenship Education**

Citizenship education is a highly political agenda, especially for nations that have just gained independence, after being colonized for a period of history, by the British rule in the case of Singapore and Hong Kong.

In analysing the purposes and debate on who should choose the purposes and contents for citizenship education for Hong Kong and Singapore, it was evident that politicians and governments have an immediate stake and control in the crafting of the focus or lack of focus of the political content. It was noted too that political circumstances, economic reasons, social contexts and globalisation challenges drive the purposes of the evolvement of the citizenship education in both societies as discussed in chapter 7.

The researcher is aware that this list of purposes is not exhaustive, but it is the start of a new perspective of examining how citizenship education is shaped by a more holistic birds' eye view of the country's economic, political needs, social contexts and the ultimate political agenda. This approach has not been attempted by past historians or comparative educationists.

In fact by appreciating the background of the political, economic and social circumstances, it serves as a guiding compass in locating the direction of the

focus of the goals, themes, messages and values of organic changes made to the citizenship education in the respective societies.

Singapore is a case in point where direct and explicit government values of the ruling Peoples' Action Party (PAP) are infused through National Education into the Civic and Moral Education and Social Studies syllabi from Primary to Junior College levels. All Singapore students need to know the *Singapore Story*, basically a mythical historical account of the struggles of PAP in nation-building. The instinctual need to survive and fend for herself is a strong cord that binds the National Education theme and it is highly prescriptive.

In contrast, Hong Kong has greater breath of coverage in its citizenship education syllabus. In terms of history, reference is made to China history that dates back thousands of years ago. There is room for interpretation of the history content as the students are allowed to think critically. Hong Kong's infusion of the cultural heritage of China is a parallel version of Singapore's infusion of National Education in citizenship education. Rich cultural elements of China are infused into all Key Learning Areas in Hong Kong to help build national identity with China.

Moreover the Life Event Approach of the Civic and Moral Education curriculum provides for a more authentic, realistic, relevant and makes for more interesting

lessons. It is more learner-centred and the values learnt help more with their individual growth and development compared to Singapore.

#### **9.4 Redefining Citizenship Education**

To conclude, the researcher would like to offer some reflections on citizenship education.

9.4.1 First, she would like to propose that in analyzing the evolvement of citizenship education for new nations, researchers should not only concentrate on the present content of the curriculum or the current findings of the implementation of curriculum concerned. Citizenship education is a political agenda, and especially more so for emerging nations with changing political circumstances.

9.4.2 Findings of the dissertation have revealed that the political, economic and social contexts have direct bearings on the impact in which citizenship education is shaped in a society. These macro factors are important considerations to be weighed when studies are conducted on how citizenship education has arrived at the time of study.

9.4.3 Key defining speeches by significant politicians (e.g. Lee Kuan Yew in his 1967 National Day speech to Singaporeans on nation-building) can be revealing in their message on how a politician can successfully persuade the citizens of the nation to imbibe political ideologies that are to become



part of the political heritage of nation-building and national identity. Researchers should be on the alert on how the ruling government crafts its nation-building tenets as it has direct links and transference on how the schools also embrace the values caught by the public.

9.4.4 Post-colonial politicians from Singapore and Hong Kong make annual National Day and Policy Address public speeches; and theorise political ideologies on nationalism, nation-building and building national identity for their country and region respectively. The ideologies mirror their political agenda. These ideologies are derived from past, existing, and with a view to future political, economic and social factors; and are then translated into national values for citizenship education in its evolving forms to help build national identity. There is a direct link from the ideologies perpetuated and the values transmitted into the public education for nation-building.

9.4.5 While some of the characteristics of nation and national identity proposed by the politicians correspond to some of the academic theories on nationalism, nation-building and national identity; not all the data on politicians' political agenda and theories can be accounted for by academic theories. The politicians' ideologies are politically motivated, unique to their circumstances, and thus may not fully match the academic theories.

9.4.6 What distinguishes Hong Kong from Singapore in its category of nationalism is the combination of Objective/Subjective/Globalised National Identity, where Hong Kong has the richness of the element of cultural/"subjective" heritage from China infused into the curriculum. Especially for the young in school, this element of culture will be a strong marker of national identity with China as it is acknowledged to be a powerful tool in enhancing the bonds between Hong Kong and China. Thus studies on citizenship education for new nations should consider if there is any hidden agenda of cultural elements that can be naturalized to become a part of national life in future.

9.4.7 More work on this type of macro and micro-analysis of the evolvement of citizenship education could be embarked by researchers in the future to validate if the political, economic and social factors have direct impact on the citizenship education curriculum. In particular, examining the politicians' public speeches can throw light into grasping the political ideologies and theoretical statements that are propagated at the community, and the public education levels. The researcher believes that such a fresh approach can give new meaning to the understanding of the direction of the future of citizenship education.

## **9.5 Limitations of Research**

The researcher would also like to discuss the limitations of the research.

9.5.1 Despite the attempts made to uncover as many documents as possible within the researcher's confine of time, space and finances afforded, the researcher could not afford to go to Hong Kong to retrieve some important documents not available in Singapore. However the researcher was fortunate to have liaised with a lecturer in Hong Kong who obliged in sending relevant documents. Most of the other primary sources of information from Hong Kong are obtained from government websites and the libraries. Although this source of approach was the researcher's best alternative to visiting Hong Kong, it had its limitations. Compared to a relatively wider coverage of primary sources of information uncovered for Singapore, it would have been even more comprehensive for the study if the researcher could have afforded the time and expenses to visit Hong Kong for a period of time to undertake this study. Perhaps an attachment to the Hong Kong Institute of Education for a period of half a year would have yielded more insight into their citizenship education curriculum and the macro factors affecting citizenship education.

9.5.2 The researcher's focus on citizenship education centred on the scope of coverage in the syllabi for both Singapore and Hong Kong. No attempt was made to carry out empirical work of any nature on the responses to the citizenship curriculum. Future researchers could look into conducting

interviews with education officials, school teachers and students concerned, to examine the implementation of the curriculum in practice. These interviews could then throw some light on whether citizenship education can effectively contribute to nation-building for Singapore and Hong Kong.

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## **Appendices**

### **Appendix 3.1**

#### **Chew Seen Kong's (1969) Findings of "Singaporean National Identity"**

1. 90% of the respondents called themselves Singaporeans;
2. 74% preferred being called Singaporeans rather than Chinese, Malays, Indians, Eurasians, or other ethnicity.
3. 80% had seen or heard three or more of Singapore's symbols of nationhood: National Day, National Anthem, National Flag, the President, and Prime Minister;
4. 58% were correct in describing, naming, or dating three or more of these five national symbols;
5. 64% expressed good feelings towards three or more of these symbols;
6. 75% expressed good feelings towards two or more of Singapore's three prideful symbols of national development – Jurong industries, community centers, and HDB flats;
7. 48% considered that separation from Malaysia in 1965 was good for Singapore; and
8. 74% professed willingness to fight and die for Singapore.

## Appendix 4.1

### **Transcript of Speech by the Prime Minister at the Joint Alexandra and Queenstown Community Centres' National Day Celebrations on 15<sup>th</sup> August 1967.**

Para     Mr Chairman, Friends and Fellow-citizens,

1        I think in the midst of our festivities we should sit back and ask ourselves what kind of future we will be giving to the young children we have brought into this world. What will happen in 1975? What kind of Asia will it be, what kind of world will it be in 1985, 20 years from now?

2        And the answer very frankly is: nobody knows because there are too many factors, too many imponderables. But one thing I can tell you for certain: that if we don't organize ourselves and anticipate quite a number of the problems which we know are coming, then whatever else may happen to the rest of the world, there will be a lot of unhappiness for the children that we have brought into Singapore.

3        There are very few countries in Asia and probable fewer in Africa that have got independence since the war who, as a people – not as leaders, not as ministers, not as generals, but as people – have done better than what they were doing before, when they were governed by



the white man, whether it was the British, the French or the Belgians.

4        Why is this so? I have asked myself this many times. And as I travel through parts of Africa and Asia, I try to formulate the reasons why this has happened. There are many reasons. The simplest one is this. Because somebody with a superior organization structure, a superior civilization, a superior technology came, whether to Asia or Africa and built up the apparatus of a modern state – the government, governors, officers all down the line, tax gatherers, laws to see that you can order your activities accordingly, law courts, police enforcement, public cleansing, some form of education – it does not mean that therefore you can automatically just take over, that when the colonial governor goes out, you can walk in and put on all the plumes and uniform and things will go on just as before. It is not true.

5        First, the people together must have the will to be a nation. And what has happened in the Congo and in parts of Africa like Nigeria where there is a civil war, goes to show that when a superior group captures a chunk of territory with many races and many tribes and many cultures, and sets up one administration, it does not mean that the people comprised in that territory can just take over.

6        This is our first problem.: the will to be a nation. That we must have. If

you and I are so many individuals, here just because our forefathers came here to make money and we got left behind, and we continue to be just so many individuals without the will, the collective will to assert our right to be ourselves, then we must perish. Somebody will come in, smack us down in the face, take over and say, "Well, I like your house, you had better put up an attap shed; I will take this over". This is what happened when the Japanese Imperial Army came here. And we must never assume that these things cannot happen again.

7        How do we express this will? How does a nation express this will? In some countries there is no such thing as the will of a people because it is confused. There is no means of expressing that will. It is just one chaotic mess. Is there such a will today in the Congo or in Nigeria? If so, who represents that will?

8        I tell you what happens in an established country, whether it is Japan, China, Britain, France, Russia or America. There is always a hard core of people who represent that will, people whose instinctive reflexes are those of the national interests. You must have that. De Gaulle has that. That is why he has made France once again a strong and self-respecting nation. He and the French leaders with him have got that will. And that will does represent the majority of Frenchmen. And even a new country like America with only 200 years of history, as an

independent nation starting with migrants, like us, and with no roots there have this hard core. Not one of us tonight can trace our history beyond 148 years. Because when Stamford Raffles came here 148 years ago, there were only a 150 people here. And there are not many of us who can trace ourselves back to the 150 people. So is there that will?

- 9      America, in 200 years, have thrown up a leadership, a hardcore. I am not saying it is good or bad. But the fact is they have such a group. They have the Roosevelts, the Kennedys, the Rockfellers, their labour union leaders in the AFLCIO, their intelligentsia in the universities – people who are all the time calculating on the abacus or on the computer in the national interests. The Japanese have it, too. They had their Zaibatsus, executives of the big combines. They ran big empires up in Korea, Manchuria, down in Taiwan and stretched into Southeast Asia. They were defeated but they have come up. And deep down inside, there is a hard will in all Japanese to be a strong nation. This is the first thing we must have. It took many years for this feeling to jell, but it is jelling now.

- 10      Tonight, the people around me on the stage represent that embryonic will of a people. These things cannot happen just doing nothing. We cannot just all sit back and say, "Oh, let us all be happy, let us

celebrate." How do we celebrate? What are the forms, the styles, the idiom? Who gives joy articulation? In Singapore, at the top, it is about 200 people. And at the grass roots another 2,000. If you can kill the 200 on the top and the 2000 on the ground in one blow you will have destroyed Singapore. It is therefore, very fragile foundation. Over the years we must consolidate this will and the mechanics by which this will is able to express itself: we must institutionalize the various organs of leadership. If we have that leadership and that will in our whole community to be a nation, there is no problem which we cannot overcome.

- 11 Of course, there are many problems. In 1971, 15,000 people in the British Armed Services – civilians – will be unemployed, about half our citizens. We have to find new jobs for them. We have inherited this, and nothing can be done about it: 20 years ago, the birth rate was 44 per thousand, 4.4%, one of the highest in the world. So even though our industry expands, you still cannot create meaningful jobs for educated boys and girls now – which is worse, you know. If they are illiterate, all they do is to curse their bad luck. When they can add, subtract, read the newspapers they curse their leaders for not providing them with the jobs. So you get a sensitive situation. But, because they are educated they are also useful digits: they can be trained to do this, that and the other.

- 12 All this adds up very simply to one thing: have we got the will in the community to be a people and the leadership to give expression to that will. If we have, and our people have got the stuffing that is required to ride the kind of problems in a turbulent part of the world, then we begin to be a nation.
- 13 However bad Singapore may be from the ideal, it is a good deal better than anything you can get elsewhere in the region. Every month people are coming in, legally and illegally. Legally, in July with the first month of passport control, 2,400 people transferred their addresses from Malaya to Singapore. There must be a reason why they come here. True, 1,700 are Chinese. But there were also 550 Malays. These are facts. And every month the immigration Department collects about 300 illegal immigrants coming from Indonesia on a one-way motor-boat ride. Two hundred dollars to the outboard motor-man; he leaves you on the bench and you take your chances. When you are found, we now not only collect the passengers, lock them up, send them back: we also confiscate the outboard motor and the boat and sentence the boatman.
- 14 This is too exposed a situation. So we must have a tightly knit society, less exposed and more secure. To survive and keep standards up requires constant effort and organization. If you slacken, if you give up,

then the drains will clog up, traffic will snarl up, there will be flies, plague and pestilence.

15 In other parts of the world, when their pigs suffer from swine fever, they hush it up. They pretend they do not have it. Net result: all pigs get infected, the position becomes permanently chronic. We can do likewise. But we will become permanently a chronic society: sick. So when we get swine fever, we announce it, alert everyone, so that we can arrest the spread of the disease and bring back normalcy. This is what is required of this community: all the time, that push, that thrust to counter the natural sluggishness which this climate tends to build into our physical systems, and all that while, we must have an awareness of the realities of life.

16 We can build the industries. We have what sociologists call a highly "achievement-oriented" type of society. For every boy, every girl here, tonight, there are fathers and mothers egging them on to perform better than the other pupils in school. Not all societies have this. In many societies, they are quite happy just to sit down under the banyan tree and contemplate their navel. So when there is famine they just die quietly. Here, they will not die quietly. If there is no food they will do something, look for somebody, break open stores, do something, plant something, and if they have to die they die fighting for the right to live.

- 17 We have done well for two years, better than I have dared to expect two years ago. But, let us have a sober appraisal of the problems ahead. Only strong, effective administration, built on the will of a people to be a nation and the inspiration which that desire to succeed can give to a people, there is nothing which we cannot resolve, given a little time.
- 18 A good, striving, hardy people cannot be kept down. There are some Form IV or Form VI schoolboys doing their HSC listening to me tonight, and if it germinates in them, one day creativity from them can make a great deal of difference to our future lives.
- 19 In your own way, you have played an important role in community leadership. You must give this place that sense of purpose, that sense of direction, not just to your family, but also to your neighbours, your relatives, your friends, the whole community. Remember that all this is not possible if there has not been organized human endeavour.
- 20 To reduce the argument to the bone for a lot of people whose reflexes have always been that of individual survival: the migrant community suffers from this one disadvantage that having moved once from their ancestral homes, they are ready to move again if things got too difficult here. But the boys and girls who have been here have nowhere to go

to. Therefore, they have to stand up and fight. Therefore I think we will succeed because they have no choice, but to succeed.



## **Appendix 8.1**

### **Desired Outcomes of Education**

#### **At the end of primary school, pupils should:**

- be able to distinguish right from wrong.
- have learnt to share and put others first.
- be able to build friendships with others.
- have a lively curiosity about things.
- be able to think for and express themselves.
- take pride in their work.
- have cultivated healthy habits.
- love Singapore.

#### **At the end of secondary school, pupils should:**

- have moral integrity.
- have care and concern for others.
- be able to work in teams and value every contribution.
- be enterprising and innovative.
- possess a broad-based foundation for further education.
- believe in their ability.
- have an appreciation for aesthetics.
- know and believe in Singapore.

#### **At the end of junior college, students should:**

- be resilient and resolute.
- have a sound sense of social responsibility.
- understand what it takes to inspire and motivate others.
- have an entrepreneurial and creative spirit.
- be able to think independently and creatively.
- strive for excellence.
- have a zest for life.
- understand what it takes to lead Singapore.

## Appendix 8.2

### A Proposed Set of Values and Attitudes for Incorporation in the School Curriculum

#### Core Values: Personal

- sanctity of life
- truth
- aesthetics
- honesty
- human dignity
- rationality
- creativity
- courage
- liberty
- affectivity
- individuality

#### Sustaining Values: Personal

- self –esteem
- self-reflection
- self-discipline
- self-cultivation
- principled morality
- self-determination
- openness
- independence
- enterprise
- integrity
- simplicity
- sensitivity
- modesty
- perseverance

#### Core Values: Social

- equality
- kindness
- benevolence
- love
- freedom
- common good
- mutuality
- justice
- trust
- interdependence
- sustainability
- betterment of human kind

#### Sustaining Values: Social

- plurality
- due process of law
- democracy
- freedom and liberty
- common will
- patriotism
- tolerance
- equal opportunities
- culture and civilization
- heritage
- human rights and responsibilities
- rationality
- sense of belonging
- solidarity

## **Attitudes**

- optimistic
- participatory
- critical
- creative
- appreciative
- empathetic
- caring and concerned
- positive
- confident
- cooperative
- responsible
- adaptable to changes
- open-minded
- with a respect for
  - \* self
  - \* life
  - \* quality and excellence
  - \* evidence
  - \* fair play
  - \* rule of law
  - \* different ways of life, beliefs and opinions
  - \* the environment
- with a desire to learn
- diligent
- committed to core and sustaining values

It is believed that the development of the above values and attitudes, together with the strengthening of students' self-management and interpersonal skills, should enable them to make wise decisions on emerging issues in society and cope with stress and negative influences from various sources. Different Key Learning Areas have, in their contexts, included a range of learning objectives contributing to the development of these values and attitudes at key stages of learning. These learning objectives, however, are by no means implying that values and attitudinal developments should progress in the order of key stages. They are proposed to facilitate the planning of relevant learning experiences in or across the Key Learning Areas.

## **Appendix 8.3**

### **Suggested Themes and Life Events for Moral and Civic Education**

#### **1) Personal Development and Healthy Living**

- Permanent teething
- Entering puberty
- Self caring
- Selecting reading materials
- Developing good habits/getting rid of bad habits (e.g. environmental preservation/punctuality/balanced diet/eye protection/exercise and rest/personal and community hygiene)
- Developing interest/hobbies
- Dressing up oneself
- Using pocket money
- Managing personal finance (e.g. expenditure and saving)
- Facing media (reading newspaper and magazines, watching television, listening to radio programmes etc.)
- Surfing the internet
- Managing emotions
- Handling sexual harassment
- Facing serious illness/death
- Hurting oneself/committing suicide

#### **2) Family Life**

- showing love and concern to family members
- eating out with family
- teaching siblings doing homework
- doing housework
- celebrating birthday with family
- family outing
- having new family member(s)
- moving house

- being alone at home
- negotiating for self-independence from parents
- family member(s) being unemployed
- handling family disputes
- parents getting divorced
- facing illness/death of family member(s)

### **3) School Life**

- Adapting to new life in primary/secondary school
- Taking lunch in school
- Handling problems in studies
- Being praised/punished by teacher
- Serving teachers and school-mates
- Going on a school outdoor trip/picnic
- Making choice among different school activities
- Receiving the report card
- Attending tutorial lesson
- Having school holiday
- Participating in election activities of class association/Student Union/House Club
- Holding responsible post (e.g. monitor/monitress, prefect, posts in Student Union/House/Club)
- Choosing courses
- Promoting to a new class/repeating in the same class
- Graduation
- Preparing for public examinations
- Making choice between further study or work

### **4) Social Life**

- Making new friends
- Respecting different opinions and cultures

- Going out with friends of opposite sex
- Playing games
- Camping
- Participating in religious activities
- Attending feast
- Showing concern and helping classmates/friends (e.g. falling ill, poor academic results)
- Handling undesirable peer pressures (e.g. drug taking, smoking, engaging in law-breaking activities)
- Being in love/lovelorn
- Attending funeral

### **5) Life at Work**

- Striking a balance between part-time job and study
- Taking up a summer job
- Meeting requirements of work and facing work pressure
- Handling interpersonal relationship at work
- Being praised/reproached by supervisor
- Wearing uniform/choosing clothes for work
- Receiving salary
- Being injured during work

### **6) Life in the Community**

- Using public facilities (such as library, museum, park, swimming pool and beach)
- Riding on public transport
- Blood donation
- Responding to recycle campaign
- Helping neighbour/needy in society
- Participating in fund-raising activities
- Participating in voluntary work

- Participating in community activities
- Participating in public affairs discussion
- Participating in election activities
- Facing temptations and undesirable societal influences
- Expressing opinions on issues of social injustice
- Participating in National Flag hoisting ceremony
- Understanding and showing concern on major events in the mainland
- Visit to the mainland
- Supporting improvement project on education and living in the mainland
- Discussing current issues of local/national/international community.

## Appendix 8.4

### Individual Growth – Nation-Building/National Identity Values in Hong Kong School Curriculum

#### Individual Growth Values

##### Core Values: Personal

- sanctity of life
- truth
- aesthetics
- honesty
- human dignity
- rationality
- creativity
- courage
- liberty
- affectivity
- individuality

total = 11 values

##### Sustaining Values: Personal

- self –esteem
- self-reflection
- self-discipline
- self-cultivation
- principled morality
- self-determination
- openness
- independence
- enterprise
- integrity
- simplicity
- sensitivity
- modesty
- perseverance

total = 14 values

#### Nation Building/National Identity Values

##### Core Values: Social

- equality
- kindness
- benevolence
- love
- freedom
- common good
- mutuality
- justice
- trust
- interdependence
- sustainability
- betterment of human kind

total = 12 values

##### Sustaining Values: Social

- plurality
- due process of law
- democracy
- freedom and liberty
- common will
- patriotism
- tolerance
- equal opportunities
- culture and civilization
- heritage
- human rights and responsibilities
- rationality
- sense of belonging
- solidarity

total = 13 values



## Individual Growth Values

### Attitudes

- optimistic
- participatory
- critical
- creative
- appreciative
- empathetic
- caring and concerned
- positive
- confident
- cooperative
- responsible
- adaptable to changes
- open-minded
- with a respect for
  - \* self
  - \* life
- with a desire to learn
- diligent

total = 18 values

**Total = 43 or 57%**

## Nation Values

## Building/National Identity

### Attitudes

- \* quality and excellence
- \* evidence
- \* fair play
- \* rule of law
- \* different ways of life, beliefs and opinions
- \* the environment
- committed to core and sustaining values

total = 7 values

**Total = 32 or 43%**

## Appendix 8.5

### Individual Growth – Nation Building/National Identity Values in Singapore Primary School Curriculum

| Individual Growth Values                           |                              | Nation Building/National Identity Values         |                                      |
|--|------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| <b>Lower Primary: Character Building</b>           |                              | <b>Lower Family</b>                              | <b>Primary: Bonding with</b>         |
| - self-respect                                     |                              |  | - love and care*                     |
| - love for self                                    |                              |  | - filial responsibility*             |
| - responsibility                                   |                              |  | - communication with grandparents*   |
| - diligence  |                              |  | - communication with family members* |
| - commitment                                       |                              |  | - mutual respect*                    |
| - consideration                                    |                              | total  | = 5 values                           |
| - responsibility                                   |                              | * Singapore Family Values                        |                                      |
| - patience   |                              |  |                                      |
| - honesty  |                              |  |                                      |
| - trustworthiness                                  |                              |  |                                      |
| - respect  |                              |  |                                      |
| total = 11 values                                  |                              |  |                                      |
| <b>Lower Family</b>                                | <b>Primary: Bonding with</b> | <b>Lower Society</b>                             | <b>Primary: Being part of</b>        |
| - respect  |                              |  | - respect                            |
| - consideration for others                         |                              |  | - co-operation                       |
| - family unity                                     |                              |  | - civic responsibility               |
| total = 3 values                                   |                              |  | - justice                            |
|  |                              |  | - neighbourliness                    |
| <b>Lower Primary: Sense of Belonging to School</b> |                              |  | - respect for others                 |
| - respect for school                               |                              |  | - sensitivity                        |
| - pride in school                                  |                              | total  | = 8 values                           |
| - loyalty in school                                |                              |  |                                      |
| - care   |                              | <b>Lower Primary: National Pride and Loyalty</b> |                                      |
| - respect  |                              |  | - respect                            |
| - responsibility                                   |                              |  | - pride in nation                    |
| - graciousness                                     |                              |  | - loyalty                            |
| - spirit of sportsmanship                          |                              |  | - patriotism                         |
| - meritocracy                                      |                              | total  | = 4 values                           |
| total = 9 values                                   |                              |  |                                      |

**Upper Primary: Character Building**

- trust in self-worth
- responsibility
- diligence
- perseverance
- love for learning
- fairness
- objectivity
- moral courage
- integrity

total = 9 values

**Upper Primary: Bonding with Family**

- commitment\*
- communication\*
- mutual respect\*
- love, care and concern\*
- filial responsibility\*

total = 5 values

\* Singapore Family Values

**Upper Primary: Bonding with Family**

- family unity
- compassion
- consideration
- co-operation

total = 4 values

**Upper Primary: Being part of Society**

- consideration
- graciousness
- responsibility
- respect
- racial harmony
- respect
- care
- generosity
- commitment

total = 9 values

**Upper Primary: Sense of Belonging to School**

- loyalty to school
- pride in school
- responsibility
- respect
- consideration
- mutual support in accepting differences
- consensus, not conflict♥
- co-operation
- responsibility in team spirit
- commitment
- mutual support in team spirit

total = 11 values

**Upper Primary: National Pride and Loyalty**

- patriotism in nation
- responsibility
- sacrifice
- incorruptibility as citizen
- unity
- meritocracy in citizens
- fairness
- responsibility as a citizen
- equality
- sensitivity in constraints
- adaptability in constraints
- responsibility of human resources
- patriotism in defence
- preparedness
- confidence in our nation
- incorruptibility in leaders
- meritocracy in leaders

♥Our Shared Values

- adaptability in challenges
- creativity in challenges
- mutual understanding and respect in ASEAN nations and world
- sensitivity in ASEAN
- peace and stability in ASEAN and world
- harmony in ASEAN

total = 23 values

**Total = 47 or 46%**

**Total = 54 or 54%**

Appendix 8.6

Individual Growth – Nation Building/National Identity Values in Singapore  
Secondary School Curriculum

| Individual Growth Values           |  |                  | Nation Building/National Identity Values  |   |           |
|------------------------------------|--|------------------|---|---|-----------|
| Lower Building                     | Secondary:   | Character        | Lower Spirit (community involvement)  | Secondary:  | Community |
|                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- honesty</li><li>- moral courage</li><li>- fairness</li><li>- incorruptibility</li><li>- trustworthiness</li><li>- personal integrity</li><li>- trustworthiness</li><li>- character building</li><li>- mutual responsibility</li><li>- mutual respect</li><li>- empathy</li><li>- loyalty</li></ul> | in               |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- respect for others</li><li>- empathy</li><li>- respect for public property</li><li>- voluntarism</li></ul>                                  |           |
|                                    |  | in               | total   | = 4 values  |           |
| Lower Relationships (Family unity) | Secondary:   | Family           | Lower Relationships (Family identity)   | Secondary:  | Family    |
|                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- respect</li><li>- empathy</li></ul>  |                  |   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- love, care and concern*</li><li>- filial responsibility*</li><li>- mutual respect*</li><li>- commitment*</li><li>- communication*</li></ul> |           |
|                                    |  |                  | total   | = 5 values  |           |
|                                    |  |                  | * Singapore Family Values   |   |           |
|                                    |  | total = 2 values |   |   |           |
| Lower Spirit (School Community)    | Secondary:   | Community        | Lower Secondary: Our Nation, Our Heritage (Our Forefathers)   |   |           |
|                                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- pride in the school</li><li>- respect</li><li>- empathy</li><li>- cooperation</li><li>- accountability</li></ul>   |                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- risk-taking</li><li>- resilience</li><li>- fortitude</li><li>- pride in our heritage</li><li>- service to community</li></ul> |   |           |
|                                    |  |                  | total   | = 5 values  |           |
| total                              | = 5 values   |                  |   |   |           |

**Lower Secondary: Our Nation, Our Heritage (Ideals of Singapore/ Our Citizenship/ nation's defence)**

- peace
- prosperity
- progress
- justice
- equality
- democracy
- Our Shared Values
- loyalty
- responsibility
- love for the nation
- confidence in our defensibility
- preparedness for any eventuality
- commitment to our defence

Total = 13 values

**Lower Secondary: Challenges Ahead (Our Achievements)**

- pragmatism
- creativity
- adaptability
- resourcefulness
- confidence in the nation
- visionary leadership
- indomitable will
- stability
- consensus
- incorruptibility

total = 10 values

**Lower Secondary: Challenges Ahead (Ensuring Singapore's Continued Growth)**

- visionary leaders
- integrity
- incorruptibility
- meritocracy
- continual learning
- creativity

- law and order
- social cohesion
- excellence

total = 9 values

| Upper Building (Person) | Secondary: (Developing the Whole Person)  | Character Building (Lifelong Learning)  |
|-------------------------|---|---|
|                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- health</li> <li>- creativity</li> <li>- mental well-being</li> <li>- respect and empathy</li> <li>- integrity</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- survival</li> <li>- belief in oneself</li> <li>- adaptability</li> <li>- responsibility</li> <li>- creativity</li> <li>- resilience</li> <li>- hope</li> </ul> |
| total                   | = 5 values  | total = 7 values  |

| Upper Relationships (marriage and parenting) | Secondary: (Responsibilities in marriage and parenting)  | Upper Relationships (The Family and Society) | Secondary: (The Family and Society)   |
|--|--|--|---|
|  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- mutual respect</li> <li>- acceptance</li> <li>- commitment</li> <li>- responsibility</li> <li>- discipline</li> </ul> |  | <p><b>Singapore Family Values:*</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- love*</li> <li>- care and concern*</li> <li>- filial responsibility*</li> <li>- mutual respect*</li> <li>- commitment*</li> <li>- communication*</li> </ul> <p><b>Our Shared Values:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- nation before community and society above self</li> <li>- family as the basic unit of society</li> </ul> |
| total  | = 5 values   |  | total = 8 values  |

**Upper Secondary: Community Spirit (Unity in Diversity)**

- respect for others
- racial and religious harmony
- sensitivity
- social responsibility
- commitment

- common good

total = 6 values

**Upper Secondary: Community Spirit  
(Respecting the Elderly/  
Consideration for People with  
Special Needs)**

- empathy for elderly
- respect for elderly
- voluntarism for elderly
- empathy for people with needs
- care and concern for people with needs
- respect for people with needs
- voluntarism for people with needs

total = 7 values

**Upper Secondary: Our Nation, Our  
Heritage (Singapore Governmer.t/  
Electoral Process)**

- peace
- progress
- happiness
- justice
- democracy
- equality
- integrity
- responsibility
- incorruptibility
- meritocracy
- multi-racialism

total = 11 values

**Upper Secondary: Our Nation, Our  
Heritage (National Security/ Citizens  
and the law)**

- survival
- security
- mutual benefit
- interdependence



- responsibility
- law and order

total = 6 values

**Upper Secondary: Challenges Ahead (Developing a civic society/ Staying ahead)**

- graciousness
- love for the arts
- kindness
- pride in our nation
- confidence in our nation
- resilience
- risk-taking
- innovativeness
- continual learning
- optimism
- creativity
- excellence
- commitment
- foresight
- ruggedness

total = 15 values

**Total = 27 or 20% values**

**Total = 106 or 80% values**

## Appendix 8.7

### Individual Growth – Nation Building/National Identity Values in Singapore Junior Colleges and Centralised Institutes Curriculum

| Individual Growth Values   | Nation Building/National Identity Values  |
|--|---|
| <b>Leadership: Nature of Leadership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- responsibility</li> <li>- accountability</li> <li>- collaboration</li> <li>- continual learning</li> </ul> <p>total = 4 values</p>  | <b>Leadership : Nature of Leadership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- renewal</li> <li>- service</li> <li>- excellence</li> <li>- empowerment</li> <li>- consultation</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Leadership: Development of Leadership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- integrity</li> <li>- dynamism</li> <li>- empathy</li> <li>- creativity</li> <li>- collaboration</li> <li>- self-knowledge</li> <li>- continual learning</li> <li>- credibility</li> <li>- respect for others</li> <li>- teamwork</li> <li>- open-mindedness</li> <li>- commitment</li> <li>- moral courage</li> </ul> <p>total = 13 values</p> | <b>Leadership: Development of Leadership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- vision</li> <li>- expertise</li> <li>- excellence</li> <li>- positive interdependence</li> <li>- confidence</li> <li>- principle-centredness</li> </ul> <p>total = 6 values</p> |
|  | <b>Leadership: The Leadership Challenge in Singapore</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- vision</li> <li>- common good</li> <li>- meritocracy</li> <li>- incorruptibility</li> <li>- sacrifice</li> <li>- steadfastness</li> </ul> <p>total = 6 values</p>   |
|  | <b>Historical Perspective: Critical Milestones of Our Nation's History</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- self-reliance</li> <li>- national consciousness</li> <li>- moral courage</li> <li>- sensitivity</li> <li>- independence</li> </ul>                |

- equality
- multi-racialism
- sovereignty
- foresight
- pragmatism
- diplomacy
- loyalty
- growth
- dynamism
- indomitable will
- security
- social cohesion

total = 17 values

#### **Historical Perspective: Lessons from the Past**

- racial and religious harmony
- meritocracy
- equality
- discipline
- law and order
- indomitable will
- courage
- optimism
- tough-mindedness
- integrity

total = 10 values

#### **Current Situation: Singapore's System of Government**

- multi-racialism
- meritocracy
- incorruptibility
- consensus
- visionary leadership

total = 5 values

#### **Current Situation: Social Cohesiveness**

- Our Shared Values
- multi-racialism
- unity

- respect
- stability
- harmony

total = 6 values

**Current Situation: Understanding Policy-Making**

- growth
- pragmatism
- security
- social cohesion
- open-mindedness
- flexibility
- continual learning
- sensitivity

total = 8 values

**Current Situation: Singapore's Place in the Current World Situation**

- survival
- interdependence
- cooperation
- goodwill
- security

total = 5 values

**Future Scenarios: Future Challenges**

- courage
- vision
- foresight
- proactiveness
- instinct for survival
- astuteness
- sensitivity
- realism
- flexibility

total = 9 values

**Future Scenarios: Ensuring Singapore's Continued Success**

- loyalty

- security
- self-reliance
- independence
- interdependence
- peace
- internal stability
- cooperation
- adaptability
- continual learning
- excellence
- entrepreneurial spirit
- risk-taking
- innovativeness
- forward-looking
- integrity

total = 16 values

**Future Scenarios: Shaping  
Singapore's Destiny**

- empowerment
- open-mindedness
- love for the nation
- confidence in the nation
- civic responsibility
- risk-taking
- creativity
- proactiveness
- commitment
- service

total = 10 values

**Total = 17 or 14% Individual Total = 103 or 86% Nation  
Growth Values Building/National Identity Values**

